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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the idea of constitutionalisation of international law in 
light of concerns of fragmentation. It focuses on the dynamic of fragmentation in the 
international legal system. It shows that arguments about constitutionalism do not 
represent a remedy to the phenomenon of fragmentation. Consequently, the 
dissertation advances arguments of integrity of international law. Further, the 
dissertation examines new developments in constitutionalisation practices that 
support a normative, teleological approach to constitutionalisation in the 
international legal system. The dissertation offers insights on both the autonomy of 
the concept of international constitutionalism and the idea of fragmentation as a 
universally recognised characteristic of modern international law. It offers 
recommendations on how to address charges of fragmentation in international law in 
light of the dominant conception of modern international law. 
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1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation examines the structural nature of international law in light of 
concerns of fragmentation. The latter is the claim that international law is becoming 
increasingly fragmented into specialised fields with own principles and rules that 
undermine the foundations of general international law. The purpose of the 
dissertation is to conceptualise the relationship between constitutionalisation and 
fragmentation of international law. Current contributions to the debate on the 
constitutionalisation of international law conceive constitutionalisation as a remedy 
to the phenomenon of fragmentation. Scholarship on global constitutionalism 
appears to divide into three schools, namely, the normative school, the functionalist 
school and the pluralist school.
1
 These three schools share the assumption that 
international constitutionalism is an idea situated at the intersection between law and 
politics.
2
 
 
The normative school presupposes that domestic constitutionalism is inherently 
deficient and it needs to be complemented by international institutions and practices. 
From this perspective, international constitutionalism is conceived as a form of 
supplemental constitutionalism. International legal scholars argue that: 
 
“The normative school sees global constitutionalism as a legal or moral conceptual 
framework that guides the interpretation, progressive development or political reform of 
legal and political practices beyond the state to reflect a commitment to constitutional 
standards.”3 
 
The functionalist school pursues a taxonomic, rather than normative approach to 
constitutionalism. It evaluates processes of constitutionalisation of existing 
international organisations. It aims to establish the extent to which constitutional 
                                                     
1
 A. Wiener, A. F. Lang, J. Tully, M. Poiares Maduro and M. Kumm, ‘Global Constitutionalism: 
Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law’ 1 (2012) GlobCon 1, at 6-8. 
2
 Ibid., at 2.  
3
 Ibid., at 7. 
2 
 
norms enable or constrain the production of international law. International legal 
scholars argue that: 
 
“[The functionalist school] focuses on the impact of constitutionalism on mapping the 
global terrain according to new standardised procedures and regulatory agreements.”4 
 
The pluralist school includes both normative and taxonomic approaches to 
constitutionalism beyond the state. Contributions to this school analyse regional and 
sub-regional processes of constitutionalisation beyond the state. They also address 
concerns of legal pluralism. Such contributions questions neo-Kantian approaches to 
international law. International legal scholars write that the pluralist school 
comprises three mainstream currents: 
 
“Generally pluralist emphasise the importance of distinct ancient, modern and post-
modern eras of constitutionalism. Some take a critical approach to universalist 
assumptions and theorise constitutional change as contextualised, contingent and 
constitutive, but others attempt to reconcile the new constitutional forms with more 
traditional universal constitutional ideals.”5 
 
The existent schools of global constitutionalism rely upon the idea of 
constitutionalisation of international law without providing any terminological or 
theoretical justification for the use of conceptions of constitutionalism as a device for 
interpreting the international legal system. Nor do they provide a definition of 
fragmentation of international law. Within this context, constitutionalism is not 
regarded as an autonomous concept of international law while fragmentation is 
perceived as a phenomenon characterising modern international law. Lack of 
positional perspectives specifying conceptions of international law and international 
constitutionalism on which subsequent analysis is based affects the objectivity of 
fragmentation concerns. It follows that the purpose of conceptions of international 
constitutionalism becomes questionable. 
                                                     
4
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5
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This dissertation seeks to determine whether conceptions of constitutionalisation 
represent a remedy to the phenomenon of fragmentation of international law. In 
particular, the dissertation analyses the significance to the debate on the structure of 
international law of contributions on the constitutionalisation of international law 
that focus only on manifestations of the formal conception of international law.
6
 In 
order to determine the significance of any contradictions between fragmentation and 
constitutionalisation, the dissertation analyses two conceptual issues. First, it 
evaluates the idea of constitutionalism from the perspective of the individualistic 
conception of international law.
7
 The aim is to establish the development of a global 
theory of constitutionalism. Secondly, it examines the value of fragmentation in 
modern international law. The aim is to show how conceptions of constitutionalism 
affect the idea of fragmentation. The dissertation is divided into six chapters.  
 
Chapter 1 introduces the idea of fragmentation through the lens of international legal 
scholarship. It scrutinises definitions of fragmentation and analyses mainstream 
theoretical and jurisprudential approaches thereto. It shows that there are two main 
methodological approaches to the phenomenon of fragmentation. The first approach 
comprises the findings of the Report on Fragmentation of the Study Group on 
Fragmentation of the International Law Commission of 2006. The second approach 
comprises current scholarly contributions on the constitutionalisation of international 
law. This chapter shows that the methodologies referred to above are manifestations 
of the formal conception of international law. It establishes that conceptions of 
international constitutionalism should take into consideration conceptions of 
international legal personality other than the formal conception. 
 
Chapter 2 examines the concept of international constitutionalism in light of the 
basic propositions of the individualistic conception of international law and the 
                                                     
6
 R. Portmann, Legal Personality in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010, pp. 173-207.  
7
 Ibid., at 126-172. 
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tripartite structure of international constitutionalism proposed by Tsagourias.
8
 It 
shows that the ultimate purpose (telos) of international law consists in the protection 
of the natural person. It establishes that as long as conceptions of constitutionalism 
presuppose underlying conceptions of international law, the conception of 
international constitutionalism grounded on the individualistic conception of 
international law pursues a teleological approach to international law. Drawing from 
this assumption, it problematizes the normative components of the teleological 
conception of constitutionalism. 
 
Chapter 3 applies the tenets of constitutionalism to the process of 
constitutionalisation of international law. It analyses the structured procedure of the 
process of constitutionalisation through the idea of the constitutional matrix of 
international law. It examines conceptions of the constitutional matrix while 
providing a review of existent patterns of constitutionalisation of the international 
legal system. It shows that the constitutional matrix of international law that is 
grounded on the tenets of formal conceptions of constitutionalism entails a functional 
approach to international law while the constitutional matrix of international law that 
is grounded on the tenets of the teleological conception of constitutionalism entails a 
holistic approach to international law. It establishes that interpretations of the same 
regime of international law through the two constitutional matrices of international 
law determine different outcomes of the process of constitutionalisation. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the constitutionalisation process of the Union of South American 
Nations (USAN, also known by its Spanish acronym UNASUR).
9
 By analysing 
USAN legal order from the perspective of the constitutional matrices of international 
law, an evaluation is attempted of the extent to which recourse to 
constitutionalisation is helpful to restore unity within international law in the context 
                                                     
8
 N. Tsagourias, ‘Introduction – Constitutionalism: A Theoretical Roadmap’ in N. Tsagourias (ed.), 
Transnational Constitutionalism. International and European Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, p. 1. 
9
 Spanish: Uniòn de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR). Most of the English literature refers to it as 
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5 
 
of an international organisation with an economic and social mandate. By analysing a 
new pattern of constitutionalisation that does not belong to the Western legal 
tradition, the dissertation contributes to advance the theory of global 
constitutionalism. It shows that USAN law does not comply with the normative 
components of the constitutional matrix of international law that is grounded on the 
tenets of formal conceptions of constitutionalism. It also shows that USAN law 
comports with the mandatory requirements of the constitutional matrix of 
international law that is grounded on the tenets of the teleological conception of 
constitutionalism. It establishes that interpretations of USAN law through the 
constitutional matrices of international law affects the phenomenon of fragmentation 
in different ways.  
 
Chapter 5 evaluates the process of constitutionalisation of the Bolivarian Alliance for 
the Americas (BAA, also known by its Spanish acronym ALBA).
10
 The aim is to 
further develop the theory of constitutionalism in international law. Regarded as an 
alternative model of integration of USAN, the BAA is a soft law organisation. The 
analysis shows that BAA law complies with the normative components of the 
constitutional matrix of international law that is grounded on the tenets of formal 
conception of constitutionalism. It also shows that BAA law comports with the 
mandatory requirements of the constitutional matrix of international law that is 
grounded on the tenets of the teleological conception of constitutionalism. It 
establishes that interpretations of BAA law through the constitutional matrices of 
international law are not able to affect the phenomenon of fragmentation of 
international law. 
 
Chapter 6 conceptualises the relationship between the idea of fragmentation of 
international law and the theory of international constitutionalism. Its purpose is two-
fold. Firstly, it establishes whether scrutinised conceptions of international 
constitutionalism represent a remedy to the phenomenon of fragmentation. Secondly, 
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 Spanish: Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America (ALBA). All documents of the 
BAA presidential summits are available online at: < http://www.alba-tcp.org/en/contenido/statements-
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official documents referred to elsewhere in this chapter can be consulted online at the address above. 
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it evaluates whether fragmentation represents a universally recognised characteristic 
of modern international law.  
 
This dissertation pursues a theoretical inquiry of selected aspects of international 
law. It applies a research methodology that is based on textual and normative 
analysis. It seeks to make a meaningful contribution to the literature on international 
constitutionalism. By developing a teleological conception of international 
constitutionalism and accompanying teleological matrix, this dissertation contributes 
to fill the gap in international literature. It also provides the first conceptualisation of 
the theoretical and practical relationship between the idea of fragmentation and 
constitutionalisation of international law. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Fragmentation of International Law: Problems and Perspectives 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines the issue of fragmentation of international law. It explores the 
origins of the concept of fragmentation from the perspective of international legal 
scholarship. It shows that the idea of fragmentation is regarded as a characteristic of 
modern international law. It establishes that current contributions address 
fragmentation concerns from a limited perspective. It demonstrates that they address 
the issue of restoring unity in international law from a state-centred and formalistic 
understanding of international law, irrespective of other conceptions of international 
law. 
 
Section 1.2 scrutinises definitions of fragmentation. It analyses the mainstream 
theoretical and jurisprudential approaches to fragmentation. It shows that there is no 
universally accepted definition of fragmentation.  
 
Section 1.3 examines methodological approaches to fragmentation and the remedies 
associated therewith. Sub-section 1 analyses the Report on Fragmentation of the 
International Law Commission of 2006. It outlines its purpose and content. In order 
to assess the methodologies proposed by the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) to 
restore coherence within the international legal system, it evaluates the ontology of 
international law presupposed by the idea of fragmentation. Sub-section 2 examines 
the debate on the constitutionalisation of international law. Considered as a remedy 
to fragmentation, it shows that the idea of constitutionalisation is a contested 
concept. It establishes that while scholars resort to constitutional language and 
principles to feature possible escapes to the perils of fragmentation, they do not 
provide for either a definition of constitutionalisation or justifications for having 
recourse to constitutional language in international law. Drawing from this 
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assumption, subsequent analysis shows how current contributions on 
constitutionalisation affect the debate on fragmentation in light of conceptions of 
international law.  
        
 
1.2 Conceptualising fragmentation 
The phenomenon of fragmentation is generally regarded as a characteristic of 
modern international law.
1
 It consists of the development of highly specialised fields 
of international law. Scholars maintain that such a functional specialisation is 
grounded on international practice.
2
 However, there is no universally accepted 
definition of fragmentation. On one hand, it is recognised as a technical problem 
comprising both conceptual
3
 and procedural matters.
4
 From this perspective, the idea 
of fragmentation is regarded as the cause of functional specialisation of international 
law. On the other hand, conflicting rules and institutional practices determine the 
erosion of general international law.
5
 From this perspective, fragmentation represents 
the consequence of functional specialisation of international law.
6
 
                                                     
1
 According to Simma, the phenomenon of fragmentation constitutes a physiological phase in the 
development of international law. B. Simma, ‘Fragmentation in a Positive Light 25 (2005) Mich. J. 
Int’l L. 845, at 847; E. Benvenisti and G. W. Downs, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy 
and the Fragmentation of International Law’ 60 (2007) Stan. L. Rev. 595, at 596.  
2
 Benvenisti and Downs, for instance, argue that fragmentation consists of “the increased proliferation 
of international regulatory institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries.” E. 
Benvenisti and G. W. Downs, supra note 1, at 596. See also P.-M. Dupuy, ‘The Danger of 
Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the International Court of Justice’ 
31 (1998-99) NYU J. Int’l L. & Pol. 791. 
3
 Martineau, for instance, writes that “the possibility of a debate on fragmentation presupposes that 
people disagree on how the tension between unity and diversity [in international law] is and should be 
managed.” A.-C. Martineau, ‘The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law’ 
22(1) (2009) LJIL 1, at 27.  
4
 Koskenniemi and Simma refer to fragmentation as the manifold act of transposition of technical 
expertise from the national to the international context. M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public 
International Law: Between Technique and Politics 70 (2007) Modern L. Rev. 1, at 4; B. Simma, 
‘Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner’ 20 (2009) EJIL 265, at 270. 
5
 On the concept of general international law, see infra section 1.3.1.1. 
6
 S. Singh, ‘The Potential of International Law: Fragmentation and Ethics’ 24 (2011) LJIL 23, at 24-
25. 
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Despite the uncertainty surrounding the definition,
7
 there is widespread agreement 
among scholars and practitioners that the root causes of fragmentation are grounded 
on the broader phenomenon of globalisation of the international society.
8
 It is 
contended that the transnational specialisation of parts of international society has 
been accompanied with the specialisation of legal institutions and their systems of 
rules.
9
 Leathley, for example, argues that: 
 
“Fragmentation stems from a multitude of factors: the lack of centralized organs, 
specialization of law, different structures of legal norms, parallel regulations, 
competitive regulations, an enlargement of the scope of international law, and different 
regimes of secondary rules. [...] 
[G]lobalisation has accelerated the trend of fragmentation and arguably defines the 
current phase in which international law is situated.”10  
 
Subsequent tension between unity and specialisation of international law has been 
dealt with by international courts. The MOX plant case of 2006 is regarded as the 
most exemplificative case of fragmentation of international law. The dispute 
concerned the construction of a nuclear power installation (the MOX plant) in 
Sellafield, United Kingdom, on its Irish Sea coast. It involved three stages and three 
jurisdictions.
11
  
 
                                                     
7
 E. Benvenisti and G. W. Downs, supra note 1.  
8
 M. N. Shaw, International Law, sixth edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 66; 
J. P. Trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2008, pp. 196-207. 
9
 A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law’ 25 (2004) Mich. J. Int’l L. 999. 
10
 C. Leathley, ‘An Institutional Hierarchy to Combat the Fragmentation of International Law: Has the 
ILC Missed an Opportunity?’ 40 (2007) Int’l Law & Politics 259, at 262-263, 264. 
11
 For a background on the litigation see, among many, R. Churchill and J. Scott, ‘The Mox Plant 
Litigation: The First-Half Life’ 53(2004) ICLQ 643. 
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In the first stage, following several rounds of correspondence between the United 
Kingdom and Ireland that failed to address Ireland’s concerns regarding the 
radioactive discharges of the MOX plant, Ireland instituted an international tribunal 
for violation of Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention).
12
 The OSPAR 
arbitral tribunal considered itself competent to take into account the provisions of the 
OSPAR Convention alone.
13
 It held that the United Kingdom had not violated the 
duty to make available the relevant information to Ireland under Article 9 of the 
OSPAR Convention.
14
  
 
In the second stage, Ireland claimed a violation of the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982
15
 for contamination of its water by the operation of the 
MOX plant. It brought proceedings against the United Kingdom pursuant to Article 
287 UNCLOS, requesting the suspension of the MOX plant activities or at least 
interim measures.
16
 The ITLOS took the view that, although competent, it would 
have been necessary to determine whether itself or the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) had definite jurisdiction to settle the dispute.
17
 Thus, bearing in mind 
considerations of mutual respect and comity between the two judicial institutions, the 
                                                     
12
 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR 
Convention) 32 (1993) ILM 1072. For extensive analysis of the case, see M. Fitzmaurice, ‘Dispute 
Concerning Access to Information Under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention (Ireland v United 
Kingdom and Northern Ireland)’ 18 (2003) Int’l J. Marine and Coastal L. 541. 
13
 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Dispute Concerning Access to Information Under Article 9 of the 
OSPAR Convention (Ireland versus United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), final 
award, 2 July 2003, UNTS XXIII, pp. 59-151, paras 85 and 92. 
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 Ibid., Conclusion, at 106. 
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 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 21 (1982) ILM 1261. 
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 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), The Mox Plant case (Ireland v United 
Kingdom), Request for provisional measures, 41 (2003) ILM 405. For a comment, see C. Brown, 
‘International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Provisional Measures before the ITLOS: The MOX 
Plant Case’ 17 (2002) J. Int’l Maritime and Coastal L. 267. 
17
 For a detailed comment on this issue, B. Kwiatkowska, ‘The Ireland v United Kingdom (Mox Plant) 
Case: Applying the Doctrine of Treaty Parallelism’ 18 (2003) J. Int’l Maritime and Coastal L. 13. 
11 
 
ITLOS stayed the proceedings in order to avoid the risk of conflicting decisions.
18
 At 
the same time, the European Commission started an infringement procedure against 
Ireland
19
 for violation of Article 292 of the European Community (EC) Treaty
20
 and 
Article 193 of the Euratom Treaty.
21
  
 
In the third stage, the ECJ held that by establishing an arbitral tribunal for alleged 
violations of the UNCLOS by the United Kingdom, Ireland had violated EC law.
22
 
The ECJ pointed out that both the EC and its members entered the UNCLOS as a 
mixed agreement.
23
 It maintained that since mixed agreements have the same status 
within EC law as agreements concluded by the EC alone, they become integral part 
of EC law.
24
 Consequently, the ECJ concluded that it had exclusive jurisdiction 
under Article 292 EC.
25
 It found Ireland in breach of the duty to inform and consult 
the competent EC institutions prior to establishing the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal.
26
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 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), The Mox Plant case (Ireland v United 
Kingdom), Suspension of proceedings on jurisdiction and merits, and request for further provisional 
measures, 42 (2003) ILM 1187, esp. para. 29, at 1191.   
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 ECJ, Commission of the European Communities v Ireland (MOX plant case) (C-459/03) [2006] E. 
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298 UNTS 167. Whereas in the MOX plant case the Commission brought the case before the ECJ, in 
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22
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23
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24
 Ibid., para. 69. On this issue see P. J. Cardwell and D. French, ‘Who Decides? The RCJ’s Judgment 
in the MOX Plant Dispute’ 19 (2007) J. Env. L. 121, at 123-124. 
25
 ECJ, Commission of the European Communities v Ireland, supra note 19, paras 63, 133 and 136. 
26
 Ibid., para. 184.  
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With regard to the issue of fragmentation of international law, the MOX plant case 
shows that judicial review of the ECJ avoided the issue of fragmentation of EC law.
27
 
It thus contributed to the fragmentation of international law. 
 
Case law also shows that special regimes constantly rely upon general international 
law to determine the meaning of specific rules. In Bankovic, for instance, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) denied the extraterritorial application of 
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)
28
 to the victims of the bombing 
of a TV centre in Belgrade, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1999.
29
 The ECtHR held that the victims of 
the air strikes did not fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent states. To reach 
that conclusion it addressed three main issues.  
 
First, it shed light on the general concept of jurisdiction set forth in Article 1 ECHR. 
To interpret the meaning of jurisdiction, it relied upon Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969.
30
 It establishes that: 
 
“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”  
 
The ECtHR concluded that the notion of jurisdiction is essentially territorial, without 
excluding the possibility of extraterritorial jurisdiction in exceptional cases.
31
 
                                                     
27
 N. Lavranos, ‘Freedom of Member States to Bring Disputes Before Another Court or Tribunal: 
Ireland Condemned for Bringing the MOX Plant Dispute Before an Arbitral Tribunal. Grand Chamber 
Decision of 30 May 2006, Case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland’ 2 (2006) E. C. L. Rev. 456, at 465-
466.  
28
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 
ETS No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S 221.  
29
 ECtHR, Bankovic v Belgium, Decision of 12 December 2001, Admissibility, 41 (2002) ILM 517.  
30
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 23 May 1969, 8 (1969) ILM 679. 
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Second, it held that the NATO countries had no effective control over the territory of 
FRY, as long as they did not exercise all or some of the public powers normally 
exercised by a government.
32
 Third, it maintained that the ECHR is a regional treaty 
operating in the legal space of the contracting states. Therefore, it does not apply 
worldwide.
33
  
 
From the perspective of the phenomenon of fragmentation of international law, the 
Bankovic case shows that although the ECtHR ruled on the regional scope of the 
ECHR, it decided not to interpret and apply the principles of the ECHR in a 
vacuum.
34
 
 
Other jurisdictions variously referred to general international law either to 
complement their rule-systems or to uphold the principle of systemic integration set 
forth in Article 31.3(c) VCLT (1969).
35
 Their judgments affect the phenomenon of 
fragmentation. For example, in its first historical report the Appellate Body (AB) of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) stressed that WTO law “should not be read in 
                                                                                                                                                      
31
 Bankovic v Belgium, supra note 29, para 61. In Loizidou v Turkey and Cyprus v Turkey, for 
instance, the ECtHR affirmed that the jurisdiction of a state’s party extends beyond its territory when 
the state exercises effective control over the territory in question. ECtHR, Loizidou v Turkey 
(Preliminary Objections) 20 (1995) EHRR 99, para. 62; see also ECtHR, Cyprus v Turkey, 35 (2002) 
EHRR 731, para. 77. 
32
 Bankovic v Belgium, supra note 29, para. 69. 
33
 Ibid., para. 80. For an assessment of the effects of the Bankovic case, L. G. Loucaides, ‘Determining 
the extra-territorial Effect of the European Convention: Fact, Jurisprudence and the Bankovic case’ 4 
(2006) Eur. Hum. Rts L.Rev. 391. More recently, in Al-Jedda v United Kingdom and Al-Skeini v 
United Kingdom the ECtHR held the United Kingdom liable for violations of ECHR rights in the 
occupied territories of Iraq. ECtHR, Al-Jedda v United Kingdom (27021/08) (7 July 2011), 53 (2011) 
E.H.R.R. 789; ECtHR, Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (55721/07) (7 July 2011), 53 (2011) EHRR 589. 
For an overview of the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties other than the ECHR, M. 
Gondek, ‘Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights: Territorial Focus 
in the Age of Globalization?’ LII (2005) Netherlands Int’l L. Rev. 349, at 378-382.  
34
 Bankovic v Belgium, supra note 29, para. 57. 
35
 Article 31.3(c) reads: “There shall be taken into account, together with the context: [...] (c) any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.” VCLT (1969), 
supra note 30, Article 31.3(c). 
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clinical isolation from public international law.”36 Likewise, in the Oil Platforms 
case the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided to interpret the right of self-
defence along with the freedom of commerce by reference to both the provisions of 
the UN Charter and customary international law.
37
 Thus, for the first time, it applied 
Article 31.3(c) VCLT (1969) in the process of interpretation of treaty provisions. 
However, it did not establish any general guideline as to when and how Article 
31.3(c) VCLT (1969) should be applied.
38
  
 
Another aspect of the phenomenon of fragmentation is that although functional 
regimes are not completely independent from public international law, they act like 
autonomous regimes of international law.
39
 In Kadi and Al Barakaat, for example, 
the ECJ affirmed that a legislative act adopted by EC institutions under Article 308 
EC Treaty
40
 to implement a UN Security Council resolution cannot violate 
                                                     
36
 WTO, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 
January 1996, at 17. Likewise, in the Biotech case a WTO panel applied Article 31.1 VCLT to 
interpret certain terms contained in Annex A to the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS); 
WTO, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
Panel report WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, 29 September 2006. For a case comment, 
see M. A. Young, ‘The WTO’s Use of Relevant Rules of International Law; An Analysis of the 
Biotech case’ 56 (2007) ICLQ 899, at 907-930. For an overview of the doctrinal debate on the role of 
general international law in the WTO dispute settlement system, A. Lindroos and M. Mehling, 
‘Dispelling the Chimera of “Self Contained Regimes”: International Law and the WTO’ 16 (2005) 
EJIL 857. 
37
 In 1992 the Islamic Republic of Iran instituted proceedings against the United States after the attack 
on and destruction of three offshore oil production complexes. It claimed a violation by the United 
States of various provisions of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between 
the United States and Iran (1955). ICJ, Case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v 
United States of America), 6 November 2003, 42 (2003) ILM 1334. For a case comment, see C. 
McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31 (3) (c) of the Vienna Convention’ 
54 (2005) ICLQ 279; E. Cannizzaro and B. Bonafe, ‘Fragmenting International Law through 
Compromissory Clauses? Some Remarks on the Decision of the ICJ in the Oil Platform case’ 16  
(2005) EJIL 481.    
38
 C. McLachlan, supra note 37, at 306-309. 
39
 G. Hafner, ‘Pros and Cons Ensuing From Fragmentation of International Law’ 25 (2004) Mich. J. 
Int’l L. 849; J. Pauwelyn, ‘Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of 
Inter-Connected Islands’ 25 (2004) Mich. J. Int. L. 903. 
40
 Now Article 352 TFEU. 
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fundamental human rights, which form an integral part of EC law.
41
 The ECJ held 
that Article 308 EC Treaty cannot serve as the basis for widening the scope of 
Community powers beyond the objects of the Community.
42
 By the same token, in 
the Beef Hormone case the AB decided that the precautionary principle developed 
under international environmental law was not binding under the WTO covered 
treaties
43
 whereas in US-Shrimp it dealt with the difficulties of applying non-WTO 
law arising from the sophisticated architecture of the WTO.
44
 
 
The selected case law shows the tendency of each court to interpret international law 
from the standpoint of each special regime.
45
 This determines uncertain 
developments of international law, due to the nature of autonomous regimes: 
 
“It is not only that the boxes have different rules. Even if they had the same rules, they 
would be applied differently because each box has a different objective and a different 
ethos, a different structural bias… whatever the rules.”46 
 
                                                     
41
 ECJ, Joined Cases C-402 and C-415/05P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] 
ECR I-6351,  para. 285. 
42
 Ibid., paras 187-191. For further analysis, K. S. Ziegler, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law, but 
Fragmenting International Law: The Kadi Decision of the ECJ from the Perspective of Human Rights’ 
9 (2009) H.R.L. Rev. 288; J. Santos Vara, ‘The Consequences of Kadi: Where the Divergence of 
Opinion between EU and International Lawyer Lies?, 17 (2011) Eur. L. J. 252. 
43
 WTO, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WT/DS26/AB/R, 13 February 1998, at paras 123-125.  
44
 It concluded that use of non-WTO law is by member states is not prohibited, to the extent that it 
does not contradict the body of WTO law. WTO, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 6 November 1998. See also J. H. Jackson, ‘Comments on 
Shrimp/Turtle and the Product/Process Distinction’ 11 (2000) EJIL 303. 
45
 This is known as the critique of managerialism in international law. See M. Koskenniemi, ‘The 
Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later’ 20 (2009) EJIL 7, at 15. 
46
 M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law: Constitutionalism, Managerialism and the Ethos of Legal 
Education’ 1 (2007) Eur. J. Legal Stud., available online at: < http://www.ejls.eu/1/3UK.htm > (last 
accessed 10 June 2012). This article circulated as a paper in 2006 under the title “International Law: 
Between Fragmentation and Constitutionalism” and it is available at: < 
http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/MCanberra-06c.pdf > (last accessed 10 June 
2012). See para. 8 of the paper version (emphasis added).  
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In addition, Koskenniemi argues that “[t]he choice of the frame determine[s] the 
decision. But for determining the frame there is no meta-regime, directive or rule.”47 
Hence, international lawyers resort to different techniques to overcome the 
phenomenon of fragmentation. 
 
This section showed that the idea of fragmentation has legal and non-legal roots. It 
established that fragmentation is a contested concept. It concluded that the 
phenomenon of fragmentation of international law arises from clashes between 
different standpoints from which selected clusters of international norms are 
interpreted. 
 
    
1.3 Perspectives on fragmentation 
Section 2 showed that “the framework of fragmentation”48 is determined by the 
interplay between general norms and particular sets of rules.
49
 To restore unity in 
international law, scholars and practitioners rely upon two approaches to 
fragmentation. The first one consists of the Report on Fragmentation of the 
International Law Commission (ILC) of 2006.
50
 It establishes a set of basic 
guidelines on normative conflict. It is entirely grounded on the law of treaties. The 
second one is represented by the idea of constitutionalisation of international law. It 
is a theoretical approach. It aims to restore coherence in the development of both 
general and specialised international law. This section evaluates, in turn, the two 
approaches to fragmentation.    
 
                                                     
47
 M. Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 6. 
48
 M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’ 17 (2004) Cambridge 
Rev. Int’l Affairs 197. A.-C. Martineau, supra note 3. 
49
 B. Simma and D. Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International 
Law’ 17 (2006) EJIL 483. 
50
 International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation (finalized by M. 
Koskenniemi), Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, UN Doc, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006 (hereinafter the ILC Report 
on Fragmentation (2006)). 
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1.3.1 The ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006)  
The ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) offers the most comprehensive approach to 
the idea of fragmentation of international law and is meant to be a technical tool-box 
for the legal professional.
51
 It aims to address the problem of coherence of 
international norms arising from the emergence of autonomous regimes of 
international law.
52
 To that extent, it explores four selected topics. The first one 
analyses conflicts between special law and general law. It includes the issues of self-
contained regimes and regionalism.
53
 The second one evaluates conflicts between 
successive norms.
54
 The third topic deals with relations of importance. It includes the 
issues of the interpretation of Article 103 of the UN Charter, jus cogens and 
obligations erga omnes.
55
 The fourth topic evaluates the principle of systemic 
integration.
56
 
 
Despite the range of topics explored, the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) does 
not provide for a definition of fragmentation. Instead, drawing from the general 
understanding of fragmentation as an outlet of the broader phenomenon of 
globalisation,
57
 it examines the effects of fragmentation on the international legal 
system: 
 
                                                     
51
 Against the formalistic approach of the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006), see M. Del Mar, 
‘System Values and Understanding of Legal Language’ 21 (2008) LJIL 29 (arguing that the ILC’s 
formalistic approach to international law leads to a surface coherence of the system instead of 
bolstering its responsiveness to social problems); S. Singh, supra note 6 (arguing against international 
law as a system and in favour of formal unity governed by a hierarchical conception of the system).  
52
 ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006), supra note 50, para. 15. 
53
 Ibid, paras 46-222. 
54
 Ibid., paras 223-323. 
55
 Ibid., paras 324-409. 
56
 Ibid., paras 410-480. 
57
 See supra section 1.2. 
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“The problem, as lawyers have seen it, is that such specialized law-making and 
institution-building tends to take place with relative ignorance of legislative and 
institutional activities in the adjoining fields and of the general principles and practices 
of international law. The result is conflicts between rules or rule-systems, deviating 
institutional practices and, possibly, the loss of an overall perspective on law.”58 
 
The ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) also points out that the emergence of 
functionally specialised and autonomous regimes affects the underlying coherence of 
the rules of general international law:
59
  
 
“Very often new rules or regimes develop precisely in order to deviate from what was 
earlier provided by the general law. When such deviations become general and frequent, 
the unity of law suffers.”60 
 
From this perspective, fragmentation can be characterised as the denial of general 
international law. Yet the idea of unity itself is undermined by the uncertainty of 
what constitutes general international law.
61
 There are two main approaches. On one 
hand, scholars acknowledge that general international law consists of customary 
international law, although multilateral treaties, such as the VCLT (1969), may also 
become part of it through a customary process.
62
 Likewise, a treaty may become 
binding upon third states through a customary process.
63
 On the other hand, the ninth 
edition of the Oppenheim’s International Law reads: 
 
“General international law is that which is binding upon a great many states. General 
international law, such as provisions of certain treaties which are widely, but not 
                                                     
58
 ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006), supra note 50, para. 8. 
59
 Ibid., para. 15.   
60
 Ibid.  
61
 Ibid., para. 493, at 254. 
62
 G. Tunkin, ‘Is General International Law Customary Law Only?’ 4 (1993) EJIL 534. 
63
 VCLT (1969), supra note 30, Article 38. 
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universally, binding and which establish rules appropriate for universal application, has 
a tendency to become universal international law.”64 
 
The considerations above show that despite the uncertainty of its boundaries, the 
definition of general international law comprises customs and certain multilateral 
treaties. In addition, the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) includes other sources 
of international law, such as general principles of law recognised by civil nations.
65
 
Other principles of international law and analogies from domestic law may also be 
relevant.
66
 
 
Against this background, the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) establishes that 
conflicts arising from fragmentation can be approached from either the perspective of 
the subject-matter or the one of the number of legal subjects bound by the same 
rule.
67
 Provisions of the VCLT (1969) are regarded as the relevant rules through 
which interpret other norms of international law.
68
 
 
This section examines the theoretical underpinnings of the ILC Report on 
Fragmentation (2006). Sub-section 1 analyses the conception of international law 
endorsed by the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006). Sub-section 2 evaluates the 
first methodological approach to fragmentation stemming from the model of legal 
argumentation outlined in the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006). Sub-section 3 
examines the second methodological approach to fragmentation referred to in the 
ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) in light of conceptions of international legal 
personality.  
                                                     
64
 R. Jennings and A. Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, ninth edition, Vol. 1, Peace, New York: 
Longman, 1996, at 4. Universal international law consists of “[t]hat part of international law that is 
binding on all states, as is far the greater part of customary international law.” Ibid. Conversely, 
particular international law is regarded as “binding on two or few states only.” Ibid. 
65
 As set forth in Article 38.1(c) of the Statute of the ICJ. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
United Nations Charter, 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Annex I.  
66
 ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006), supra note 50, para. 493(3).  
67
 Ibid., para 21. 
68
 Ibid., para. 17.  
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1.3.1.1 Ontology of international law 
Concerns over fragmentation reflect underlying conceptions of international law. As 
long as international law is recognised as a contested concept,
69
 there exist many 
interpretations of it. Scholars refer to international law according to their 
understanding of the idea of a legal system.
70
 Some argue that international law is not 
law.
71
 Others write that it is a conglomeration of rules instead of a system.
72
 Others 
maintain that it is either a legal
73
 or a social system.
74
 In this context, modern 
international law is widely regarded as a legal system
75
 that coexists with other 
systems, both legal and non-legal ones.
76
 The ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) 
establishes the presumption that: 
                                                     
69
 Koskenniemi, for example, writes that “International law is what international lawyers make of it.” 
M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of the International Legal Argument, 
Epilogue, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, at 615.  
70
 See, among many, J. Coleman and S. Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and 
Philosophy of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; H. McCoubrey and N. D. White, The 
Textbook on Jurisprudence, third edition, London: Blackstone Limited Press, 1999; J. W. Harris, 
Legal Philosophies, second edition, London: Butterworths, 1997. 
71
 J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, W. E. Rumble (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995, at 117-26. 
72
 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961, at 208-231. 
73
 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994.  
74
 A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner, supra note 9, at 999 (arguing that international law is a system 
grounded on social relations). See also N. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, translated by K. Ziegert, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2004; P. Allott, The Concept of International Law, 10 (1999) 
EJIL 31 (arguing that the social function of international law is the same as that of other forms of 
law). 
75
 J. Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979. 
76
 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave, New York: Columbia University Press, second edition, 1979, pp. 
4-5. See also M. Davies, Delimiting the Law. ‘Postmodernism’ and the Politics of Law, Chicago: 
Pluto Press, 1996, p. 41 ff. With regard to treaty norms, Article 1 of the UN Charter reads: “The 
purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: 
[…] to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to 
a breach of the peace” (emphasis added). UN Charter, supra note 65. Likewise, Paragraph 3 of the 
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“If international law is needed as a structure for coordination and cooperation between 
(sovereign) States, it is no less needed in order to coordinate and organize the 
cooperation of (autonomous) rule-complexes and institutions.”77 
 
This shows that the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) fosters a state-centered and 
rule-oriented conception of international law.
78
 In the absence of a specific object to 
fragment, it recognises the VCLT (1969) as the preferred means to address normative 
conflicts associated with the phenomenon of fragmentation.
79
 Considered as one of 
the resources of general international law,
80
 the VCLT (1969) is regarded as the basis 
for an international law of conflicts. 
 
For the purposes of the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006), a treaty conflict is “a 
situation where two rules or principles suggest different ways of dealing with a 
problem.”81 It is contended that logical reasoning alone cannot solve the conflict. It 
needs to be supported by legal reasoning.
82
 From this standpoint, conflicts may be 
approached from both the perspective of the subject-matter and the perspective of the 
subjects bound by the same rules of international law.
83
 Each methodology 
recognises that there is no formal hierarchy governing the primary sources of 
                                                                                                                                                      
Preamble to the VCLT (1969) reads: “disputes concerning treaties, like other international disputes, 
should be settled by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international 
law” (emphasis added). VCLT (1969), supra note 26, Preamble, para. 3.  
77
 ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006), supra note 50, para. 487. 
78
 Ibid., paras 16 and 17. For further analysis, see infra section 3.1.3. 
79
 By the same token, Aust argues that the VCLT (1969) “is the starting point for any description of 
the modern law and practice of treaties.” A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 6. 
80
 ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006), supra note 50, para. 492. See also supra section 1.3.1. 
81
 Ibid., para. 25.  
82
 Ibid. This issue is further explored in section 1.3.1.2. 
83
 The two methodological approaches are examined, in turn, in subsequent sections 1.3.1.2 and 
1.3.1.3. 
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international law, due to the decentralised nature of international law.
84
 It follows 
that different interpretations of the same cluster of rules may point to different 
directions depending on which normative framework is used to examine it.
85
  
 
International scholarship analysed the relationship between fragmentation and 
hierarchy. There are three main approaches. Firstly, Simma argues that the 
phenomenon of fragmentation is more apparent than real,
86
 as long as informal 
hierarchies represent a characteristic of modern international law.
87
 Secondly, 
Koskenniemi points out the risks arising from the proliferation of autonomous 
regimes: 
 
“[T]his would be not significant if the boxes had clear-cut boundaries and we could 
resolve jurisdictional overlaps by some superior set of rules. This is how international 
law saw itself in the late 19
th
 century when the boxes were legal systems of sovereign 
states. But now there is no superior set of rules.”88 
 
Thirdly, according to Weiler and Paulus there exists the possibility of looking for a 
“hierarchy of actors and institutions instead of rules,” which implies to broaden the 
normative boundaries of international law to both political and social sciences.
89
  
                                                     
84
 ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006), supra note 50, paras 9, 14, 485 and 493. See also M. 
Koskenniemi and P. Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’ 15 (2002) 
LJIL 553; see also A. Cassese, International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, second edition, 
2005, pp. 198-199. 
85
 ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006), supra note 50, para. 48. 
86
 B. Simma, supra note 4, at 265-97. From a different perspective, J. I. Charney, ‘The Implications of 
Expanding International Dispute Settlement Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea’ 90 
(1996) AJIL 69, at 73-75. A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004; W. Burke-White, ‘International Legal Pluralism’ 25 (2004) Mich. J. Int’l L. 963, at 967. 
87
 B. Simma and D. Pulkowski, supra note 49, at 500. 
88
 M. Koskenniemi, supra note 46, para. 9. On the practical difficulties to frame international law as a 
coherent system, see M. Koskenniemi, ‘Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch’ 8 (1997) EJIL 566, 
at 582.  
89
 H. H. Weiler and A. L. Paulus, ‘The Structure of Change in International Law or Is There a 
Hierarchy of Norms in International Law?’ 8 (1997) EJIL 545, at 555.  
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The ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) is grounded on the second approach,
90
 
which is not incompatible with the first one,
91
 while it does not consider the third 
one. It acknowledges that fragmentation, although unavoidable, is a matter of 
interpretation of international rules: 
 
“In an important sense, “fragmentation” and “coherence” are not aspects of the world 
but lie in the eye of the beholder. What is new and unfamiliar, will (by definition) 
challenge accustomed ways of thinking and organizing the world. Novelty presents 
itself as “fragmentation” of the old world. In such case, it is the task of reasoning to 
make the unfamiliar familiar by integrating it into received patterns of thought or by 
amending those patterns so that the new phenomenon can be accommodated.”92 
 
Sub-sections 1.3.1.2 and 1.3.1.3 examine how the ontology of international law 
affects the two-fold methodology set forth in the ILC Report on Fragmentation 
(2006) to solve normative conflicts.  
 
 
1.3.1.2 Methodology I: Speciality in regard to subject-matter  
The first methodological approach to rule conflict envisaged by the ILC Report on 
Fragmentation (2006) consists of a relative conception of the systemic relationship 
between general rules and special ones. It is referred to as “speciality in regard to 
                                                     
90
 ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006), supra note 50, para. 20. It is noteworthy that Martti 
Koskenniemi is the chairman of the ILC Study Group on Fragmentation who finalized the Report on 
Fragmentation of 2006.  
91
 “[A]lthough, sociologically speaking, present fragmentation contains many new features, and its 
intensity differs from analogous phenomena in the past, it is nevertheless an incident of the diversity 
of the international social world – a quality that has always marked the international system, 
contrasting it to the (relatively) more homogeneous domestic context.” ILC Report on Fragmentation 
(2006), supra note 50, para. 46. Bruno Simma was appointed as the first chairman of the ILC Study 
Group on Fragmentation. See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Seven Session, 
Supplement No. 1, UN Doc. A/57/10, Chapter IX.A, paras 492-94.  
92
 ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006), supra note 50, para. 20. 
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subject-matter.”93 On one hand, it acknowledges that recourse to fact-description 
may be useful to single out the relevant, although informal, hierarchical relationship 
among selected international rules. For example, use of anti-personnel mines is a 
special subject within the general subject of humanitarian law.
94
 In other cases, 
however, the determination of the same-subject matter within which locate the 
relationship between general and special law is not obvious.
95
 For example, a treaty 
on maritime transport of chemicals relates to various fields of international law, 
including trade law, the law of the sea and maritime transport.
96
 This is determined 
by the fact that the distinction between general and special rules is not always clear.
97
 
The ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) also recognises that no rule “is general or 
special in the abstract but in relation to some other rule.”98  
 
Consequently, the condition of same-subject matter cannot be regarded as decisive in 
establishing whether or not there is a conflict of international rules. It is thus 
contended that logical reasoning needs to be complemented by legal reasoning. This 
entails that, as long as an international instrument may be described from different 
perspectives, determining the goal that selected legal instrument seek to attain is 
essential for the purpose of interpretation.
99
 From this perspective, the role of the 
international lawyer consists in establishing that the case in point is governed by a 
specific set of general and special rules, depending on what is regarded as the 
regulatory purpose.
100
 
                                                     
93
 ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006), supra note 50, paras 116-118. 
94
 Ibid., para. 112.  
95
 Ibid., para. 116. 
96
 Ibid., para. 21. 
97
 Like general rules, special rules must be generally defined, even when they apply to a few cases 
only. This marks the difference between a special rule and an order given to somebody. Ibid., para. 
111. 
98
 Ibid., para. 112. 
99
 Ibid., para. 117. 
100
 Ibid.  
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For the purposes of the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006), legal reasoning is 
regarded as “the pragmatic process through which lawyers go about interpreting and 
applying formal law.”101 Conceived as a purposive activity, it aims to build rational 
and systemic relationships among selected clusters of rules:  
 
“[Legal reasoning] should be seen not merely as a mechanic application of apparently 
random rules, decisions or behavioural patterns but as the operation of a whole that is 
directed toward some human objective.”102 
 
The process of legal reasoning set forth in the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) 
comprises three steps.
103
 The first step consists of an initial assessment of what the 
applicable rules and principles might be.
104
 It aims to single out the regulatory 
purpose. The second step allows the interpreter to determine which particular rules 
apply to the selected case.
105
 The choice must be consistent with the regulatory 
purpose and it must be justified in light of it. The third step consists in formulating 
conclusions of the legal argumentation that establish the pertinent relationship 
between conflicting principles and rules.
106
 Conclusions must also comport with 
general international law, including the rules of the VCLT (1969), customary 
international law and general principles of law recognised by civilized nations.
107
 
 
Although the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) acknowledges that “no 
homogeneous, hierarchical meta-system is realistically available to do away with 
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such problems,”108 it relies upon MacCormick’s model of legal reasoning, both 
implicitly and explicitly. It does so implicitly by arguing that logical reasoning alone 
is not able to solve normative conflicts.
109
 Likewise, MacCormick argues that: 
 
“[D]eductive reasoning from rules cannot be a self-sufficient, self-supporting, mode of 
legal justification. It is always encapsulated in a web of anterior and ulterior reasoning 
from principles and values.”110 
 
It does so explicitly twice. First, it refers to the role of principles and general rules as 
interpretive guidelines, as outlined by MacCormick in Legal Reasoning and Legal 
Theory.
111
 Secondly, it states that the pertinent relationship between the relevant 
rules must be established “in view of the need for consistency of the conclusion with 
the perceived purposes or functions of the legal system as a whole.”112 
 
Resort to the method of legal argumentation outlined in Legal Reasoning and Legal 
Theory implies that the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) accepts MacCormick’s 
theoretical background as well. It possesses two main features. First, it consists of a 
rule-based reasoning
113
 within a system of positive law.
114
 Second, it is conceived as 
an account of legal reasoning “grounded in or at least fully compatible with Hart’s 
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legal-positivistic analysis of the concept of law.”115 This shows that the ILC Report 
on Fragmentation (2006) acknowledges legal reasoning as a process grounded in 
positive law.  
 
However, it is unusual to rely upon a Hartian model of interpretation to solve rule 
conflicts in international law. On one hand, Hart argues that the ontology of the 
concept of law consists of the interplay between the primary and secondary rules 
identified by a rule of recognition.
116
 Hence, lacking an international rule of 
recognition and a central legislative and adjudication power, international law is 
regarded as a conglomeration of rules but not as a system.
117
 Conversely, the ILC 
Report on Fragmentation (2006) conceives international law as a system.
118
 It also 
recognises that there is neither a single legislative will behind international law
119
 nor 
a formal hierarchy between its primary sources.
120
 On the other hand, the model of 
legal argumentation described by MacCormick in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory 
was not conceived to be applied to international law. As noted above,
121
 systematic 
use of the provisions of the VCLT (1969) operates only once the interpretive 
perspective is chosen. Although this model of legal argumentation might contribute 
to restore coherence in international law, it does not provide evidence of the 
legitimacy of the process of legal argumentation.  
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This shows that since international norms are not organised around a formal 
hierarchy, to establish the regulatory purpose through which interpret the correct 
relationship between the relevant clusters of rules ultimately represents an arbitrary 
choice.
122
 
 
The analysis above shows that the VCLT (1969) has the potential to evolve into an 
international law of conflicts, even in presence of legitimacy concerns arising from 
the positivistic root of the process of legal argumentation established by the ILC 
Report on Fragmentation (2006).  
 
 
1.3.1.3 Methodology II: Speciality in regard to parties  
The second methodological approach to rule conflict referred to in the ILC Report on 
Fragmentation (2006) concerns the number of subjects bound by the same normative 
provision.
123
 Although Article 30(3) VCLT (1969) on successive treaties is regarded 
as the relevant provision to solve rule conflicts between treaties on the same subject-
matter concluded by the same parties,
124
 it does not regulate the case where a state 
(A) undertakes conflicting obligations in regard to two or more different states (B 
and C). Since each treaty is governed by the principle pacta sunt servanda,
125
 no 
obligation is in theory prevailing over the other. By implication, state (A) will choose 
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which treaty to perform and which one to breach, thus incurring in state 
responsibility.
126
 
 
The ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) does not examine further the issue of 
speciality in regard to parties. Moreover, its rule-oriented and state-centered 
conception of international law
127
 restricts the perspective of normative conflicts to 
treaty provisions. No mention is ever made of international actors other than states. 
However, it is contended that modern international law is an open system, not 
restricted to states and state-entities.
128
 Consequently, a modern international law of 
conflicts should be able to take into account the actual contribution of all 
international actors to the development of international law. To that extent, a 
conceptualisation of international law from the perspective of international legal 
personality proves to be helpful to outline the strengths and the limits of the rule-
based approach to fragmentation put forward in the ILC Report on Fragmentation 
(2006). 
 
The issue of legal personality in international law has been the object of much 
scrutiny.
129
 With regard to modern international law, Portmann writes that there are 
three mainstream conceptions.
130
 The formal conception of international law is 
                                                     
126
 ILC Report on Fragmentation, supra note 50, para. 115. 
127
 As discussed in section 1.3.1.1. 
128
 R. Portmann, Legal Personality in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010; J. Crawford, International Law as an Open System: Selected Essays, London: Cameron May, 
2002, pp. 17-38. See also L. Henkin, supra note 76, p. 15. On the peculiar role of international 
organizations in the development of international law, see M. Prost and P. K. Clark, ‘Unity, Diversity 
and the Fragmentation of International Law: How Much Does the Multiplication of International 
Organizations Really Matter?’ 5 (2006) Chinese J. Int’l L. 341.   
129
 For an historical perspective, see J. E. Nijman, The Concept of Legal Personality: An Inquiry into 
the History and Theory of International Law, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2004. For a selection of 
essays, see F. Johns (ed.), International Legal Personality, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010.  
130
 Portmann’s analysis is the most comprehensive contribution to the issue of international 
personality from a normative point of view. It shows that the states-only conception and the 
recognition conception do not represent a characteristic of modern international law. R. Portmann, 
supra note 128, pp. 42-125. 
30 
 
grounded on the thought of Kelsen.
131
 It has two main propositions. The first 
proposition maintains that the personal scope of international law is an open concept. 
Since international actors are regarded as the addressees of the norms of international 
law, international legal personality proves to be the consequence of the making of 
international norms.
132
 The second proposition establishes that there are no further 
consequences attached to being an international person. The formal conception of 
international law pursues a general, rule-oriented approach to international law. Its 
main manifestations in legal practice are the LaGrand
133
 and Avena
134
 cases before 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the AMCO v Indonesia case
135
 before the 
International Centre for Settlement of International Disputes (ICSID). 
  
The individualistic conception of international law draws on the teaching of 
Lauterpacht.
136
 It has two basic propositions. The first proposition establishes that 
states are regarded as entities consisting of individuals. In principle, this entails that 
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there is no difference between the interest of the state and the interest of the 
individuals: 
 
“No doubt it is true to say that international law is made for States, and not States for 
international law, but it is true only in the sense that the State is made for human beings, 
and not human beings for the State.”137 
 
From this standpoint, international law creates basic rights and duties of the 
individual. The second proposition maintains that the sources of international law 
include general principles of law. Hence, the international personality of the 
individual is not derived from state will. This entails a qualified presumption that 
individuals are subjects of international law as well as the ultimate addressees of all 
law, including international law. The individualistic conception pursues a 
teleological and normative approach to international law. Its main manifestations in 
legal practice consist of the Nuremberg trials,
138
 the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act case 
law
139
 and the case law on the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).
140
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Finally, the actor conception of international law draws on the thought of McDougal, 
Lasswell and Reisman.
141
 It is also known as the New Haven School of International 
Law (Yale University). In Europe the leading scholar is Higgins. It has two main 
propositions. The first proposition establishes that international law is not a set of 
rules. It is a process of authoritative decision-making. The second proposition 
maintains that participation in the decision-making process is open to all those state 
and non-state actors that have authoritative power. The actor conception of 
international law pursues a policy-oriented approach to international law. Its main 
manifestations in legal practice are the Reineccius et al v Bank for International 
Settlements case,
142
 the International Tin Council case
143
 and the Sandline v Papua 
New Guinea award.
144
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None of the existent conceptions of international law is in principle superior to 
another. However, Portmann argues that on one hand, the actor conception is 
considered as minoritarian while the individualistic conception is regarded as 
functional to the field of international human rights law.
145
 On the other hand, the 
formal conception is regarded as the dominant conception.
146
 Considered as “a 
merely descriptive device belonging to the realm of legal doctrine and as such being 
without concrete legal implications,”147 the formal conception of international law 
establishes that international legal personality does not confer the competence to 
create international law on international actors. In particular, it recognises that the 
capacity of international law-creation stems from customary international law, since 
the latter contains rules declaring that states are competent to create law by 
concluding international treaties.
148
 This creates a hierarchy of norms authorising 
particular entities to create and apply international law. However, since the second 
basic proposition establishes that there are no further consequences attached to 
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international personality, nothing prevents individuals to be direct addressees of the 
norms of international law. Simma, for instance, writes that:  
 
“[Q]uite apart from idealism, the application of international law in a multi-level system 
of international governance with manifold consequences for the individual is already a 
fact of life. This phenomenon has led to the creation of legal responsibilities for 
individuals and their being targeted directly by international acts or decisions.”149 
 
One of the consequences of the formal conception is that modern international law is 
regarded as a hierarchical, state-centered system.
150
 As long as international norms 
are not organised around a formal hierarchy of norms,
151
 international practice shows 
that, from this perspective, international law cannot be regarded as a homogeneous 
entity. On one hand, states create norms of customary international law and enter into 
general treaties. On the other hand, they enter into additional agreements aimed at 
narrowing the focus of state intervention to specific tasks. As a result, the norms of 
international law have progressively gained precision, leading to the phenomenon of 
fragmentation of international law.
152
 
 
Other conceptions of international law produce different consequences. The 
individualistic conception recalls the Kantian conception of international law, which 
establishes that “the primary normative unit is the individual, not the State.”153 The 
same assumption also applies to international organizations, since they are entities 
created by states with a functional scope.
154
 From this perspective, the boundaries of 
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international law are not conceived as horizontal relationships between sovereign 
states. Peters, for example, argues that international law is entirely based on an 
individualised view of sovereignty
155
 where the principles of equality and human 
dignity constitute the pillars of the international legal system.
156
 This shows that the 
teleological perspective embodied in the individualistic conception of international 
law extends far beyond international human rights law.
157
 
 
One of the consequences of the actor conception is that the concept of law, including 
international law, is not limited to rules and it is not separated from policy factors. 
Interpretations of law must take into account both the context and the rules. With 
regard to international law, McDougal argues that: 
 
“The recommendation we make, from perspectives of human dignity and for efficiency 
of inquiry into varying patterns of authority and control, is, accordingly, that 
international law be regarded, not as mere rules, but as a whole process of authoritative 
decision in the world arena, a process in which authority and control are appropriately 
conjoined and which includes, along with an inherited body of flexible prescriptions 
explicitly related to community policies, both a structure of established decision-makers 
and a whole arsenal of methods and techniques by which policy is projected and 
implemented.”158 
 
Stressing the role of international rules, Higgins points out that: 
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“International law is the entire decision-making process and not just the reference to the 
trend of past decisions which are termed ‘rules’. To rely only, and mechanically, on 
accumulated past decisions (rules) when the context in which they are articulated has 
changed […] is to ensure that international law will not be able to contribute to the 
resolution of today’s problems. Reference to the ‘correct legal view’ or ‘rules’ can 
never avoid the element of choice (though it can seek to disguise it), nor can it provide 
guidance to the preferable decision. In making this choice one must inevitably have 
consideration for the humanitarian, moral and social purposes of the law.”159  
 
The considerations above show that each conception of international legal 
personality affects the phenomenon of fragmentation. On one hand, the analysis of 
the basic propositions of the formal conception of international law establishes that 
the ontology of law endorsed by the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) is 
consistent with them. From this perspective, provisions of the VCLT (1969) are 
regarded as the basis of an international law of conflict. On the other hand, the 
analysis of the basic propositions of the individualistic conception shows that the 
latter acknowledges a concept of law that is different from the one recognised by the 
ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006).
160
 This prevents the interpreter to ignore the 
teleology of international law. It follows that the methodological approach set forth 
in the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) is inconsistent with the tenets of the 
individualistic conception of international law. Finally, the analysis of the basic 
propositions of the policy-oriented approach shows that the notion of fragmentation, 
if any, cannot be restricted to norm conflict. The teleological limit also applies or, at 
least, it is not inconsistent with the actor conception’s ontology of law.161 
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1.3.2 Constitutionalisation of international law 
The previous section examined the features of the ILC Report on Fragmentation 
(2006). It showed that in order to address the phenomenon of fragmentation, the ILC 
Report on Fragmentation (2006) relies upon a model of legal argumentation that 
takes into account the relationship between rules of international law. It concluded 
that the ontology of law recognised by the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) is a 
manifestation of the formal conception of international law. This section analyses the 
second interpretive approach to fragmentation. It consists of the growing body of 
literature on the constitutionalisation of international law.
162
 It attempts to organise 
the entire body of international norms in a rational and coherent order.
163
  
 
However, the idea of constitutionalism in international law is a contested concept.
164
 
Sometimes scholars refer to it as either international constitutionalism, 
constitutionalisation of international law, or the international constitution.
165
 
Sometimes they use these terms with different meanings.
166
 In this context, 
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 A. Peters, ‘Global Constitutionalism Revisited’ 11 (2005) Int’l Legal Theory 39, at 49. 
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 G Wallace Brown, ‘The Constitutionalization of What?’ 1 (2012) GlobCon 201; B. Fassbender, 
‘The Meaning of International Constitutional Law’ in R. St. J. Macdonald and D. M. Johnston (eds.), 
Towards World Constitutionalism. Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community, Leiden: 
Nijhoff, 2005, p. 837; B. Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International 
Community’ 36 (1998) Colum. J. Transn’l L. 529, at 552 ff. 
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 See infra section 1.3.2.1.  
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 For example, Johnston refers to constitutionalism as a model of international utopianism whereas 
Fassbender endorses the vision of constitutionalism as a normative and institutional project. D. M. 
Johnston, ‘World Constitutionalism in the Theory of International Law’ in R. St. J. Macdonald and D. 
M. Johnston (eds.), supra note 164, p. 27. See also B. Fassbender, supra note 164. For a detailed 
overview of conceptions of international constitutionalism, see infra section 1.3.2.1. 
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international scholarship derives fundamental concepts of constitutionalism from the 
national experience.
167
 Thus the vocabulary of constitutionalism in international law 
turns out to be largely influenced by its domestic conception.
168
 Nevertheless, 
scholarly efforts share the vision that global constitutionalism is a project for 
institutional engineering of the international legal order.
169
 
 
This section analyses the idea of constitutionalism in international law. Sub-section 
1.3.2.1 examines existent definitions of international constitutionalism. It evaluates 
the nature and scope of the ongoing academic debate. Sub-section 1.3.2.2 explores 
the relationship between conceptions of international constitutionalism and 
fragmentation. It shows that current conceptions of international constitutionalism 
replicate the findings of the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006). Sub-section 
1.3.2.3 evaluates the relationship between conceptions of constitutionalism in 
international law and international legal personality. It shows that current literature is 
able to address concerns over fragmentation of international law from a limited 
perspective. 
  
 
1.3.2.1 Problematizing definitions 
There exists no universal definition of constitutionalisation of international law. 
Some refer to it as a synonym of either constitutionalism or the international 
constitution.
170
 Others acknowledge that they have different meanings. For example 
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 E. A. Young, ‘The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism’ 38 (2003) Texas Int’l L. J. 527, at 528.  
168
 For a critique of the democratic liberal model of global constitutionalism, see C. E. J. Schwöbel, 
supra note 162.  
169
 Against the current idea of constitutionalism in international law, see Koskenniemi, supra note 46, 
at para. 20. 
170
 Stone Sweet, for instance, examines the meaning of both constitution and constitutionalism. He 
concludes that “the constitutionalisation of the legal system is largely the product of how the tensions 
inherent in legal pluralism are resolved.” A. Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and 
International Regimes’ 16 (2009) Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 621, at 644 (emphasis added). 
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constitutionalism is regarded as a concept broader than constitutionalisation.
171
 
Others rely upon them as if they were concepts taken for granted.
172
 Against this 
backdrop, it is possible to single out as many definitions of international 
constitutionalism as the number of scholars that entered the debate. To organise the 
mainstream ideas about constitutionalism in international law into categories, 
Schw bel proposes a classification based on the purpose of global 
constitutionalism.
173
 It comprises four dimensions. 
 
The first dimension is described as ‘social constitutionalism.’174 It conceives 
international law as an order in which the international community of states and non-
state actors coexist. From this standpoint, constitutionalism is regarded as the 
normative background against which protect and promote the web of social relations 
that emerge under international law. Concerns about participation as a means of 
limiting power, accountability of all international actors and individual rights are 
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 Peters and Armigeon refer to constitutionalism as “both a mode of governance and an intellectual 
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E. J. Schwöbel, supra note 162, p. 4; C. E. J. Schwöbel, ‘Situating the Debate on Global 
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 Ibid., at 613-617. 
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central to this vision. The second dimension is referred to as ‘institutional 
constitutionalism.’175 It deals with the institutionalisation or limitation of power, 
especially in the form of accountability of decision-makers. From this perspective, 
global constitutionalism is conceived as a network of constitutional levels traversing 
both the national and the international legal order. The third dimension is described 
as ‘normative constitutionalism.’176 It maintains that international law is governed by 
certain superior norms whose legitimacy lies in their inherent moral value for 
society. The fourth dimension is referred to as ‘analogical constitutionalism.’177 It 
draws analogies between features of the national and international constitutional 
orders.  
 
Schwöbel argues that the four dimensions of global constitutionalism share five key 
themes.
178
 They are further grouped in two models. On one hand, social 
constitutionalism and institutional constitutionalism represent the democratic 
model.
179
 They focus on participation-oriented forms of constitutionalism. On the 
other hand, normative constitutionalism and analogical constitutionalism represent 
the liberal model.
180
 They focus on rights-oriented forms of constitutionalism.
181
 
 
Another way to articulate the discourse about the constitutionalisation of 
international law is the functional approach to international law.
182
 Dunoff and 
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Trachtman, for instance, developed a constitutional matrix that applies to the 
international legal system as a whole as well as to autonomous regimes. It aims to 
recognise the constitutional functions of each rule-system. To that extent, the 
constitutional matrix represents an analytical tool, not a constitutive one.
183
 
  
Finally, constitutionalisation may be featured as a procedural conception. Tsagourias, 
for example, writes that “constitutionalism provides the ideological context within 
which constitutions emerge and constitutionalisation functions.”184 This statement 
contains three different concepts: constitutionalism as ideology, constitutionalisation 
as process and the constitution as the outcome of constitutionalisation.
185
 The 
tripartite structure proposed by Tsagourias is not explicitly linked to any specific 
purpose or content of international law. In order to avoid any terminological 
confusion with other conceptions or classifications of global constitutionalism, the 
idea of the tripartite structure of constitutionalism outlined by Tsagourias will be 
henceforth referred to as ‘the constitutional approach to international law.’186 
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 For further analysis, see Chapter 3, section 3.2. 
184
 N. Tsagourias, ‘Introduction – Constitutionalism: A Theoretical Roadmap’ in N. Tsagourias (ed.), 
Transnational Constitutionalism. International and European Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, at 1. Likewise, Walker describes constitutionalism as “a multidimensional 
form of practical reasoning” or as “a framing mechanism.” See N. Walker, ‘Taking Constitutionalism 
Beyond the State’ 56 (2008) Pol. Stud. 519, at 525. 
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Tsagourias, supra note 184. Contra, see C. E. J. Schwöbel, supra note 162, p. 149 (describing 
constitutionalism as “an ongoing process that is not aimed at hardening to form a specific 
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 For example, Lachmayer advocates the “International Constitutional Law (ICL) approach.” It 
consists of the comparison of various national and international constitutional law systems – such as 
national constitutional law, EU constitutional law or the WTO constitutional law – within a single 
network of constitutional laws. K. Lachmayer, ‘The International Constitutional Approach. An 
Introduction to a New Perspective on Constitutional Challenges in a Globalizing World’ 2 (2007) 
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expression “constitutional approach to international law.” Regarded as a limited approach to global 
governance, it was described as a project “less ambitious than constitutionalism.” J. Klabbers, supra 
note 162, at 54-55.  
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1.3.2.2 Delimiting conceptions of international constitutionalisation  
The previous sub-section showed that there is no universally accepted definition of 
constitutionalisation of international law. It also analysed terminological issues 
related to the use of constitutional language by international legal scholarship. This 
sub-section outlines the repercussions of the debate on the constitutionalisation of 
international law on the phenomenon of fragmentation. It evaluates the extent to 
which conceptions of constitutionalism in international law offer possible remedies 
to the fragmentation of international law. Relevant contributions to the debate are 
divided into two groups. 
  
The first group comprises conceptions of global constitutionalism that either avoid 
the conundrum of the definition of constitutionalism and constitutionalisation
187
 or 
choose not to restrict the field within the boundaries of any arbitrary definition.
188
 
Schwöbel argues that this cluster of conceptions is grounded on three common 
assumptions.
189
 The first basic assumption is represented by the belief that 
constitutions can exist beyond the state. The second basic assumption maintains that 
international law contains a certain degree of unity and homogeneity. The third basic 
assumption considers global constitutionalism as a global idea. Such conceptions 
eventually fail to demonstrate the importance of resorting to constitutional 
interpretations of international law. Therefore, they do not provide any evidence of 
the distinctive contribution brought by constitutional projects to proposals of reform 
of the international legal system. 
 
The second group comprises conceptions of global constitutionalism that possess a 
theoretical justification for the use of constitutional language in international law. It 
includes contributions contained in the volume The Twilight of Constitutionalism?, 
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edited by Doubner and Loughlin,
190
 as well as the constitutional approach to 
international law outlined by Tsagourias.
191
 However, whereas The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism? provides a valuable insight on a general theory of 
constitutionalism, it is not tailored to the specific features of the international legal 
system.
192
 On the other hand, the tripartite structure of the constitutional approach to 
international law specifically applies to the transnational or post-national legal space. 
It outlines the definition of constitutionalism, constitutionalisation and 
constitution.
193
 It also delimits their respective functions. Hence, it turns out to be an 
interpretive device which is able to feature a holistic approach to international law.
194
 
Regrettably, it represents a seminal project which has not been developed by 
international scholarship. 
 
Each group affects the phenomenon of fragmentation in different ways. Albeit none 
of the existent conceptions of international constitutionalism is limited to this task, 
they all envision a constitutional project that addresses concerns of coherence and 
legitimacy in international law. On one hand, the first group of conceptions focuses 
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P. Doubner and M. Loughlin (eds.), The Twilight of Constitutionalism?, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010, pp. 3-22 (arguing that constitutionalism cannot be reconstructed at the 
international level); U. K. Preuss, ‘Disconnecting Constitutions from Statehood: Is Global 
Constitutionalism a Viable Concept?’ in P. Doubner and M. Loughlin (eds.), The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism?, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 23-46 (arguing that by linking the 
idea of constitutionalism to popular sovereignty instead of territorial sovereignty, constitutions can 
create schemes of normative integration at the transnational level); M. Loughlin, ‘What is 
Constitutionalisation?’ in P. Doubner and M. Loughlin (eds.), The Twilight of Constitutionalism?, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 47-71 (arguing that constitutionalism is the political 
theory associated to the constitution. Constitutionalisation is the process whereby all public powers 
are exercised according to the procedures and norms of liberal-legal constitutionalism. Finally, 
constitution is regarded as the constitutional text). 
191
 N. Tsagourias, supra note 184. 
192
 T. Kleinlein, ‘On Holism, Pluralism, and Democracy: Approaches to Constitutionalism beyond the 
State’ 21 (2010) EJIL 1075, at 1076. 
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 As discussed in section 1.3.1.3.  
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on certain constitutional norms or principles of international law. Subsequent 
constitutional projects turn out to be either descriptive or prescriptive. However, lack 
of theoretical underpinnings of their constitutional assumption raises several 
critiques. They converge in two streams. Some argue that “[i]nternational 
constitutionalism is not a legal theory.”195 Others maintain that such projects 
perpetuate the liberal democratic tradition, so that they do not represent a truly global 
vision of constitutionalism.
196
 This shows that the first group of conceptions 
conceptualises constitutionalisation as an engineering project which is able to restore 
unity in international law by establishing the supremacy of certain constitutional 
norms and principles. To that extent, they entail the same model of legal 
argumentation set forth in the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006).
197
 
  
On the other hand, the constitutional approach to international law proposed by 
Tsagourias represents an interpretive tool tailored to the peculiarities of the 
international legal system.
198
 It neither suggests new classifications of the sources of 
international law nor does it allow scholars to claim competences they do not 
have.
199
 Since its tripartite structure is not endowed with any specific content, it turns 
out to be a neutral means through which assess positive international law as it is. 
Consequently, on one side its outcome is not binding.
200
 On the other side, resort to 
the constitutional approach to international law may comport with both the findings 
of the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006)
201
 and each of the individual 
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contributions on international constitutionalism, depending on which international 
norms are regarded as the superior ones. Superior norms would fall within the notion 
of constitutionalism and justify the subsequent process of constitutionalisation. 
Although the constitutional approach to international law neither adds any value to 
the conclusions of the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) nor does it overcome the 
difficulties arising from other contributions to international constitutionalism, it is 
not limited to formalistic conceptions of international law. 
 
 
1.3.2.3 Constitutionalisation and international legal personality 
The idea of constitutionalisation presupposes an underlying conception of 
international law.
202
 Section 1.3.1.3 showed that the phenomenon of fragmentation 
can be analysed from the perspective of conceptions of international legal 
personality. Likewise, since constitutionalisation is regarded as a remedy to 
fragmentation,
203
 contributions of international constitutionalism may be assessed 
against the conceptual background provided by the above mentioned theories of 
international legal personality. 
 
Section 1.3.1.3 showed that the formal conception represents the dominant 
conception of modern international law. It entails a rule-oriented approach to 
international law. Existent conceptions of constitutionalism share the common 
assumption that the process of constitutionalisation of international law refers to a 
state-centered idea of international law, and it is governed by a rule-oriented 
approach.
204
 By implication, none of them takes into account the individualistic 
conception or the actor conception, which in turn pursue a teleological and policy-
oriented approach to international law.
205
 On the contrary, the constitutional 
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approach to international law may be used in context of each of the three conceptions 
of international legal personality.
206
 
 
The absence of interests towards conceptions of international law other than the 
formal conception shows that current debates on fragmentation and 
constitutionalisation suffer from the same lack of alternative perspectives. This also 
shows that, from the perspective of international legal personality, scholarship on the 
constitutionalisation of international law can be divided in two groups. On one hand, 
current contributions are grounded on the tenets of the formal conception of 
international law. They aim to rationalise international law by reconfiguring 
hierarchies of existent international rules. On the other hand, there is scope for 
elaboration of new conceptions of international constitutionalism from the 
teleological and policy-oriented perspectives. To that extent, the constitutional 
approach to international law is perhaps the most valuable means whereby to 
elaborate an alternative conception to the existent ones. Since both the individualistic 
and the actor conception share the common assumption of the centrality of the 
human person,
207
 new conceptions of international constitutionalism should focus on 
teleological and policy-oriented interpretations of international law, either jointly or 
separately. This would create alternative conceptions of global constitutionalism that 
may be helpful to understand the phenomenon of fragmentation of international law.     
 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the issue of fragmentation of modern international law from 
the international legal perspective. It showed that fragmentation is a contested 
concept. It analysed scholarly efforts addressing fragmentation concerns. It showed 
there are two main approaches. The first approach comprises the findings of the ILC 
Report on Fragmentation (2006). Grounded on the law of treaties, it establishes a set 
of basic guidelines on normative conflicts. It endorses a formalistic and state-
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centered conception of international law. The second approach comprises current 
contributions to the academic debate on the constitutionalisation of international law. 
They feature hierarchical projects through which restore a sense of unity within the 
international legal system. They endorse a formalistic and state-centered conception 
of international law. 
  
This chapter established that current contributions on both fragmentation and its 
remedies are manifestations of the formal conception of international law. On one 
hand, it demonstrated that the idea of an international law of conflicts outlined in the 
ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) is consistent with the basic propositions of the 
formal conception of international law. On the other hand, it showed that the 
constitutional approach to international law might be applied to the formal 
conception of international law as well as to the individualistic and the actor 
conception. 
 
This chapter concluded that the ontology of international law affects the outcome of 
the analysis of the phenomenon of fragmentation. As a result, the remedies to 
fragmentation put forward in the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) and those 
proposed by scholarship on international constitutionalisation are not alternative to 
each other. As they share the same conceptual premise, they rely upon similar 
structures of legal reasoning. From this perspective, resort to constitutional language 
does not offer any distinctive contribution to the academic debate on fragmentation. 
Drawing from this assumption, the following chapters attempt to feature an 
interpretive device through which assess the phenomenon of fragmentation from the 
teleological perspective of the individualistic conception of international law. 
Chapter 2 examines the idealistic component of the tripartite structure of the 
constitutional approach to international law in light of the basic propositions of the 
individualistic conception of international law while leaving the analysis of 
procedural matters to subsequent chapters.    
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CHAPTER 2 
International Constitutionalism Characterised 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 examined the phenomenon of fragmentation of international law. It 
assessed the idea of fragmentation from the perspective of international legal 
scholarship. It also analysed the proposed scholarly solutions to restore coherence 
and unity in the international legal system. To that extent, it evaluated the 
methodologies set forth in the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) and contributions 
to the academic debate on the constitutionalisation of international law. It showed 
that all scholarly approaches deal with the issue of fragmentation from a formalistic 
and state-centered conception of international law. It concluded that other 
conceptions of international law are excluded from the ongoing debate on 
fragmentation and constitutionalisation of international law.  
 
This chapter evaluates the concept of international constitutionalism from a 
teleological perspective. It applies the basic propositions of the individualistic 
conception of international law to the seminal idea of the tripartite structure of the 
constitutional approach to international law. It examines the theoretical background 
of international constitutionalism while leaving the analysis of procedural issues to 
subsequent chapters. It aims to feature a non-binding, interpretive device for 
assessing the degree of coherence and legitimacy of international law. 
 
Section 2.2 examines the theoretical background of the idea of constitutionalism in 
international law. Conceived as a manifestation of the individualistic conception of 
international law, it establishes that the ultimate purpose (telos) of international law 
is represented by the protection of the natural person. Hence, it acknowledges that 
the ultimate beneficiary of international law is humanity as a whole. The analysis 
shows that the telos of international constitutionalism is grounded on two 
assumptions. The first one is represented by the ethical foundation of international 
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law. It maintains that constitutionalism embraces the Kantian conception of law. The 
second one is described as the normative foundation. It shows that constitutionalism 
is an interpretive instrument through which assess positive international law in light 
of the individualistic conception of international law. 
     
Section 2.3 analyses the normative components of international constitutionalism. It 
shows that from the perspective of the individualistic conception of international law, 
the telos of international law consists of the protection of the minimum core of 
human dignity. Sub-section 1 analyses the normative components of human dignity. 
It singles out the definition of human dignity stemming from the concept of 
constitutionalism. Sub-section 2 explores the relationship between human dignity 
and human rights. It establishes that human dignity is the precondition and the 
outcome of human rights. Sub-section 3 evaluates the role of the normative concept 
of human dignity in shaping the distinctive features of constitutionalism. 
 
Section 2.4 examines the process of legalisation of human rights through the rule of 
law in light of the basic propositions of the individualistic conception of international 
law. It shows that the rule of law is a principle of governance while human rights 
norms and standards represent a substantive part of it. It establishes that the 
international rule of law is embodied in international constitutionalism. Sub-section 1 
analyses its theoretical components. Sub-section 2 examines the methodological 
approach to the process of operationalization of the international rule of law 
stemming from the normative structure of international constitutionalism. 
   
Section 2.5 evaluates profiles of similarities and differences between the teleological 
approach embedded in international constitutionalism and the policy-oriented 
approach developed by the New Haven school of international law. It shows that, 
although they pursue a teleological approach to international law that seeks to attain 
the preservation of human dignity, they depart from this shared assumption in 
relation to their methodological approaches. 
 
 
50 
 
2.2 Teleology of international constitutionalism 
Modern international law acknowledges the international legal personality of both 
states and non-state entities, including the individual.
1
 This section explores the 
theoretical foundations of the idea of international constitutionalism from the 
teleological perspective of the individualistic conception of international law. It aims 
to contribute to the development of the academic debate on the constitutionalisation 
of international law. To establish a link between current contributions and the 
proposed one, the analysis relies upon the seminal idea of international 
constitutionalism proposed by Tsagourias.
2
 It is therefore contended that 
constitutionalism represents the idealistic component of the tripartite structure of the 
constitutional approach to international law and it informs the subsequent process of 
constitutionalisation as well as its outcomes. Conceived as a manifestation of the 
individualistic conception of international law, constitutionalism establishes the 
presumption that the ultimate beneficiary of the international legal system is 
humanity as a whole.
3
  
 
To argue that the telos of international law is to protect the world community of 
individuals entails two sets of arguments. The first one acknowledges the ethical 
foundation of international law. It establishes that the ultimate justification of 
international law lies in the value of the natural person qua person. Lauterpacht, for 
example, writes that: 
 
“The individual is the ultimate unit of all law, international and municipal, in the double 
sense that the obligations of international law are ultimately addressed to him and that 
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 On conceptions of international legal personality, see Chapter 1, section 1.3.1.3. 
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3
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the development, the well-being, and the dignity of the individual human being are a 
matter of direct concern to international law.”4  
 
This perspective is regarded as a modern interpretation of the Kantian conception of 
international law.
5
 Likewise, Tomuschat argues that international law is an 
individual-centered system: 
 
“The international community [...] views the state as a unit at the service of the human 
beings for whom it is responsible. Not only it is expected that no disturbances for other 
states originate from the territory of the State, it is moreover incumbent upon every 
State to perform specific services for the benefit of its citizens.”6 
 
The second set of arguments comprises conceptions of the normative justification of 
the telos of international law. Falk’s “law of humanity” attempts to represent 
transnational civil society as an alternative force to governmental power in 
international relations.
7
 Since the law of humanity is implicitly embodied in 
international human rights law,
8
 it establishes that transnational civil society is able 
to produce the “formalization of [its own] voice by way of legal instruments… and 
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8
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acts.”9 Falk argues that this global process would determine a “globalization-from-
below.”10  
 
The idea of the law of humanity has been strongly criticised. One critique points to 
the vagueness of the concept of “law of humanity.”11 Another critique stresses the 
indeterminacy of the notion of transnational civil society.
12
 A third one evidences the 
systematic attention to positive law, in particular to international human rights law, 
instead of the process of law-making.
13
  
 
From the standpoint of international constitutionalism, it is possible to move a 
critique to both Falk and his critics. On the one hand, Falk suggests that the principal 
international actors are states and civil society. On the contrary, constitutionalism 
acknowledges the legal personality of a plurality of state and non-state actors, where 
the individual is regarded as the central and smallest unit of the system.
14
 On the 
other hand, it is contended that the critics of the law of humanity reject the potential 
innovative role of the newly organized transnational civil society in absolute terms 
without offering any alternative constructive vision. Therefore, they end up 
defending the status quo. Conversely, while recognising important shortcomings of 
Falk’s proposal, international constitutionalism proposes to protect the world 
community of individuals through international law by advocating a teleological and 
individualistic interpretation of international law instead of the formalistic and state-
centered one.
15
 
                                                     
9
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 B. L. Apt, ‘Some Reflections on the Law of Humanity’ 1 (1995) Int’l Legal Theory 26, at 27; A. 
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The second conception addressing the normative justification of the telos of 
international law is Teitel’s “humanity law”. Like Falk’s law of humanity, it 
recognises that the centrality of the person is not limited to citizenship: 
 
“The emerging legal order addresses not merely states and state interests and perhaps 
not even primarily so. Persons and peoples are now at the core, and a non-sovereignty 
based normativity is manifesting itself, which has an uneasy and uncertain relationship 
to the inherited discourse of sovereign equality. I call this new normativity “humanity 
law” and it might be viewed as the dynamic “unwritten constitution” of today’s 
international legal order – the lens through which many of the key controversies in 
contemporary law and politics come into focus.”16 
 
Teitel argues that humanity law already exists in international law. Explicitly derived 
from the international humanitarian regime,
17
 humanity law is described as “the 
evolving merger of international human rights and humanitarian legal regimes.”18 It 
is conceived as a new interpretive lens
19
 whose purpose consists in securing the 
“preservation and decency” of the natural person.20 Teitel also writes that this 
teleological value
21
 creates an “alternative rule of law.”22  
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 R. Teitel, ‘Humanity Law: A New Interpretive Lens on the International Sphere’ 77 (2008-2009) 
Fordham L. Rev. 667, at 667-68. See also R. Teitel, Humanity’s Law, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011, pp. 19-33.  
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Despite its positive roots, the concept of humanity law suffers from the same critique 
of vagueness of Falk’s law of humanity. The idea of decency may be regarded as one 
such vague concept. Forcese, for example, describes decency as the byproduct of a 
“responsible engagement” in international economic law.23 The vagueness of the 
concept of decency unavoidably affects the related idea of Teitel’s alternative rule of 
law.
24
 
 
Considered from the perspective of constitutionalism, humanity law turns out to be a 
global normative project. Although respectful of the primacy of the natural person,
25
 
it derives the international legal personality of the individual from the rules of 
international law. Conversely, the teleological conception of international 
constitutionalism establishes a presumption in favour of the international legal 
personality of the individual.
26
 It then assesses the legitimacy and coherence of 
international law against this assumption. It is therefore conceived as an interpretive, 
non-binding device.
27
 
  
This section analysed the normative underpinnings of the teleology of international 
constitutionalism. It showed that the ethical foundation of international 
constitutionalism consists of a presumption in favour of the international legal 
personality of the individual. It also showed that the natural person is regarded as the 
ultimate beneficiary of all law, including international law. It concluded that 
international constitutionalism fosters the Kantian conception of law. In relation to 
its normative foundation, this section demonstrated that international 
constitutionalism is conceived as a non-binding interpretive mechanism. It concluded 
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 The latter, in turn, is regarded as “a halfway approach to promoting human rights-sensitive 
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24
 See supra note 22. 
25
 R. Teitel, supra note 16, at 677. 
26
 As discussed above. 
27
 See also Chapter 1, section 1.3.2.2.  
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that although it is devoid of any constitutive purpose, international constitutionalism 
evaluates international law against its telos instead of featuring a prescriptive global 
project. To that extent, it addresses coherence and legitimacy concerns. 
 
 
2.3 Normative components of international constitutionalism 
The previous section showed that the ultimate justification of international law is 
represented by the protection of the natural person. It also showed that 
constitutionalism is a non-binding instrument through which assess positive 
international law. It concluded that, as an interpretive instrument, it pursues the 
teleology of international law. It follows that the telos of international law turns out 
to be the telos of constitutionalism as well. However, scholars disagree on the 
normative content of the teleology of international law. Etzioni, for instance, writes 
that the idea of human rights is the “axiomatic concept or assumption” as well as “the 
primary normative concept for the construction of international law and norms.”28 
Others maintain that “respect for human dignity must be the ultimate concern.”29 
 
This section explores the normative features of constitutionalism. Sub-section 1 
analyses the normative components of human dignity.
30
 Sub-section 2 explores the 
relationship between human dignity and human rights. It shows that human dignity is 
the precondition and the outcome of human rights. Sub-section 3 evaluates the role 
of human dignity in shaping the normative features of constitutionalism. 
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2.3.1 Conceptions of human dignity and international law 
The idea of human dignity is a contested concept.
31
 In the absence of any universally 
accepted definition of it, Neuman proposes a minimal approach to the concept of 
human dignity. Such a minimum core of human dignity comprises three elements. 
The first element is referred to as the ontological claim.
32
 It maintains that “every 
human being possesses an intrinsic worth, merely by being human.”33 The second 
element is described as the relational claim.
34
 It establishes that the intrinsic worth of 
the person should be recognised and respected by others. The third element is 
represented by the limited-state claim.
35
 It addresses the relationship between the 
state and the individual. It establishes “that the state should be seen to exist for the 
sake of the individual and not vice versa.”36 Although the three elements of the 
minimum core of human dignity individually comport with the basic propositions of 
the individualistic conception of international law, Neuman’s approach was not 
conceived from the international legal perspective. 
  
International scholarship also addresses the issue of the normative foundations of 
human dignity. Tesón, for example, writes that international rules and processes 
should always be interpreted in a manner consistent with human dignity.
37
 In a more 
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 C. McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ 19 (1998) EJIL 655 
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radical way, Davidsson argues that commitment of states to human dignity and 
human values should represent their top priority. Specifically, it should be used as 
the benchmark to assess the legitimacy of any humanitarian intervention.
38
 Reference 
to human dignity and to “the intrinsic worth” of the person39 is also made in the 
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
40
 This shows that 
the concepts of human dignity and human rights are intertwined. In addition, 
McCrudden writes that such a relationship becomes explicit in the reference to 
human dignity contained in the Preambles of other international treaties and 
declarations.
41
 From this perspective, human dignity represents the precondition of 
human rights.
42
 By the same token, Schachter writes that the idea of dignity is a 
normative concept.
43
 
  
One way to single out the normative components of the minimum core of human 
dignity consists in examining the provisions of the international instruments referred 
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to above.
44
 Some provisions recognise human dignity as something inherent to the 
natural person.
45
 Others acknowledge either the entitlement
46
 or the right
47
 of the 
individual to an existence worthy of human dignity. They establish that the value of 
life in society is determined by “a sense of dignity.”48 The latter turns out to be 
“incompatible”49 with the most severe violations of human rights and it is 
“destroyed”50 by such extreme conditions. Other conditions, such as poverty and 
social exclusion, also constitute a violation of human dignity.
51
 A further set of 
provisions acknowledges that human dignity is respected or violated through the 
adoption of practical measures or concrete actions by any international actor. 
Therefore, they require drawing a balance between the protection of the sense of 
human dignity and the interests at stake. Section B of the Programme of Action 
adopted during the Vienna World Conference (1993), for example, addresses the 
issue of dignity along with the principles of equality and tolerance. Finally, 
provisions of the UDHR clearly associate human dignity with human rights. For 
example, the latter are regarded as the innate attributes of the person.
52
 The UDHR 
also stresses that economic, social and cultural rights are indispensable for human 
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dignity.
53
 Likewise, the Covenants (1966)
54
 and the Vienna World Conference 
(1993)
55
 establish that all human rights derive from the inherent dignity of the 
person. 
  
The analysis above shows that the normativity of human dignity is not determined by 
judicial interpretation and adjudication, neither does it stem from state practice. In 
light of positive international law, it is determined by the relevant provisions of 
universal instruments of international human rights law. In addition, the scrutiny of 
selected international provisions above shows that international law acknowledges 
the fundamental principle of human dignity.
56
 This section showed that such a 
principle is violated when a severe denial or violation of human rights occurs or 
when conditions of extreme poverty and social exclusion deprive the individual of 
the capability to enjoy basic human rights. It follows that the actual determination of 
the normative components of the principle of human dignity is based upon the 
underlying conception of human rights adopted.
57
   
 
 
2.3.2 Relationship between human dignity and human rights 
Although human dignity and human rights are regarded as distinct concepts,
58
 
international law scholars disagree about which of them has the logical and legal 
priority over the other. Sub-section 2.3.1 analysed the normative core of the concept 
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of human dignity. In order to determine the extent to which human dignity and 
human rights are interrelated concepts, this sub-section examines the concept of 
human rights. 
 
It is often contended that the idea of human rights is a normative concept whose 
justification is both legal and non-legal.
59
 On one hand, legal rights are human rights 
declared in international documents. On the other hand, non-legal rights are those 
which survive to a public and unobstructed scrutiny and complement the legal ones.
60
 
A passage from the Human Development Report 2000 (HDR 2000) states that: 
  
“Human rights express the bold idea that all people have claims to social arrangements 
that protect them from the worst abuses and deprivations – and that secure the freedom 
for a life of dignity. 
[…] no matter what the laws may be, individuals have certain rights by virtue of their 
humanity.”61  
 
With regard to the justiciability of human rights, Sen argues that everyone in a 
position to contribute to the realisation of those human rights is held responsible for 
his actions or omissions, even in the absence of a specific legal remedy.
62
 In addition, 
Higgins writes that: 
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“[J]usticiability is not the yardstick by which the status of a provision as a human right 
is to be judged. It is to be judged by reference to the authoritative nature of the sources 
that purport to identify it, by community expectation that an obligation exists.”63 
 
Others maintain that human rights are self-evident
64
 and they are not granted by the 
state.
65
  
 
None of the positions above-mentioned seems to challenge the assumption that any 
legal system recognises human rights as they are established in normative provisions. 
At the same time, they do not deny that human rights have a pre-legal foundation. 
Sen, for example, argues that interpretations of the term human rights imply “the 
existence of a corresponding moral claim.”66 In turn, the recognition of the 
underlying moral claim turns out to be a separate issue from the ground of that 
claim.
67
 It also proves to be an issue taken for granted when the moral claim becomes 
the object of a piece of fresh legislation.
68
 This shows that human rights do not 
originate in the legal system; they become a part of it through the process of 
legalisation. The HDR 2000, for example, states that: 
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“[L]egal rights should not be confused with human rights – nor it should be supposed 
that legal rights are sufficient for the fulfillment of human rights.”69  
 
From this perspective, human rights are regarded as ethical claims.
70
 In relation to 
international human rights law, Carozza writes that: 
 
“[I]t would be unrealistic and disingenuous to ignore the limitations of building the 
edifice of global human rights law merely on a positive law which has only a very thin 
practical accord beneath it. …The law which is constructed without attentiveness to the 
underlying cultural context tends toward abstraction which separates it from the society 
that it purports to regulate. 
[…] In short, the thin practical consensus on human rights alone is not self-sustaining; it 
depends on extra-legal sources of commitment about human status and worth and 
extra-legal sources of commitment to respecting that status and worth.”71 
 
The non-legal foundation of human rights is also compatible with different 
conceptions of legal rights. The HDR 2000, for instance, refers to human rights as a 
means through which achieve human freedom. Since human rights have an 
instrumental value, they are not regarded as an end in itself.
72
 From a different 
perspective, Carozza acknowledges human rights as procedural rights.
73
 Resort to 
each conception of legal rights affects the outcome of interpretation in two ways. The 
former conception entails a consequentialist approach while the latter entails a non-
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consequentialist approach.
74
 They determine different relationships with the 
normative concept of human dignity. There are three possible scenarios. The first one 
maintains that human dignity is the pre-condition of human rights.
75
 The second one 
recognises that human dignity is a human right in itself. The third one acknowledges 
human dignity as the outcome of human rights.
76
 The first scenario is a manifestation 
of the non-consequentialist approach. It entails that a human right is an end in itself. 
The second scenario is rejected by the minimal notion of human dignity, as discussed 
in section 2.3.1 above. The third scenario is a manifestation of the consequentialist 
approach. It establishes that human rights are instrumental to the preservation of 
human dignity. In theory, it is also possible that in the case of the first scenario, 
human rights serve a consequentialist function towards an end different from the 
minimum core of human dignity. In the case of the third scenario, human rights may 
be conceived as an end in itself and, nonetheless, end up protecting the minimum 
core of human dignity. 
 
This section showed that human dignity represents both the precondition and the 
outcome of human rights. It also showed that the minimum core of human dignity is 
implemented through the promotion and protection of human rights. It established 
that different conceptions of legal rights recognise different functions of human 
rights provisions. It concluded that they affect the relationship between human rights 
and human dignity in different ways.  
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2.3.3 Human dignity and international constitutionalism 
The previous sub-sections analysed the normative components of the concepts of 
human dignity and human rights. They established that the minimum core of human 
dignity becomes positive law through the process of legalisation of human rights. 
This sub-section examines the implications of adopting the minimum core of human 
dignity as the basic component of constitutionalism. 
 
Although scholarship on international constitutionalism evaluated the role of human 
rights from the limited perspective of the formal conception of international law,
77
 
the analysis of the normative concept of human dignity shows that international law 
is a value-oriented system.
78
 This establishes the presumption that all international 
actors, including the individual, are committed to respect the value-oriented 
characteristic of the system. Howard and Donnelly, for example, write that “[h]uman 
rights are a particular social practice that aims to realize a distinctive substantive 
conception of human dignity.”79 Likewise, Carozza points out that “reasoned 
reflection on human flourishing needs to take place at the level of individual persons 
in community with others.”80 From this standpoint, individuals are regarded “as 
having the capacity to assert claims to protect their essential dignity.”81  
 
The considerations above show that, by establishing a presumption in favour of the 
legal personality of the natural person, the principle of human dignity comports with 
the basic propositions of the individualistic conception of international law.
82
 As a 
consequence, the normative conception of human dignity determines the actual 
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features of constitutionalism. They comprise three normative components. The first 
component establishes that human dignity represents an end in itself whereas human 
rights are instrumental means for the preservation of human dignity. The second one 
recognises that human rights are both legal rights and ethical claims. From this 
perspective, they are conceived as valuable means through which create the 
conditions for the exercise of the individual’s freedom of choice. The third 
component acknowledges that there is an open catalogue of human rights. 
  
This section showed that the normative core of human dignity is compatible with the 
basic propositions of the individualistic conception of international law. It establishes 
that the relationship between the minimum core of human dignity and the 
teleological conception of international constitutionalism determine the normative 
components of constitutionalism. It concluded that the teleological conception of 
international constitutionalism possesses three normative components. 
 
 
2.4 Structural ordering arrangements 
Section 2.3 showed that the telos of international law is represented by the protection 
of the inherent dignity of the human person. It concluded that the normative 
components of human dignity become positive international law through the 
legalisation of human rights.
83
 This section examines the process of legalisation of 
human rights through the rule of law. It features the notion of international rule of 
law that is compatible with the tenets of the individualistic conception of 
international law. It establishes that the international rule of law is embedded in 
constitutionalism. Sub-section 1 analyses the theoretical components of the 
conception of rule of law recognised by international constitutionalism. Sub-section 
2 examines the subsequent process of operationalization of the conception of rule of 
law stemming from the tenets of the teleological conception of international 
constitutionalism. 
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The idea of rule of law is a contested concept.
84
 There is no universally accepted 
definition of it.
85
 Some refer to it as a notion that is equivalent to the principle pacta 
sunt servanda.
86
 Others describe it as the “law of rules.”87 Tamanaha argues that: 
 
“Law at the global level possesses unique characteristics that disrupt easy analogy to the 
rule of law in the context of nation states. The public international law system is 
conceptually constructed in terms of relations among sovereign states. There is no real 
legislature or executive. With limited exceptions (universal principles, and customary 
international law to which a state has not yet objected), the legal regimes that apply to a 
given sovereign state are only those that the state chooses to accept as applicable.”88  
 
It is widely recognised that states abide by the rules of international law.
89
 Franck, 
for example, argues that compliance is secured by the states’ perception of 
legitimacy of those rules.
90
 However, such perceptions of legitimacy by those to 
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whom the rules of international law are addressed are based on underlying 
conceptions of international law. Chapter 1 analysed different conceptions of 
international legal personality.
91
 It showed that acceptance of the basic propositions 
of each conception of modern international law affects the degree to which any rule 
is perceived as legitimate. Likewise, Tamanaha argues that:  
 
“[P]alpable differences in approach and attitude feed into how international law is 
understood and constituted.”92  
 
Section 2.3.1 established that the normative concept of human dignity stems from 
provisions of selected international human rights instruments.
93
 Section 2.3.2 showed 
that the normative components of human dignity become positive international law 
through the process of legalisation of human rights. As long as the universal human 
rights documents referred to above are UN treaties and declarations, for the purposes 
of this dissertation the concept of rule of law associated with the teleological 
conception of constitutionalism is grounded on UN law as well. Introduced as an 
agenda item of the UN General Assembly,
94
 UN law provides a conceptualisation of 
the idea of rule of law that is based on state practice.
95
 Although it does not establish 
a definition, it addresses the idea of rule of law in a holistic manner by focusing on 
the analysis of sub-topics.
96
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The notion of rule of law developed by the UN
97
 and its specialised body
98
 comports 
with the basic propositions of the individualistic conception of international law.
99
 It 
acknowledges that the rule of law is a principle of governance
100
 while international 
human rights norms and standards represent a substantive part of it.
101
 This global 
idea of rule of law complies with the normative components of international 
constitutionalism as well.
102
 Although it does not refer to the dignity of the person 
either in the UN General Assembly resolutions on the rule of law
103
 or in subsequent 
reports of the UN Secretary-General,
104
 it establishes the presumption that “human 
rights, the rule of law and democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing [and] 
they belong to the universal and indivisible core values and principles of the United 
Nations.”105 In addition, the World Summit Outcome (2005) recognised that the 
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commitment of UN members is not restricted to the UN Charter but embraces 
international law as a whole.
106
  
 
However, the two approaches depart from their common assumptions in the process 
of implementation of the rule of law. On one hand, the UN and its agencies put the 
national perspective at the centre of the rule of law assistance. They aim to involve 
the target population in all stages of the decision making process.
107
 On the other 
hand, the individualistic conception of international law recognises the natural person 
as the ultimate beneficiary of all law.
108
 To that extent, the individual is considered 
the central and smallest unit of the system.
109
 It follows that, whereas the procedures 
of implementation of the rule of law backed by the UN are ultimately grounded on 
the formal conception of international law,
110
 those embedded in the idealistic 
component of constitutionalism in international law focus on individuals as decision-
makers.     
 
 
2.4.1 The rule of law and international constitutionalism 
Section 2.3 showed that the individualistic conception of international law recognises 
that the idea of rule of law is instrumental to the preservation the normative core of 
human dignity. It established that the purpose of the rule of law is to implement 
provisions of international human rights law. This section examines the normative 
features of the rule of law. 
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The first feature acknowledges individuals as decision-makers. It stems from the 
presumption in favour of the personality of international law of the natural person.
111
 
Peters, for example, argues that the natural person is “the ultimate unit of legal 
concern.”112 From this standpoint, individuals partake in the process of creation of 
international norms by virtue of their participatory rights.
113
 Peters also writes that 
“the individual capacity to claim [before an international tribunal] is a limited 
functional equivalent to the law-making power of states.”114 
 
The second feature establishes that the rule of law is a means for the empowerment 
of individuals. It stems from the assumption that the individual possesses rights and 
obligations under international law, irrespective of nationality concerns.
115
 It entails 
that the function of the rule of law consists in creating the conditions for the 
fulfilment of the individual’s needs, both as a single and in society. The UN 
Secretary-General, for example, writes that the rule of law is a powerful tool for the 
empowerment of individuals and civil society.
116
 
 
The third feature recognises the value-oriented character of the process of 
implementation of the rule of law. It is derived from the normative concept of human 
dignity.
117
 The UN Secretary-General, for example, stresses that engagement in the 
rule of law assistance rests upon the “need to evaluate the impact of [its] 
programming on the lives of the peoples the Organization serves.”118 This entails that 
cultural diversity is a matter of utmost concern, especially in the field of long-term 
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development programmes in developing countries.
119
 It follows that the 
operationalization of the rule of law requires the constant participation of local 
communities in the various decision-making and verification processes. 
 
The fourth feature acknowledges the rule of law “as an ideal [rather] than a specific 
recipe for institutional design.”120 It has two main implications. First, the operational 
field of the rule of law is instrumental to attain extra-legal goals.
121
 The UN 
Secretary-General, for example, writes that: 
 
“Ultimately, legal protection as the means to achieve freedom from fear and freedom 
from want is the most sustainable form of protection.”122 
 
Secondly, it rejects the dichotomy between national and international rule of law, 
especially in areas where they converge and overlap.
123
 
 
This section examined the normative features of the idea of the rule of law from the 
perspective of the individualistic conception of international law. It established that 
the teleological conception of the rule of law possesses four normative features.  
 
 
2.4.2 Operationalization process 
The previous section examined the theoretical component of the idea of rule of law. 
In order to implement its normative features, it is contended that “[t]he rule of law as 
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a mere concept is not enough.”124 For instance, Ringers writes that to become 
operational, the idea of the rule of law should be accompanied by a structured 
procedure.
125
 Such a structured procedure may be linked to different conceptions of 
international law. This section evaluates the process of operationalization of the rule 
of law from the perspective of the teleological conception of constitutionalism. 
  
Section 2.3 showed that the teleology of international constitutionalism is 
represented by the protection of the minimum core of human dignity.
126
 It established 
that human dignity is both the precondition and the outcome of human rights.
127
 It 
concluded that the normative components of human dignity become positive 
international law through the legalisation of human rights.
128
 Subsequent process of 
operationalization of the rule of law is based on two assumptions. The first 
assumption establishes that since the individualistic conception of international law 
acknowledges the individual as the central and smallest unit of international law,
129
 
the process of operationalization of the rule of law fosters a bottom-up perspective
130
 
while recognising several decision-making levels. Peters, for example, argues that 
“the constitutional premise [is] that the ultimate point of reference should be 
individuals, not states.”131 However, international practice shows that states possess 
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the most developed apparatus for law-making and law enforcement. For example, a 
passage from the 2008 report of the Secretary-General on the rule of law reads: 
 
“No rule of law programme can be successful in the long turn if imposed from the 
outside. […] Leadership and decision-making for the programme must be in the hands 
of national stakeholders… National ownership also involves public consultation based 
on the principles of inclusion, participation, transparency and accountability.”132 
 
It follows that, in order to be realistic, any structured procedure for implementing the 
rule of law must take into consideration both theoretical and practical factors, as 
discussed above. 
 
The second assumption establishes that the bottom-up perspective confers on the 
process of operationalization of the rule of law an inductive character. The people-
centered characteristic of the structure procedure of the rule of law discussed above 
entails that the inductive character of the rule of law proves to be different from the 
inductive approach to international law developed by Schwarzenberger.
133
 The latter 
endorses a state-centered and formalistic conception of international law.
134
 On one 
hand, by describing the inductive process as both a verification
135
 and justification
136
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method for action and non-action by states, it turns out to be a state-centered 
approach. On the other hand, by establishing that the inductive approach is entirely 
grounded on the provisions of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice,
137
 it turns out to be a formalistic approach. 
 
This section analysed the process of operationalization of the conception of the rule 
of law arising from the teleological conception of international constitutionalism. It 
established that it entails a bottom-up perspective and it possesses an inductive 
character.  
 
 
2.5 Constitutionalism and international legal order: comparative perspective  
Previous sections examined the normative components of the teleological conception 
of constitutionalism.
138
 They showed that constitutionalism is an interpretive 
approach to international law aimed at protecting the normative core of human 
dignity
139
 through the implementation of a human rights-based rule of law.
140
 This 
section evaluates profiles of similarities and differences between the teleological 
conception of international constitutionalism and the policy-oriented approach of the 
New Haven school of international law. Bearing in mind the basic propositions of the 
actor conception of international law,
141
 it aims to evaluate theoretical and 
methodological implications of the teleological approaches to international law 
grounded on different conceptions of international law. 
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The New Haven school establishes the presumption that law is a means for creating a 
global public order of human dignity.
142
 A world order of human dignity is described 
as:  
 
“[O]ne which approximates the optimum access by all human beings to all things they 
cherish: power, wealth, enlightenment, skill, well-being, affection, respect, and 
rectitude.”143 
 
New Haven scholars maintain that international law has three main features.
144
 First, 
international law is not regarded as a states-only system and it is not dominated by 
the concept of national sovereignty.
145
 Portmann recognises this feature as the first 
basic proposition of the actor conception. It establishes that international law is not a 
set of rules, but an authoritative process of decision-making.
146
 Second, the 
international legal system comprises a plurality of actors. Each actor contributes to 
the creation of international norms.
147
 The third feature stems from the second one. It 
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establishes that international law is not the byproduct of customs or treaties only.
148
 
It also recognises that this is not in contrast with the role of the state in international 
law and international relations,
149
 as long as law is regarded as part of a broader 
social process.
150
 Portmann writes that the second and third feature of international 
law represent the basis of the second basic proposition of the actor conception, which 
establishes that participation to the international decision-making process is based on 
effective power to participate and it is not based on legal rules or specific acts of 
recognition.
151
 
 
The considerations above show that the New Haven school of international law 
pursues a teleological perspective. Like the teleological conception of international 
constitutionalism, the New Haven school of international law recognises that the 
natural person is the ultimate beneficiary of all law.
152
 Wiessner, for example, writes 
that: 
 
“[A]n ideal legal order should allow all individuals, and particularly the weakest among 
them, to realize themselves and accomplish their aspirations.”153  
 
However, to implement this principle, they rely upon different methodologies. On 
one hand, the New Haven school of international law does not provide any definition 
of human dignity. It acknowledges that the process of law-making consists of a 
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sequence of authoritative and controlling decisions.
154
 Such decisions are evaluated 
through international incidents.
155
 New Haven scholars argue that law-making 
process takes place “beyond, but including” the state.156 This does not imply an 
inductive approach to international. On the other hand, the process of 
operationalization of the rule of law arising from the teleological conception of 
international constitutionalism pursues a bottom-up and inductive approach.
157
  
 
Another similarity between international constitutionalism and the New Haven 
school of international law is that theory is regarded as important as practice. New 
Haven scholars argue that “[t]he touchstone of a good theory is its practical 
application.”158 On the other hand, international constitutionalism represents the 
ideological component behind the process of constitutionalisation.
159
 By the same 
token, New Haven scholars write that the passage from “law-in-the-books” to “law-
in-action” is particularly empowering for the individuals, “[provided that] they know 
how.”160 On the contrary, from the perspective of international constitutionalism 
commitment to individual empowerment is based on the idea of rule of law.
161
 
Therefore, the process of operationalization of the rule of law recognises that 
individuals are decision-makers.
162
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This section showed that international constitutionalism and the New Haven school 
of international law pursue a teleological approach to international law. It established 
that they share the common assumption that the telos of international law is 
represented by the commitment to the preservation of human dignity. It concluded 
that they depart from their common assumption in relation to methodological 
approaches. Therefore, they affect international practice in different ways. 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the concept of constitutionalism in light of the individualistic 
conception of international law. It analysed its normative components. It showed that 
constitutionalism is an interpretive approach through which assess positive 
international law. It concluded that international constitutionalism possesses two 
distinctive features. First, it is grounded on the principle of human dignity. It 
recognises that human dignity is an end in itself while human rights are instrumental 
to attain the goal of preservation of human dignity. Second, it relies upon the idea of 
rule of law. The process of operationalization of the rule of law recognises that 
individuals are decision-makers. It entails an inductive approach to international law. 
 
Chapter 3 applies the tenets of constitutionalism to the process of 
constitutionalisation of international law. Against this backdrop, it evaluates existent 
models of constitutionalisation of international legal system in light of concerns of 
fragmentation while leaving the analysis of other systems of international law to 
subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Constitutionalisation Processes and Practices in the International Legal System 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 examined the concept of constitutionalism in international law. It showed 
that it is based on the principle of human dignity and the rule of law. It concluded 
that the teleology of constitutionalism requires a process of operationalization 
grounded on a human rights-constraint. This chapter applies the tenets of 
constitutionalism to the process of constitutionalisation of international law. It 
examines conceptions of the constitutional matrix of international law while 
providing a review of existent models of international constitutionalisation. 
  
Section 3.2 evaluates the embryonic idea of the constitutional matrix of international 
law. It analyses existent proposals. It shows that they feature normative and 
descriptive projects. It establishes that they are not grounded on a general theory of 
constitutionalism in international law. Sub-section 1 evaluates the analytical matrix. 
It shows that it is regarded as a manifestation of the formal conception of 
international law and it entails a functional approach to international law. Sub-
section 2 examines the normative components of the teleological matrix. It shows 
that it is regarded as a manifestation of the individualistic conception of international 
law and it allows a holistic approach to international law. 
 
Section 3.3 examines existent constitutionalisation processes through the 
constitutional matrices. It shows that since scholarship addressed the issue of 
fragmentation exclusively from the perspective of the formal conception of 
international law, current literature relies upon the analytical matrix. Sub-section 1 
evaluates processes of macro-constitutionalisation in light of concerns of 
fragmentation. It analyses the constitutionalisation of the international legal system 
and the constitutionalisation of the United Nations. Sub-section 2 analyses processes 
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of micro-constitutionalisation. They comprise the constitutionalisation of the World 
Trade Organization and the constitutionalisation of the European Union. 
 
Section 3.4 examines existent constitutionalisation practices from the perspective of 
the teleological matrix. It shows the different implications of adopting a holistic and 
teleological approach to international law instead of the functional and formalistic 
approach underpinning the analytical matrix.    
 
 
3.2 Constitutional matrices of international law 
According to the tripartite structure of the constitutional approach to international 
law,
1
 constitutionalism represents the idealistic component behind the process of 
constitutionalisation. Chapter 2 showed that international constitutionalism is 
grounded on the principle of human dignity and the rule of law. This section analyses 
the process of constitutionalisation of international law. 
  
Existent contributions evaluate constitutionalisation in terms of the constitutional 
matrix of international law. Chapter 1 showed that current proposals are regarded as 
manifestations of the formal conception of international law.
2
 It also established that 
they are not grounded on a theory of international constitutionalism.
3
 The first 
attempt to evaluate the constitutional matrix in international legal system is traceable 
to Klabbers’ assessment of the opportunity to resort to international constitutionalism 
as a means to restore order within a fragmented system.
4
 It showed that the cardinal 
principles and rules of international law establish the conditions for the ordered 
functioning of international legal system. This approach recognises that once such 
conditions are established, they may be respected or violated. It concludes that resort 
                                                     
1
 N. Tsagourias, ‘Introduction – Constitutionalism: A Theoretical Roadmap’ in N. Tsagourias (ed.), 
Transnational Constitutionalism. International and European Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, p. 1. 
2
 See Chapter 1, section 1.3.2.3. 
3
 Ibid., section 1.3.2.2.  
4
 J. Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism Lite’ 1 (2004) Int’l Org. L. Rev. 31.  
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to the constitutional matrix cannot guarantee legal certainty, since there is no 
agreement on the identity of the cardinal principles and rules of international law. 
Klabbers writes that: 
  
“[S]uch a matrix would suggest that there are some values that simply cannot be 
affected: there is a bottom line, somewhere, somehow, an apparent unity underlying all 
apparent disunity.”5  
 
Klabbers argues that the search for unity in international law through the 
constitutional matrix is jeopardized by two factors. First, the idea of the 
constitutional matrix is affected by the paradox of anachronism. The latter implies 
that the idea of constitutionalism is able to bind the will of current and future 
generations to a normative order which is crystallized on the needs of the past.
6
 By 
neglecting the propensity of international law for change, Klabbers writes that the 
constitutional matrix would produce more fragmentation than unification of the 
system.
7
 Secondly, the concept of human rights is embedded in the idea of 
constitutionalism. Since the language of rights is pervasive and uncertain, Klabbers 
maintains that the constitutional matrix would undermine the politics of international 
law carried out by states and international organizations.
8
  
 
For the reasons detailed above, Klabbers concludes that global constitutional projects 
should be avoided.
9
 Viewed from this angle, the constitutional matrix is conceived as 
a prescriptive project through which redress difficulties arising from the phenomenon 
                                                     
5
 Ibid, at 49. 
6
 Ibid., at 50-53. For a philosophical perspective, see K. Skagen Ekeli, ‘Constitutional Experiments: 
Representing Future Generations Through Submajority Rules’ 17 (2009) J. Pol. Phil. 440 (arguing 
that within the national context, the paradox of anachronism is regarded as a problem related to 
submajority models and, as such, should be addressed by using alternative forms of deliberative 
democracy). 
7
 J. Klabbers, supra note 4, at 53. 
8
 According to Klabbers, the language of international human rights is pervasive and uncertain. 
Consequently, human rights end up undermining the politics of international law, in particular those 
of states and international organizations. Ibid., at 57.  
9
 Ibid., at 55.  
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of fragmentation of international law. Other conceptions of constitutionalisation 
conceive the constitutional matrix as an interpretive device. Subsection 1 examines 
the analytical matrix proposed by Dunoff and Trachtman. It shows that it is a 
descriptive device and it pursues a functional approach to international law. 
Subsection 2 evaluates the teleological matrix stemming from the concept of 
constitutionalism. It shows that it is a normative device that allows holistic 
interpretations of international law from the perspective of the individualistic 
conception of international law. 
 
 
3.2.1 Analytical matrix 
Dunoff and Trachtman describe the constitutional matrix as an analytical device.
10
 Its 
purpose is to rationalize the allocation of powers within the legal order of both 
international organizations and the international law system as a whole. Dunoff and 
Trachtman write that:  
 
“[A] functional approach permits conceptual analysis that is not premised upon a 
definition setting forth a group of necessary and sufficient conditions which determine 
whether a given order is constitutional or not. … [C]onstitutionalism consists of a type – 
rather than a quantum – of rules.”11 
 
Such a functional approach recognises that the process of constitutionalisation is an 
issue with autonomous relevance in international legal theory and practice. To assess 
the constitutional quality of the rules of international law, Dunoff and Trachtman 
establish a presumption: 
 
“We posit that the distinguishing feature of international constitutionalization is the 
extent to which international law-making authority is granted (or denied) to a 
                                                     
10
 J. L. Dunoff and J. P. Trachtman,’A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization’ in 
J. L. Dunoff and J. P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and 
Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 26-30 (hereinafter referred to 
as “the analytical matrix”). 
11
 Ibid., p. 9. 
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centralized authority. We thus focus on the extent to which international constitutions 
enable or constrain the production of international law.”12 
 
The analytical matrix comprises seven mechanisms.
13
 They are used to evaluate 
basic functions of constitutional norms.
14
 Such functions serve the purpose of 
enabling the formation of international law, constraining the formation of 
international law and supplementing domestic constitutional law as a result of the 
phenomenon of globalisation.
15
 Dunoff and Trachtman argue that the analytical 
matrix aims “to allow to compare the constitutional development of different 
regimes, but it does not allow to identify strengths and weaknesses in various 
regimes.”16 As a result, the functional approach embedded in the analytical matrix 
provides a map of the law-making centres of international regimes. Consequently, it 
does not address concerns of fragmentation, nor does it envision a prescriptive global 
project of constitutionalism.  
 
 
3.2.2 Teleological matrix  
Chapter 2 showed that the normative components of international constitutionalism 
are implemented through the rule of law. The latter is conceived as the process of 
legalisation of human rights.
17
 It acknowledges individuals as decision-makers.
18
 It 
also implies an inductive approach to international law.
19
 By implication, it is 
contended that the constitutional matrix implementing the normative components of 
                                                     
12
 Ibid., p. 4. 
13
 Ibid., pp. 10, 27-29. See Table 3.2.  
14
 Ibid., pp. 10-18. See Table 3.2. They are further analysed in section 3.4.1, in relation to the process 
of constitutionalisation of the World Trade Organization.  
15
 Ibid., p. 10. 
16
 Ibid., p. 30. 
17
 See Chapter 2, section 2.3.2.  
18
 Ibid., section 2.4.1.  
19
 Ibid., section 2.4.2.  
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the teleological conception of constitutionalism is grounded on positive international 
law. Regarded as one of the sources of positive international law, this section 
examines the teleological matrix in light of the UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development of 1986.
20
 It aims to show whether the right to development provides 
the basis for a procedural model of constitutionalisation which is consistent with the 
tenets of constitutionalism. 
 
The UN Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) establishes the right to 
development as a human right.
21
 It recognises that it represents a right to a process of 
development or a meta-right.
22
 Although the right to development was not conceived 
as a component of the constitutional matrix, provisions of the UN Declaration on the 
Right to Development (1986) may be interpreted in light of the normative 
components of the teleological conception of international constitutionalism.
23
 
 
 
Table 3.1: Teleology of constitutionalism 
Normative components of constitutionalism 
International legal personality of the individual 
Human dignity as an end in itself 
Open catalogue of human rights (legal rights and ethical claims) 
Rule of law (individuals as decision-makers, inductive approach) 
      
                                                     
20
 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development, UN Doc. A/RES/41/128, 4 
December 1986. For a historical and normative account, see I. D. Bunn, The Right to Development 
and International Economic Law: Legal and Moral Dimensions, Oxford and Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2012; R. N. Kiwanuka, ‘Developing Rights: The UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development’ 35 (1988) NILR 257.  
21
 Ibid., Article 1(1). 
22
 Ibid. See also A. Sengupta, The Human Right to Development, 32 (2004) Oxford Dev’t Stud. 179, at 
183, 191.  
23
 See Table 3.1.   
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The first normative component of constitutionalism establishes a presumption in 
favour of the legal personality of the individual.
24
 Article 1 of the UN Declaration on 
the Right to Development (1986) states that the right to development is an 
inalienable human right in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be 
realised.
25
 It also proclaims that every human person is entitled to participate in, 
contribute to and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development.
26
 
Article 2 of the UN Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) establishes that 
all individuals have a responsibility for development, individually and collectively.
27
 
The considerations above show that provisions of the UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development (1986) confer rights and duties on the natural person. Therefore, they 
recognise the legal personality of the individual. 
 
The second normative component of constitutionalism establishes that human dignity 
is an end in itself.
28
 As noted above, Article 1 of the UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development (1986) acknowledges both the notion of human rights as legal rights 
and human rights as ethical entitlements.
29
 The UN Independent Expert on the Right 
to Development writes that: 
  
“There is a view, particularly among lawyers of the positive school, that if certain rights 
are not legally enforceable they cannot be regarded as a human right. At best they can 
be regarded as social aspirations or statements of objectives. This view, however, 
confuses human rights with legal rights. Human rights precede law and are derived not 
from law but from the concept of human dignity. There is nothing in principle to prevent 
                                                     
24
 Ibid.  
25
 UN Declaration on the Right to Development (1986), supra note 20, Article 1(1). 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid., Article 2(2). 
28
 See Table 3.1.  
29
 UN Declaration on the Right to Development (1986), supra note 20, Article 1(1). See also Chapter 
2, section 2.3.2.  
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a right being an internationally recognized human right even if it is not individually 
justified.”30 
 
From this perspective, human dignity is conceived as the precondition of human 
rights. It implies that subsequent implementation of human rights aims to preserve 
human dignity.
31
 The considerations above show that the right to development 
complies with the second normative component of international constitutionalism. 
  
The third normative component of constitutionalism recognises an open catalogue of 
human rights.
32
 Article 1 of the UN Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) 
establishes that the right to development is a vector of human rights.
33
 It also 
acknowledges human rights as both legal rights and ethical claims.
34
 However, the 
legal conception of the right to development as a process of development that is 
grounded on a human rights-constraint is controversial.
35
 Donnelly, for example, 
acknowledges that the legal source of the right to development is represented by the 
                                                     
30
 UN Independent Expert on the Right to Development, first report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/WG.18/2, 
27 July 1999, para. 21 (emphasis added). For further analysis on the issue of human rights as 
entitlements, see UN Independent Expert on the Right to Development, fourth report, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2002/WG.18/2, 20 December 2001, para. 22. 
31
 Alston, for example, writes that “human rights derive from the inherent dignity and worth of the 
human person. They are thus above and prior to the state and would continue to exist regardless of 
action by the state or action by the international community to revoke their recognition.” P. Alston, 
‘Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development 1 (1988) Harv. Hum. 
Rts Y. B. 3, at 30. 
32
 See Table 3.1.  
33
 See supra note 25. 
34
 See supra note 29.   
35
 The right to development is often described as an aspirational or ineffective right. From this 
perspective, the right to development relies upon previous fulfilment of economic and social rights. 
As a consequence, it does not represent a human right to basic needs. See, among many, I. D. Bunn, 
supra note 20, at 78-83; F. Stewart, ‘Basic Needs Strategies, Human Rights, and the Right to 
Development 11 (1989) Hum. Rts. Q. 347; P. Uvin, ‘From the Right to Development to the Rights-
Based Approach: How “Human Rights” Entered Development’ 17 (2007) Development in Practice 
597. 
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provisions of the International Bill of Human Rights.
36
 From this perspective, the 
right to development is regarded as a synthesis of previously recognised human 
rights. Considered as a dangerous tautology, Donnelly writes that: 
 
“The right to development is not just a charming delusion, but a threat to human rights, 
and a particularly insidious threat because it plays upon our fondest hopes and best 
desires, and diverts attention from more productive ways of linking human rights and 
development.”37 
 
This interpretation entails that the right to development is not a human right in 
itself.
38
 However, Alston argues that Donnelly’s position presents two major 
drawbacks.
39
 First, it turns out to be an excessive legalistic interpretation of the 
provisions of international human rights law. Secondly, the fact that a consensus 
within the UN has developed through the years without the support of a specialized 
field of academic literature represents an important but not decisive element to assess 
the existence of a new right. In addition, Shelton writes that interpretations of the 
corpus of UN law as a whole may lead to opposite conclusions. It follows that the 
                                                     
36
 It includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), UN Doc. A/RES/217 (III) A, 10 
December 1948; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), UN Doc. A/6316, 
16 December 1966, reprinted in 6 ILM (1967) 368; the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
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15 (1985) Cal. W. Int’l L. J. 473, at 479-89. See also J. P. Humphrey, ‘The International Bill of 
Rights: Scope and Implementation’ 17 (1976) Wm & Mary L. Rev. 527.  
37
 J. Donnelly, supra note 36, at 508. Donnelly argues that the word development should be regarded 
as personal development only; ibid., at 507. In line with this position, practitioners tend to describe 
development as a word devoid of any specific meaning. See G. Rist, ‘Development as a Buzzword’ 17 
(2008) Development in Practice 485 (referring to development as a cluster of economic policies in 
developing countries rather than a universal human right).  
38
 J. Donnelly, supra note 36, at 483. 
39
 P. Alston, ‘The Shortcomings of a “Garfield the Cat” Approach to the Right to Development’ 15 
(1985) Cal. W. Int’l L. J. 510, at 513. Contra, J. Donnelly, ‘The Theology of the Right to 
Development: A Reply to Alston’ 15 (1985) Cal. W. Int’l L. J. 519, at 522 (arguing that the right to 
development is a “baseless right without significant benefits”).  
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textual analysis of international human rights law alone is not sufficient to show the 
non-existence of the right to development.
40
 
 
Another perspective envisions the idea of development as a precondition for the 
enjoyment of human rights.
41
 Viewed from this angle, development is regarded as 
economic development, not as a human right. As an economic approach, it 
recognises human rights and development policies as distinct issues. Likewise, the 
UN Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) acknowledges that the right to 
development and development are different concepts.
42
 However, it recognises that 
economic, social, cultural and political development represents the good protected by 
the right to development.
43
 
 
The considerations above show that although problematic, the meta-right to 
development established by the UN Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) 
comports with the third normative component of constitutionalism. On one hand, 
Article 1(1) thereof does not restrict the catalogue of human rights composing the 
vector of human rights. On the other hand, it recognises both the notion of human 
rights as legal rights and human rights as ethical entitlements.  
  
The fourth normative component of international constitutionalism is represented by 
the rule of law.
44
 Chapter 2 showed that the idea of rule of law embedded in 
constitutionalism requires interpretations of positive international law from a bottom-
                                                     
40
 D. Shelton, ‘A Response to Donnelly and Alston’ 15 (1985) Cal. W. Int’l L. J. 524, at 514, 525.  
41
 B. I. Hamm, ‘A Human Rights Approach to Development’ 23 (2001) Hum. Rts. Q. 1005. On the 
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up and inductive perspective.
45
 Article 2 of the UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development (1986) establishes that: 
 
“The human person is the central subject of development and should be the active 
participant and beneficiary of the right to development.”46 
 
It also recognises that individuals are duty bearers, individually and collectively,
47
 
and they share the responsibility for development with states.
48
 The collective of 
rights and duties set forth in the provisions of the UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development (1986) confers on the right to development a participatory character.
49
 
It has two main implications. First, individuals bear the responsibility to take into 
account the need for full respect of their human rights and their duties to the 
community.
50
 In relation to this, the Global Consultation report (1990) states that: 
 
“Since the individual is the central subject of development, the individual must take 
responsibility for her or his own welfare to the extent possible.”51  
 
In addition, Pellet writes that the right to development is a right to the means of self-
realisation.
52
 Secondly, states have the right and the duty to formulate national 
                                                     
45
 See Chapter 2, section 2.4.   
46
 UN Declaration on the Right to Development (1986), supra note 20, Article 2(1). 
47
 Ibid., Article 2(2). 
48
 Ibid., Article 2(3).  
49
 A passage from the Global Consultation report (1990) reads: “[Participation] should be viewed both 
as a means to an end and as an end in itself.” UN Secretary-General, Global Consultation on the Right 
to Development as a Human Right, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1990/9/Rev.1, 26 September 1990, para. 149.  
For a comment on the Global Consultation see R. L. Barsh, ‘The Right to Development as a Human 
Right: Results of the Global Consultation’ 13 (1991) Hum. Rts. Q. 322, at 329; J. C. N. Paul, 
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 UN Declaration on the Right to Development (1986), supra note 20, Article 2(2). 
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 Global Consultation report (1990), supra note 49, para. 119. 
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development policies aiming at the constant improvement of the individuals on the 
basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development.
53
 
Furthermore, states have the primary responsibility for the creation of conditions 
favourable to the realisation of the right to development.
54
 The considerations above 
show that provisions of the UN Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) are 
consistent with the bottom-up conception of the rule of law. 
 
Another aspect of the rule of law is the phase of implementation. Chapter 2 showed 
that the rule of law becomes operational through a structured procedure.
55
 Regarded 
as a controversial aspect,
56
 the UN Independent Expert on the Right to Development 
suggests that one way to implement the right to development consists of the adoption 
of development compacts. Development compacts require specific negotiations on a 
case-by-case basis.
57
 Negotiations must ensure the prioritization of certain basic 
commitments,
58
 popular participation
59
 and accountability of the actors involved.
60
 
                                                                                                                                                      
52
 “[The right to development] is a right to the concretization of proclaimed rights or, to put it in a 
nutshell, it is a right to the means of self-realisation.” A. Pellet, ‘The Functions of the Right to 
Development: A Right to Self-Realisation’ (1984) Third World Legal Studies 129, at 135. 
53
 Declaration on the Right to Development (1986), supra note 20, Article 2(3). 
54
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55
 Chapter 2, section 2.4.2. 
56
 As pointed out, for instance, by the UN Independent Expert. See UN Independent Expert on the 
Right to Development, second report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/WG.18/CRP.1, 11 September 2000, 
paras 26-34. 
57
 See UN Independent Expert on the Right to Development, first report, supra note 30, para. 34. See 
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58
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59
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The considerations above show that provisions of the UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development (1986) are consistent with the inductive character of the rule of law. 
 
This section showed that provisions of the UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development (1986) comply with the normative components of the teleological 
conception of international constitutionalism. It concluded that as long as the meta-
right to development is conceived as a particular vector of human rights, it may be 
regarded as the normative component of the teleological matrix.  
 
 
3.3 Constitutionalisation processes and the analytical matrix 
Section 2 examined the process of constitutionalisation of the international legal 
system through the idea of the constitutional matrix. It showed that existent 
constitutional matrices serve different functions. On one hand, the analytical matrix 
entails a functional approach to international law. It aims to analyse the extent to 
which international law-making authority is granted or denied to a central authority. 
Its structured procedure comprises seven mechanisms through which evaluate three 
constitutional functions.
61
 On the other hand, the teleological matrix allows holistic 
interpretations of international law. It aims to implement the tenets of international 
constitutionalism. Its structured procedure consists of the meta-right to development 
and it is implemented through development compacts. Although negotiations of 
development compacts are conducted on a case-by-case basis, they are all governed 
by three mandatory requirements.
62
  
 
This section evaluates existent contributions on the constitutionalisation of 
international legal regimes through the constitutional matrix. As long as international 
legal scholarship addresses the issue of constitutionalisation from the limited 
                                                                                                                                                      
this.” UN Independent Expert on the Right to Development, first report, supra note 30, para 41 
(emphasis added). 
61
 See section 3.2.1.  
62
 See section 3.2.2.  
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perspective of the formal conception of international law,
63
 current literature relies 
upon the analytical matrix. Bearing in mind terminological and theoretical concerns 
about the idea of global constitutionalism,
64
 this section shows that all existent 
contributions acknowledge the process of constitutionalisation as an instrument of 
institutional design. It also assesses how constitutionalisation processes affect the 
phenomenon of fragmentation. 
 
 
Table 3.2: Structural requirements of the constitutional matrices 
 
Analytical matrix 
 
Mechanisms 
 
Functions 
 Horizontal allocation of powers Enabling 
constitutionalisation 
 Vertical allocation of powers Constraining 
constitutionalisation 
 Supremacy Supplemental 
constitutionalisation 
 Stability  
 Fundamental rights  
 Review  
 Accountability/democracy  
 
Teleological Matrix 
                                                                                                  
Mandatory requirements 
 Prioritization of basic commitments (protection of the worst-
off, the poorest and the most vulnerable) 
 Popular participation (active, free and meaningful) 
 Accountability of actors involved (individuals and states, 
individually and collectively) 
 
 
                                                     
63
 As discussed in Chapter 1, section 1.3.2.  
64
 Ibid, section 1.3.1. 
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3.3.1 Macro-constitutionalisation 
Previously scrutinised constitutional regimes of international law can be divided into 
two categories. Micro-constitutionalisation comprises the process of 
constitutionalisation of international organizations.
65
 Macro-constitutionalisation 
comprises the process of constitutionalisation of international organizations 
possessing constitutional functions that extend beyond the law of a specific 
international organization.
66
 The process of constitutionalisation of the international 
legal system as a whole is also regarded as a form of macro-constitutionalisation.
67
 
This sub-section examines models of macro-constitutionalisation. It analyses the 
constitutionalisation of the international legal system and the constitutionalisation of 
the United Nations. Sub-section 2 evaluates models of micro-constitutionalisation. It 
examines the process of constitutionalisation of both the World Trade Organization 
and the European Union. 
 
 
3.3.1.1 International legal system 
Existent contributions to the study of the analytical matrix are hosted in the volume 
Ruling the World?, edited by Dunoff and Trachtman.
68
 Paulus examined the 
constitutionalisation of international law.
69
 The analysis relies upon a combination of 
both comparative and functionalist elements.
70
 As a result, Paulus envisions three 
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 A. Peters, ‘The Merits of Global Constitutionalism’ 16 (2009) Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 397, at 
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 Ibid., at 408.  
67
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components of the process of constitutionalisation instead of relying upon the 
structural requirements of the analytical matrix.
71
 
  
The first formal component is the recognition of international law as a system.
72
 
Paulus argues that international law is made up of both primary and secondary rules 
on law-making by sovereign states.
73
 The international legal system is thus 
conceived as a state-centered and hierarchical system. Its ultimate rule of recognition 
is represented by a formal constitution, which is derived from extra-legal sources of 
legitimacy.
74
 
 
The second formal component is institutionalism.
75
 Paulus argues that states are the 
primary subjects of international law. They possess the power to create international 
organizations. The latter, in turn, are endowed with internal law-making power.
76
 
Other international actors, such as non-state actors and individuals, do not possess 
any law-making power.
77
 From this perspective, the constitutionalisation of 
international legal system aims to create a comprehensive institutional order which is 
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complementary to national constitutions.
78
 Paulus writes that the United Nations is 
regarded as the international actor having the potential to constitutionalise the entire 
international legal system. On one hand, its Charter contains both primary and 
secondary rules.
79
 On the other hand, the UN Charter’s provisions are regarded as 
hierarchically superior norms by virtue of Article 103 thereof. In addition, Paulus 
points out the limits of recognising the UN Charter as the constitutional structure of 
international law: 
  
“In summary, the Charter relies on general international law rather than defining its 
basic parameters.”80  
 
Consequently, the analysis of the constitutionalisation of international law relies 
upon substantive principles of international law, which are considered the 
constitutional principles of the international legal system.
81
  
 
The third formal component concerns the analysis of the substantive principles of 
constitutionalisation.
82
 With regard to jus cogens norms and obligations erga omnes, 
Paulus writes that jus cogens norms, such as the prohibition of the use of force or 
genocide, do not necessarily belong to the international constitution. As long as they 
lack any mechanism of enforcement, they are not effective norms.
83
 As a result, they 
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ultimately depend on the consensus of the entire international community of states.
84
 
Obligations erga omnes, such as the right to self-determination, are regarded as 
constitutional principles. Paulus writes that although the right to self-determination 
lacks a mechanism of enforcement, it “bears on the question of who is to be regarded 
as a legal subject.”85 Drawing from these assumptions, Paulus examines an 
alternative set of constitutional principles.
86
 The analysis aims to establish whether 
such constitutional principles belong to the international legal order. They comprise 
six established patterns of standards and principles of domestic constitutions.  
 
The first principle is democracy.
87
 Paulus writes that democracy at the international 
level is different from democracy at the national level. For instance, tasks such as 
climate change and free trade cannot be resolved at the national level. Instead, 
solutions must be negotiated at the international level.
88
 However, while recognising 
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that democratic decision-making requires a polity, Paulus argues that in the absence 
of a global polity, the international legal system is affected by a democratic deficit.
89
 
Viewed from this angle, the principle of democracy proves to be meaningful only at 
the national level. To be democratic, the international legal system should possess an 
international consensus procedure open to direct participation of individuals and non-
state entities, coupled with democratic decision-making mechanisms within states. 
Paulus writes that: 
 
“[O]nly an international order that reaches the level of individual human beings can be 
called ‘constitutional.’”90  
 
The second principle is the rule of law.
91
 It stems from the assumption that “as all 
humans are created equal, rule itself is conditioned on rules that are equal for 
everybody.”92 Paulus argues that although international law is a system without a 
central compulsory jurisdiction,
93
 the rule of law is guaranteed by judicialization.
94
 
For instance, specialized areas of international law, such as international trade and 
international criminal law, are covered by adjudication. In addition, a few regional 
jurisdictions, most notably the EU, have a binding system for judicial protection of 
individual rights.
95
 Within this context, the constitutionalisation of the international 
rule of law would cover the entire international legal system. Paulus writes that it 
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“can be achieved only by improving the democratic legitimacy of all the actors 
involved.”96  
 
The third principle is the separation of powers.
97
 Unlike the domestic system, 
international law does not possess any system of separation of powers. Even the UN 
Charter does not establish a system of separation of powers.
98
 Therefore, Paulus 
concludes that it is a principle that is not fulfilled by the international system.  
 
The fourth constitutional principle is referred to as the state’s rights.99 It is derived 
from the conception of international law as a state-centered system.
100
 Paulus argues 
that Article 2 of the UN Charter, for example, establishes the principle of equal 
sovereignty of states and the subsequent right of non-interference in internal 
affairs.
101
 However, since international law does not provide for any mechanism of 
enforcement and international judicial control relies upon previous consent of states, 
Paulus concludes that the principle of state’s rights is not a constitutional principle of 
international law.
102
  
 
The fifth principle of constitutionalism is human rights protection.
103
 Paulus writes 
that international human rights law does not provide for supremacy and direct effect 
on individuals.
104
 By implication, it cannot be enforced in the domestic legal order 
without collaboration of the state. Likewise, international law lacks a compulsory 
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mechanism to hold international organisations and other international actors 
accountable for human rights violations.
105
  
 
The sixth constitutional principle is solidarity.
106
 Paulus writes that at the 
international level it lacks operationalization.
107
 Therefore, it has no practical 
implications. Subsequent constitutionalisation of the principle of international 
solidarity is doomed to be elusive.
108
  
 
The considerations above show that the international legal system is undergoing a 
limited process of constitutionalisation. Vertical allocation of power and supremacy 
of the provisions of the UN Charter prove that international law is a hierarchical 
system grounded on the rule of law and it has the potential to develop into a 
democratic system. Although described as a form of analogical constitutionalism,
109
 
Paulus writes that the international legal system serves the function of constraining 
constitutionalisation:
110
 
 
“[T]he international constitutional order itself resembles in effectiveness and coercion 
the domestic legal order. […] As in the domestic sphere, constitutionalization may lead 
to a limitation rather than an extension of international power.”111 
 
From this perspective, the constitutionalisation of international legal system 
addresses the phenomenon of fragmentation by establishing a hierarchical system of 
rules. It acknowledges the supremacy of the rule-system of an international 
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organization with quasi-universal membership such as the UN. Hence, it proposes a 
methodological approach that rejects the findings of the ILC Report on 
Fragmentation (2006).
112
     
 
 
3.3.1.2 The United Nations 
The United Nations is an international organization with universal mandate
113
 and 
quasi-universal membership.
114
 Some argue that the UN possesses constitutional 
quality as well.
115
 Fassbender, for example, writes that “the UN Charter is a 
constitution in the clothes of a treaty, because no other garment was available in 
1945.”116 However, the significance of the UN constitution is debated.117 
 
Crawford draws a distinction between two meanings of the term constitution. In a 
weak sense, constitution means “the constituent instrument of an organization – of 
whatever kind.”118 In a stronger sense, the term refers to “a constitution which 
constitutes a society and not just an organization – a constitution which is basal and 
not only bureaucratic.”119 As long as it establishes the United Nations, the UN 
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Charter proves to be the constitution of the international organisation in the weak 
sense. With regard to the stronger meaning, to be regarded as a constitution the UN 
Charter had to become the constitution of something more than the United Nations 
organization.
120
 Crawford writes that: 
 
“[W]e are only at the beginning of developments which might justify such a conclusion. 
In particular, democratization and individual (and minority) rights would need to be 
much better instituted at the global level than at present, despite some advances in 
recent years.”121  
 
Fassbender examined the constitutionalisation process of the United Nations from 
the perspective of the analytical matrix proposed by Dunoff and Trachtman.
122
 Based 
on previous studies on the UN constitution, the analysis is grounded on three 
assumptions. The first assumption is that the UN Charter complies with an abstract 
model of constitution. The latter is derived from a comparative study of the “typical 
features of existing (state) constitutions.”123 The findings of the study show that: 
  
“A constitution is a set of fundamental norms about the organization and performance 
of governmental functions in a community, and the relationship between the 
government and those who are governed.”124 
 
Fassbender writes that the UN Charter possesses five constitutional features: 
 
“[I]t establishes a horizontal and vertical system of governance, it defines the members 
of the constitutional community, it claims supremacy over “ordinary” international law 
(art. 103), and it aspires to eternity.”125 
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Subsequent interpretation of the UN constitution in light of the analytical matrix 
shows that all the features of the analytical matrix comport with the features of the 
UN constitution. Fassbender draws a distinction between two types of constitutional 
features. Four features are regarded as “elementary or primordial” characteristics and 
apply to every constitution.
126
 The remaining three features are considered typical 
Western ideas which confer a peculiar meaning on a given constitution.
127
 In 
addition, Fassbender argues that international constitutionalism is both an 
institutional and a normative project
128
 whereas Dunoff and Trachtman feature the 
constitutional matrix as an analytical device.
129
 As a result, Fassbender conceives the 
UN constitution as both a normative project and an analytical device. 
  
The first cluster comprises characteristics shared by all constitutions.
130
 Compared to 
the analytical matrix, they appear to correspond to four of its mechanisms.
131
 The UN 
system of governance is regarded as equivalent to horizontal allocation of powers.
132
 
Fassbender argues that the legislative power is held by both the Security Council
133
 
and the General Assembly.
134
 The executive power is held by the Security Council
135
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while some administrative tasks are performed by the General Assembly, the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Trusteeship Council, under the 
assistance of the Secretary-General.
136
 Finally, a limited judicial function is held by 
the International Court of Justice.
137
  
 
Sovereignty is regarded as equal to vertical allocation of powers.
138
 It addresses the 
issue of the dichotomy between the UN jurisdiction and the domestic one. 
Fassbender argues that within the UN, sovereign equality is grounded on the ban of 
the use of force.
139
 Its main implication for the UN member states is that: 
 
“[A]dherence to the Charter does not diminish, or is in conflict with, a state’s sovereign 
equality. Rather, it is a necessary prerequisite for the de facto enjoyment of that right. It 
is only by the Charter and the organization it has established that a state’s sovereign 
equality can be effectively protected.”140 
 
With regard to non-member states, Fassbender writes that: 
 
“It follows from the concept of sovereign equality that if a state can refer to Chapter VII 
as a remedy against unlawful action by other states, it must also be a possible addressee 
of Chapter VII measures when it violates the Charter. 
[…] It is not by virtue of Article 2(6) that the Charter is binding on non-member states. 
Rather the Charter is binding because of the overriding principle of sovereign equality. 
Accordingly, non-member states are not only bound by the principles of Article 2, but 
the Charter as a whole.”141 
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Fassbender resorts to the criterion of the universal application of the UN Charter to 
strengthen the idea that it was created with constitutional quality.
142
 In contrast, 
others argue that not all international law is subject to the provisions of the UN 
Charter.
143
 This suggests that the UN Charter cannot be regarded as the source of all 
international norms.
144
 
 
Hierarchy of norms is regarded as equivalent to supremacy.
145
 Supremacy of UN law 
is established by Article 103 of the UN Charter.
146
 Fassbender argues that the UN 
Charter is part of a broader constitutional process comprising “by-laws,” including 
treaties and customary rules. Constitutional by-laws of the international community 
are regarded as accessory instruments which are endowed with constitutional quality 
to the extent that “they characterize in detail, or further develop”147 the UN Charter 
“as the framework constitution of the international community.”148 For example, the 
two international Covenants of 1966 are constitutional by-laws of the international 
community. Repeal of UN Charter’s provisions by such by-laws would be 
impossible because Article 103 of the UN Charter prevails.
149
  
  
According to the structural requirements of the analytical matrix, stability refers to 
the procedure for amendments of the UN Charter and the absence of the possibility 
of state withdrawal, as set forth in Articles 108 and 109 of the UN Charter.
150
 By 
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virtue of a simple deduction, Fassbender concludes that this is a constitutional 
attribute of the UN Charter: 
  
“Every constitution aspires to eternity. The Charter, too, makes such a claim: It only 
provides for amendments, not for termination.”151  
 
Fassbender writes that the definition of membership
152
 is another constitutional 
feature of the UN Charter, although it does not represent one of the features of the 
analytical matrix. Other UN constitutional features comprise the constitutional 
history of the Charter, the choice of the name “Charter,” and the “constitutional 
moment” for the international community as a whole.153    
 
The second cluster comprises the principle of protection of fundamental rights, 
judicial review by the ICJ for the acts of the UN bodies and accountability of and 
democratic representation within the UN institutions.
154
 Fassbender argues that they 
are manifestations of Western ideals.
155
 Therefore, none of them is regarded as a 
component of the abstract model of constitution referred to above. However, they are 
implicitly regarded as compatible with the UN constitution.
156
 No further analysis is 
then provided for any of them.  
 
The considerations above show that the process of constitutionalisation of the United 
Nations is fraught with ambiguity. On one hand, the UN Charter is portrayed as a 
formal constitution. From this perspective, the UN Charter is not undergoing any 
process of constitutionalisation. On the other hand, the UN constitution aims to 
regulate the functioning of the entire international legal system. Although the 
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ultimate purpose of the UN constitution is not the creation of a world state,
157
 its 
constitutional project envisions an international order of sovereign states. 
Consequently, international law-making process and enforcement mechanisms are 
governed by state will. 
 
From this perspective, resort to the analytical matrix does not provide for an 
alternative insight. Since the UN Charter is conceived as a normative project, it 
addresses the phenomenon of fragmentation by establishing the superiority of UN 
law. It thus doubles the findings of the constitutionalisation of international legal 
system.
158
 By conceiving Article 103 of the UN Charter as the normative foundation 
of the international law of conflicts instead of the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969,
159
 the UN Charter rejects the 
methodology set forth in the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006).
160
      
 
 
3.2.3 Micro-constitutionalisation 
This section evaluates the constitutionalisation processes of the World Trade 
Organization and the European Union. Some argue that the Council of Europe is 
undergoing a process of constitutionalisation as well. Stone Sweet, for example, 
writes that the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) has been 
constitutionalised through incorporation in national legal orders.
161
 Within this 
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perspective, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is regarded as a 
transnational constitutional court, although it does not possess any review power.
162
 
Others maintain that the constitutionalisation of the Council of Europe is still at a 
lower stage.
163
 Since existent contributions on the analytical matrix do not address 
this issue, for the purposes of this dissertation the process of constitutionalisation of 
the Council of Europe is not taken into account.   
 
 
3.3.2.1The World Trade Organization 
Legal scholarship examined the issue of the constitutionalisation of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) from different perspectives.
164
 There are three main 
positions.
165
 The first one is referred to as institutional architecture. It is headed by 
the work of Jackson.
166
 It advocates a rule-based approach for decentralised 
international markets.
167
 The second one consists of the constitutional entrenchment 
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of normative values proposed by Petersmann.
168
 It suggests to privilege a set of 
normative commitments that would create certain citizen’s rights vis-à-vis the 
governmental powers.
169
 The third one is represented by constitutionalisation 
through judicial mediation. Its leading scholar is Cass.
170
 It considers the mediating 
and norm-generating elements of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as the 
engine of constitutional development.
171
  
 
In addition to the classifications described above, Dunoff and Trachtman resort to the 
analytical matrix to evaluate the constitutional quality of WTO law.
172
 They examine 
the extent to which WTO law allows enabling, constraining and supplemental 
constitutionalisation.
173
 By focusing on the constitutional functions instead of the 
seven mechanisms of the analytical matrix,
174
 they aim to provide both theoretical 
reasons and practical evidence of the value of the constitutional reading of the 
WTO.
175
 Although they provide no justification for the use of constitutional language 
in assessing regimes of international law, they assume that this perspective is correct 
or valuable.
176
 They also write that while interpretations based on the seven features 
of the analytical matrix rely upon existing patterns of domestic constitutionalism, 
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interpretations based on the three constitutional functions create a pattern of analysis 
tailored to the characteristics of international law.
177
  
 
Dunoff and Trachtman carry out separate evaluations of the constitutionalisation of 
the WTO. They reach different conclusions on it. With regard to ‘enabling 
constitutionalisation,’178 Dunoff writes that since the WTO possesses an 
underdeveloped legislative capacity,
179
 WTO law does not comprise any norms 
authorizing or facilitating the production of international law. Nor the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism can make new law, as shown by the crossed interpretation of 
Articles 3(2) and 19(2) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
180
 On the 
other hand, Trachtman writes that:  
 
“Enabling international constitutionalization at the WTO […] would mean the end of 
the WTO as a member organization in which each member (in formal terms) retains 
veto power.”181  
 
However, in functional terms the establishment of the DSU represents a 
manifestation of enabling constitutionalisation.
182
 Within this perspective, Trachtman 
writes that one mechanism which is able to justify the establishment of rules 
allowing enabling constitutionalisation is ‘constitutional economics.’  
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“Constitutional economics assumes that constitutions exist to resolve transactional costs 
and strategic problems that would otherwise prevent the achievement of efficient 
exchanges of authority.”183  
 
It follows from the description above that it is not clear whether the idea of 
constitutional economics is conceived as an instrument of political and economic 
choice or as a normative concept.  
 
In relation to ‘constraining constitutionalisation,’184 Trachtman writes that compared 
to enabling constitutionalisation, it represents the other side of the same coin:
185
  
 
“Constraining international constitutionalization might take the form of restrictions on 
scope of lawmaking at the international level, either in terms of subject matter or in 
terms of procedural limitations.”186  
 
Trachtman argues that the WTO does not possess any such norms.
187
 On the other 
hand, Dunoff maintains that there are few, if any, examples of constraining 
constitutionalisation at the WTO. Fundamental rights, for instance, are generally 
regarded as a form of constraining constitutionalisation. However, WTO law 
currently contains no explicit provisions protecting fundamental rights.
188
 Another 
form of constraining constitutionalisation is represented by judicial review. Dunoff 
writes that whereas the WTO panels review the conformity of domestic measures 
with ordinary WTO norms, they do not review the legality of acts by WTO 
institutions.
189
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With regard to ‘supplemental constitutionalisation,’190 Trachtman writes that its 
demand can rise as a consequence of the multiform globalisation of the markets.
191
 
The democratic deficit of representation within the WTO, for instance, may represent 
a claim for enabling constitutionalisation.
192
 On the other hand, Dunoff argues that 
there is no pressure for such norms, since the WTO does not threaten domestic 
constitutional orders.
193
  
 
In conclusion, Dunoff argues that a positivist approach to the WTO does not 
recognise any constitutional quality of the WTO system.
194
 On the contrary, 
Trachtman maintains that the WTO constitution is a part of the international legal 
system and it is endowed with enabling, constraining and supplemental functions.
195
 
Trachtman also writes that in order to redress the phenomenon of fragmentation, the 
process of constitutionalisation would require the adoption of tertiary rules: 
 
“[T]ertiary rules allocate authority among constitutions: among state constitutions, 
between state constitutions and international organization constitutions, and among 
international organization constitutions.”196 
 
Such rules would represent an important component of both enabling and 
constraining constitutionalisation.
197
 In addition, constitutional economics provides 
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“a set of tools that can be brought to bear on whether tertiary rules are needed, and 
what their structure should be.”198 Thus, Trachtman concludes that the whole process 
of constitutionalisation is not determined or regulated by the analytical matrix alone. 
It is complemented by the concept of constitutional economics: 
 
“A constitutional matrix is a useful tool of taxonomy, but it cannot answer the question, 
at any particular level, of what constitutional features are needed. Rather, it is 
constitutional economics that provides the answer to this question. […] Optimal 
constitutions are those that maximize the benefits of production of international law, net 
of transaction costs.”199 
 
This section showed that the process of constitutionalisation of the WTO through the 
analytical matrix turns out to be an assessment of the autonomy of the WTO legal 
order. Resort to the analytical matrix recognises that as a self-contained regime, the 
WTO is a part of the international legal system. However, the latter is conceived as a 
functional entity whose purpose is to facilitate inter-state relations. This section also 
showed that the concept of constitutional economics is regarded as the teleology of 
all WTO law. Thus, interpretations of the WTO legal system through the analytical 
matrix serve the function of improving the efficiency of WTO law through the 
evaluation of functional uses of positive international law.  
 
From this perspective, the constitutionalisation of the WTO does not address the 
phenomenon of fragmentation. It neither upholds nor does it reject the 
methodological approach to fragmentation set forth in the ILC Report on 
Fragmentation (2006).
200
 Had the WTO primary law established any international 
law conflict clause, referring to a set of rules of general international law such as the 
provisions of the VCLT (1969),
201
 fragmentation would have been a matter of utmost 
concern for the international trade system. This shows that interpretations of WTO 
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law in light of the structural requirements of the analytical matrix do not feature any 
normative project. On the contrary, they serve a non-binding interpretive function of 
current positive international law from a strictly functional perspective. 
 
  
3.3.2.2 The European Union 
Constitutionalism within the European Union is a contested issue.
202
 Current 
contributions examine the constitutional quality of the EU institutional architecture 
in relation to domestic constitutions. Walker wrote the contribution on EU 
constitutionalism hosted in Ruling the World.
203
 However, the analysis takes no heed 
of the structural requirements of the analytical matrix. Instead, Walker suggests a 
multilevel interpretation of constitutionalism.
204
 The latter establishes the assumption 
that EU constitutionalism is composed of five constitutive frames. Among them, the 
EU legal order represents the judicial frame and it is grounded on the rule of law.
205
 
Collectively, such frames form an uneven backdrop of constitutionalism which is 
portrayed as a form of documentary constitutionalism.
206
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Scholarship on EU constitutionalism is grouped in skeptical and non-skeptical 
positions.
207
 Walker endorses the non-skeptical position.
208
 In Ruling the World, 
three clusters of strategic approaches to the EU process of integration are regarded as 
the theoretical background of the EU constitutional project.
209
 The first cluster 
comprises strategies of intensification of the constitutional project. It is grounded on 
the premise that the EU “is capable of becoming a thick constitutional frame in self-
authorizing and social terms as well as in legal and political-institutional terms.”210 
The second cluster is represented by the strategy of nominalization. It establishes that 
the formal act of labelling a treaty as a constitution would provide a sense of maturity 
of the process of constitutionalisation.
211
 The third cluster is referred to as the 
strategy of refinement. It aims to set out a new configuration of the relations between 
EU member states and different orders of polity. It affects the basic legal and 
political-institutional frames of constitutionalism.
212
  
 
Walker’s assessment of EU process of constitutionalisation presents a high degree of 
sophistication. However, it establishes a retrospective focus of analysis that justifies 
an already constituted entity through the use of constitutional language.
213
 Thus, it 
turns out to be an appraisal of the status quo rather than a proposal for future 
constitutionalisation of the EU. In addition, Walker’s approach does not take into 
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account the contribution of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon to the process 
of constitutionalisation.
214
 Reference to the reform treaty is limited to the recognition 
that: 
 
“[The signing of the Lisbon Treaty represents] a nominally non-constitutional initiative 
that proceed[s] on the same intergovernmental basis as all of its predecessor treaties 
since the Treaty of Rome but retain[s] the vast majority of the substantive constitutional 
strategies of adjustment and refinement of the legal order and institutional system 
previously found in the Constitutional Treaty.”215   
 
No further analysis of the impact of Lisbon Treaty on EU legal architecture is 
provided.
216
  
 
This section showed that scholarship on constitutionalisation of international law 
never examined the EU legal system through the mechanisms and functions of the 
analytical matrix. One reason is that the purpose of the analytical matrix is to 
rationalize the allocation of international law-making powers to a centralized 
authority.
217
 However, the EU is one of the most advanced autonomous regimes of 
international law and it is endowed with binding mechanisms of enforcement and 
judicial review. This suggests that assessment of EU law through the analytical 
matrix is not necessary to advance the internal efficiency of EU legal order. Another 
reason is that as an international organization, the EU functioning entails a functional 
approach to international law. Consequently, resort to the analytical matrix would not 
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address the issue of fragmentation of general international law. Unlike the WTO,
218
 
the characteristics of the EU legal order suggest that there is no scope to envision 
compliance with an international law of conflict, such as the one outlined in the ILC 
Report on Fragmentation (2006),
219
 by either the EU as an international organization 
or any if its member states. 
    
 
3.4 Constitutionalisation practices and the teleological matrix 
Section 3.3 examined processes of constitutionalisation of international law through 
the analytical matrix. It showed that macro-constitutionalisation processes feature a 
formal hierarchy of the sources of international law. It also showed that micro-
constitutionalisation processes entail a functionalist approach to international law. It 
concluded that interpretations of rule systems of international law do not rely upon 
general international law to solve normative conflicts. Therefore, they do not take 
into consideration the findings of the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006). 
 
Chapter 1 analysed both the concept of fragmentation and international 
constitutionalism. It established that they are contested concepts. It concluded that 
their essentially contested nature depends on underlying conceptions of international 
law. This chapter analysed the concept of constitutionalisation. It showed that the 
analytical matrix is regarded as a manifestation of the formal conception of 
international law
220
 and it does not address definitional and theoretical issues.
221
 This 
chapter also showed that the teleological matrix is grounded on the individualistic 
conception of international law,
222
 which is also conceived as the operational process 
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of a specific conception of constitutionalism.
223
 Finally, it showed that the two 
matrices are interpretive tools, not constitutive ones.
224
  
 
Drawing from the considerations above, an argument is made that all constitutional 
processes examined in section 3.3 can be interpreted in light of the teleological 
matrix as well. This section evaluates constitutional practices through the normative 
components of the teleological matrix. It aims to outline the difference between the 
outcomes of interpretations of selected rule-systems carried out through the two 
constitutional matrices in order to establish how they affect the phenomenon of 
fragmentation of international law.  
 
 
3.4.1 International legal system 
Section 3.2 showed that the teleological matrix is grounded on positive international 
law. It analysed the normative origins of its structural components.
225
 It established 
that the process of constitutionalisation serves the function of implementing the 
tenets of constitutionalism through the meta-right to development. It concluded that 
for the purposes of this dissertation, the preferred methodology through which 
implement the normative components of constitutionalism
226
 is the development 
compact. The latter entails the prioritization of basic commitments, popular 
participation and accountability of all actors involved as well as a case-by-case 
approach.
227
   
 
The international legal system may be interpreted in light of the individualistic 
conception of international law through the teleological matrix. From this 
perspective, its process of constitutionalisation, although non-binding, affects the 
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phenomenon of fragmentation by imposing a teleological perspective over a formal 
hierarchy of norms.
228
 It thus rejects the outcome of the constitutionalisation process 
through the analytical matrix.
229
 The main difference between the two instruments is 
that the teleological matrix is derived from a theoretical background of international 
constitutionalism.
230
 Consequently, it possesses a tripartite structure and each 
category is endowed with different functions. On the contrary, the analytical matrix 
avoids definitional and theoretical issues.
231
 Drawing from this assumption, Paulus 
argues that the UN Charter is the constitution of international law.
232
  
 
Viewed from this angle, the process of constitutionalisation proves to be limited to 
the recognition that international legal system possesses a formal constitution. 
Hence, the process and its outcome are regarded as the same thing.
233
 In light of the 
teleological matrix, the process of constitutionalisation is represented by the 
implementation of the mandatory requirements of the teleological matrix.
234
 
However, such normative components are derived from the idea of the development 
compact, which requires a case-by-case approach. It follows that the teleological 
matrix is useful to evaluate selected constitutionalisation practices of international 
law instead of the constitutionalisation of international legal system as a whole. 
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3.4.2 The United Nations 
Section 3.2.2 above showed that the teleological matrix is grounded on UN law. The 
UN Declaration on the Right to Development (1986)
235
 is regarded as the blueprint 
for the constitutionalisation process. It establishes that the individual is the ultimate 
beneficiary of the process of development. Realization of the right to development 
entails that individuals and states share the responsibility for implementation, both 
individually and collectively. This section applies the three mandatory components 
of the development compact
236
 to the institutional organization of the UN.  
 
First, the prioritization of basic commitments
237
 is derived from both the provisions 
of the UN Charter establishing the mandate of the international organization
238
 and 
provisions of the UDHR.
239
 Within this context, commitment to the protection of the 
most disadvantaged people aims to secure progress and development for the whole 
international community. 
 
Second, active, free and meaningful participation by the people
240
 in the functioning 
of the UN calls for direct participation as well as representative participation through 
member states. The former is absent from the institutional structure of the UN.
241
 The 
latter implies a democratic polity. The requirement of popular participation affects 
both the UN institutional architecture and the acts of its bodies and specialised 
agencies.
242
 As for the institutional architecture, the non-democratic composition of 
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the UN Security Council undermines the principle of equality of UN member 
states.
243
 Likewise, democratic representation within the UN bodies and institutions 
is regarded as a matter of utmost concern.
244
 Failure to address democratic 
representation within the institutions jeopardizes the attainment of the goals of the 
organization.
245
 As regards the acts of UN bodies and agencies, popular participation 
implies that involvement of the target population in all aspects of decision-making 
and policy-making is a mandatory requirement.
246
 
 
Third, UN bodies and agencies should be held accountable against the first two 
mandatory requirements of the teleological matrix.
247
 It implies that failure to respect 
those conditions would make impossible to achieve the goals set forth in the UN 
Charter. This shows that the teleological matrix addresses concerns of legitimacy of 
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and coherence within the UN legal order. As an interpretive device, it does not 
propose any practical solution. Therefore, it does not suggest any prescriptive project 
of global constitutionalism.
248
  
 
There are three main differences between the constitutionalisation practices of the 
UN envisioned by the teleological matrix and the ones featured by the analytical 
matrix. Firstly, as discussed in relation to the constitutionalisation of international 
legal order,
249
 the teleological matrix is grounded on the tenets of constitutionalism 
and it serves a specific procedural function whereas the analytical matrix is not 
grounded on any theoretical background of international constitutionalism. It follows 
that the latter avoids any definitional issue of the term constitutionalisation in 
relation to UN law. Secondly, section 3.2.2 showed that the teleological matrix 
pursues a holistic approach to international law whereas the analytical matrix devises 
a functional approach to international law. Thirdly, while the teleological matrix is a 
manifestation of the individualistic conception of international law, the analytical 
matrix is a manifestation of the formal conception of international law.
250
 Therefore, 
the latter does not address individuals as the primary unit of concern of UN law. 
 
In light of concerns of fragmentation, the two matrices establish two different 
approaches. On one hand, recourse to the analytical matrix determines that the UN 
Charter represents the formal constitution of international law. It thus doubles the 
findings of the analysis of the constitutionalisation process of the international legal 
system.
251
 On the other hand, the teleological matrix requires a case-by-case 
approach. As long as it does not establish a one-fits-all model of interpretation of 
international law, it applies to selected aspects of UN law instead of the UN Charter 
as a whole.      
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3.4.3 The World Trade Organization 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the analysis of WTO law from the perspective 
of the teleological matrix is carried out in light of the three normative components of 
the teleological matrix.
252
 By implication, the fact that the WTO is an autonomous 
regime of international law
253
 is not regarded as a characteristic of the process of 
constitutionalisation of the WTO. The first component of the teleological matrix 
consists of the prioritization of basic commitments.
254
 Although WTO law does not 
address concerns of the natural person, provisions on least developed countries 
(LDCs) aim to protect its poorest and most vulnerable member states.
255
 For 
example, Article XI:2 of the WTO constitutive treaty establishes that the LDCs 
recognised as such by the United Nations will only be required to undertake 
commitments and concessions to the extent consistent with their individual 
development, financial and trade needs or their administrative and institutional 
capabilities.
256
 Other provisions include Article 24 of the DSU establishing special 
procedures governing the settlement of disputes involving LDCs
257
 and Article 27.2 
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of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) 
establishing that prohibitions on subsidies do not apply to LDCs.
258
  
 
The second component of the teleological matrix is represented by popular 
participation.
259
 As noted above,
260
 WTO law does not provide for any form of 
popular participation at the WTO.
261
 The third component of the teleological matrix 
is described as the accountability of actors involved.
262
 Section 3.3.2.1 showed that 
mechanisms to held WTO members accountable are restricted to the WTO panels’ 
review of the conformity of domestic measures with WTO norms. It also established 
that neither panels nor the Appellate Body review the legality of acts by WTO 
institutions against WTO law. 
 
The considerations above show that the WTO is an international actor whose 
mandate does not recognise the individual as the primary unit of concern. Trachtman, 
for example, argues that “as long as human rights are implemented somewhere, they 
need not to be implemented at the WTO per se.”263 It implies that states are regarded 
as the primary international actors. The analysis above also suggests that the main 
difference between the analytical matrix and the teleological matrix is that the latter 
does not establish a functional approach to WTO law. This entails that the analytical 
matrix addresses concerns of internal efficiency of the WTO legal order. As a result, 
recourse to the functional approach to WTO law contributes to the perception of the 
phenomenon of fragmentation of international law whereas the holistic approach to 
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international law entailed by the teleological matrix addresses coherence concerns of 
WTO law in light of the individualistic conception of international law.           
 
 
3.4.4 The European Union 
Section 3.3.2.2 showed that existent scholarship on the constitutionalisation of EU 
law does not take into consideration either the analytical matrix or the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon. This sub-section evaluates the EU legal order from the 
perspective of the teleological matrix in light of innovations introduced by the 
Lisbon Treaty.  
 
With regard to the prioritization of basic commitments,
264
 EU law does not address 
individuals directly. Although EU policies address specific needs of vulnerable 
people, such as access to affordable financial services,
265
 they are implemented 
separately by member states. In addition, the EU Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP) grants specific tariff preferences to developing countries, vulnerable 
developing countries and least developed countries.
266
 One of the major innovations 
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon is that the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (EU Charter)
267
 is now primary law of the EU.
268
 Consequently, EU 
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content, see VV.AA, ‘EU Reshapes Import Scheme for Developing Countries’ 284 (2011) EU Focus 
35. 
267
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union OJ C 83/389 30.3.2010. 
268
 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) OJ C 83/13, 30.3.2010, Article 6(1). 
On the historical meaning and content of the Charter see, among many, D. Denman, ‘The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights’ 4 (2010) Eur. Hum. Rts L. Rev. 349; G. De Burca, ‘The Drafting of the European 
Union Charter of Fundamental Rights’ 26 (2001) Eur. L. Rev. 126. For a critical assessment of the EU 
system of human rights, see F. R. Llorente, ‘A Charter of Dubious Utility’ 1 (2003) IJCL 405, at 408. 
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institutions have the duty to protect the rights enshrined in the EU Charter in the 
exercise of their powers. Likewise, member states are subjected to the same duty in 
executing EU law.
269
 Article 1 of the EU Charter establishes that the limit to all EU 
actions is human dignity: 
 
“Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.” 
 
Since the purpose of the EU Charter is to restate rights already recognised as general 
principles of EU law,
270
 a large body of case law deals with the issue of human 
dignity.
271
  
 
With regard to popular participation,
272
 EU law establishes mechanisms for direct 
participation in the life of the EU,
273
 in addition to representative forms of 
participation.
274
 The Lisbon Treaty introduced the European Citizens’ Initiative 
                                                     
269
 VV.AA, ‘Oh Brave New World! Lisbon Enters into Force’ Legislative Comment, 267 (2010) EU 
Focus 1, at 3. 
270
 D. Denman, supra note 268, at 350. See also ECJ, Case C-540/03 Parliament and Council (Family 
Reunification) [2006] E.C.R. I-5769, para. 38: “the principal aim of the Charter, as is apparent from its 
preamble, is to reaffirm ‘rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and 
international obligations common to the Member States, the Treaty on European Union, the 
Community Treaties, the [ECHR], the Social Charters adopted by the Community and by the Council 
of Europe and the case-law of the Court… and of the European Court of Human Rights’.”  
271
 Two prominent cases are Netherlands v Parliament and Council of 2001 and Omega of 2004. ECJ, 
Netherlands v Parliament and Council, Case C-377/98, [2001] E.C.R. I-7079; ECJ (First Chamber), 
Omega Spielhallen und Automatenaufstellungs GmbH v Bundesstadt Bonn, Case C-36/02 [2004] 
E.C.R. I-9609.  
272
 See Table 3.2.  
273
 Prior to the Lisbon Treaty it was limited to the right to petition to the European Parliament (Article 
227 TFEU), the right to apply to the European Ombudsman (Article 228 TFEU), and the right to 
address the European institutions and bodies (Article 20.2, d TFEU). Consolidated version of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) OJ C 83/47, 30.3.2010.   
274
 Representative democracy within the EU consists of the representation of EU citizens in the 
European Parliament (Article 10.2 TEU) and the presence of EU political parties (Article 10.4 TEU 
and Article 224 TFEU). See also Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 4 November 2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the 
rules regarding their funding, OJ L 297, 15.11.2003.  
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(ECI),
275
 which confers the right to present legislative proposal to the European 
Commission on European citizens.
276
 Article 11(4) TEU reads: 
 
“No less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member 
States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the 
framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where the 
citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of 
implementing the Treaties.”277 
 
The provision above is completed by Article 24 TFEU.
278
 It establishes that the 
procedures and conditions required for an ECI shall be determined by means of a 
regulation. Regulation 211/2011 establishes the conditions and procedures required 
for an ECI.
279
  
 
Another mechanism for participatory democracy in the EU is the system of 
consultations. Article 10.3 TEU states that: 
 
“Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. 
Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizens.”280 
 
                                                     
275
 VV.AA, ‘Details of European Citizens’ Initiative Proposed’ 271 (2010) EU Focus 1.  
276
 For an overview of precedent proposals for a popular initiative in the EU, see A. Auer, ‘European 
Citizens’ Initiative’ 1 (2005) E. C. L. Rev. 79. See also Direct Democracy, supra note 235, at 930 and 
accompanying notes. On the difference between the ECI and the right to petition, see R. Deplano, 
‘The Citizens of Democracy: Participation for Integration in the European Union after the Lisbon 
Treaty’ 19 (2011) Hum. Rts. Brief 8. 
277
 TEU, supra note 268, Article 11(4). 
278
 TFEU, supra note 273, Article 24. 
279
  Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 
on the citizens’ initiative, OJ L 65/1, 11.3.2011. 
280
 TEU, supra note 268, Article 10.3.  
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Accordingly, the European Commission has developed a system of public 
consultations through which EU citizens engage in the process of shaping EU 
policies, prior to a decision by the European Commission.
281
  
 
With regard to the accountability of actors involved,
282
 acts of both the EU 
institutions and member states are subject to the judicial review of the European 
Court of Justice.
283
 
 
The considerations above show that the EU legal system is concerned with the 
centrality of the natural person. Treaty provisions creating the EU internal market are 
implemented by member states while policy strategies are decided by EU 
institutions. Operationalization processes of EU policies comply with the structural 
requirements of the teleological matrix, although the prioritization of basic 
commitments is grounded on the principle of equality of EU citizens instead of the 
recognition of the individual as the primary unit of EU law.  
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the concept of constitutionalisation of international law. It 
showed that existent contributions evaluate the process of constitutionalisation of 
regimes of international law in terms of the constitutional matrix of international law. 
It examined existent patterns of constitutional matrices. It showed that scholarship 
relies exclusively upon the analytical matrix. The latter entails a functional and 
formal approach to international law and it is not grounded on a general theory of 
international constitutionalism. The analysis of constitutional processes included the 
                                                     
281
 The system of public consultations was not introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. See Commission 
communication, ‘Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue – General Principles 
and Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission’, COM(2002) 704 
final, at 3. See also V. Cuesta Lopez, ‘The Lisbon Treaty’s Provisions on Democratic Principles: A 
Legal Framework for Participatory Democracy’ 16 (2010) Eur. Public Law 123, at 132-138. 
282
 See Table 3.2.  
283
 TEU, supra note 268, Article 19(3).  
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assessment of the international legal system, the United Nations, the World Trade 
Organization and the European Union. This chapter also evaluated the above-
mentioned models of constitutionalisation in light of the normative components of 
the teleological matrix. It concluded that the teleological matrix does not apply to 
models of macro-constitutionalisation while it determines different outcomes in 
relation to micro-constitutionalisation practices. 
 
This chapter analysed selected regimes of international law. It established that UN 
law, WTO law and EU law are regarded as manifestations of the formal and state-
centered conception of international law. In order to contribute to the theory of 
international constitutionalism from a different perspective, Chapters 4 and 5 
evaluate the constitutional processes of regional organizations with a teleological and 
people-centered mandate. They assess the extent to which the analytical matrix and 
the teleological matrix contribute to restore unity in international law through the 
legal orders of such regional organisations while leaving the final appraisal of the 
relationship between international constitutionalism and fragmentation of 
international law to Chapter 6.  
129 
 
CHAPTER 4 
Constitutional Assessment of the Union of South American Nations 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Chapter 1 showed that the constitutionalisation of international law is regarded as 
one of the remedies to the phenomenon of fragmentation. Chapter 2 examined the 
substantive concept of constitutionalism in international law while Chapter 3 
evaluated the procedural idea of constitutionalisation. Chapter 3 also analysed 
existent constitutionalisation practices through the two matrices of international law. 
This chapter examines the constitutionalisation process of the Union of South 
American Nations (USAN, also known by its Spanish acronym UNASUR)
1
 from the 
perspective of the analytical matrix and the teleological matrix. Its purpose is to 
assess the extent to which recourse to constitutionalisation is helpful to restore unity 
in international law in context of a regional economic and social integration with a 
people-centered mandate. 
  
USAN’s model of integration is conceived as an alternative to previous schemes of 
regional economic integration in Latin America.
2
 It is also regarded as a model of 
integration alternative to the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (BAA, also known 
by its Spanish acronym ALBA).
3
 On one hand, USAN establishes a free trade area. 
On the other hand, the BAA establishes a scheme of cooperation and mutual 
assistance among its member states that rejects policies of trade liberalization. For 
the purpose of this dissertation, the analysis focuses on the Latin American continent. 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 aim to contribute to the development of the theory of 
international constitutionalism by analysing rule-systems of international law other 
                                                          
1
 Spanish: Uniòn de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR). Most of the English literature refers to it as 
UNASUR. 
2
 See infra section 4.2. 
3
 Spanish: Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America (ALBA). The process of 
constitutionalisation of the BAA is the object of Chapter 5. 
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than those belonging to the Western legal tradition. Although the African continent 
and the Asia-Pacific region established own patterns of regional economic 
integration,
4
 Latin America offers a context that is helpful to the original scope of 
this study. As discussed in Chapter 1, current contributions to the theory of 
international constitutionalism share the same liberal-democratic underpinnings.
5
 
Models of constitutionalisation examined in Chapter 3 confirm this assumption. 
Thus, the constitutional analysis of USAN law and the BAA law provides the 
framework for a paradigm-shifting towards a global theory of international 
constitutionalism. 
   
Section 4.2 situates USAN in context of South American regionalism. It examines its 
historical and normative background as well as its institutional organization. It shows 
that USAN is an integration of existing regional and sub-regional integrations. 
  
Section 4.3 analyses USAN law from the perspective of international 
constitutionalism. Sub-section 1 shows that interpretations of USAN law from the 
perspective of the formal conception of international law determine conceptions of 
international constitutionalism that are not helpful to redress the phenomenon of 
fragmentation of international law. Sub-section 2 shows that USAN law comports 
with the basic propositions of the individual conception of international law and it 
possesses a teleological conception of international constitutionalism. 
    
Section 4.4 evaluates USAN’s constitutionalisation process. Bearing in mind 
terminological and theoretical problems associated with global constitutionalism, 
sub-section 1 examines the primary law of USAN from the perspective of the 
analytical matrix. It shows that USAN law does not serve any of the three 
                                                          
4
 Examples of such regional integrations in the African continent are the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
Examples of integrations in the Asia-Pacific region are the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Examples of integrations in the 
Arab world are the Arab Common Market (ACM) and the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA). 
5
 See Chapter 1, section 1.3.2.2. See also C. E. J. Schwöbel, ‘Organic Global Constitutionalism’ 23 
(2010) LJIL 529; C. E. J. Schwöbel, ‘Situating the Debate on Global Constitutionalism’ 8 (2010) IJCL 
611; C. E. J. Schwöbel, ‘The Holy Trinity of International Legal Debate’ 24 (2011) LJIL 1035.   
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constitutional functions of the analytical matrix. It concludes that with regard to 
USAN law, the analytical matrix does not represent a means through which redress 
the phenomenon of fragmentation of international law. Sub-section 2 analyses USAN 
law from the perspective of the teleological matrix. It shows that USAN law 
comports with the normative components of the teleological matrix. 
  
Section 4.5 examines USAN’s constitutionalisation outcomes from the perspective of 
the teleological matrix. Sub-section 1 examines the rules governing the Bank of the 
South. Sub-section 2 evaluates projects implementing USAN’s prioritized areas in 
the field of universal access to healthcare services.   
 
 
4.2 The Union of South American Nations (USAN) 
USAN is a governmental organization that aims to foster a deeper economic, social 
and political integration among South American Nations.
6
 This section situates 
USAN in context of South American regionalism. Sub-section 1 outlines USAN’s 
historical background. It shows that USAN is conceived as a pattern of integration 
alternative to previous ones. Sub-section 2 evaluates the relationship between 
USAN’s legal order and early regional agreements. It shows that USAN is an 
integration of existing regional and sub-regional integrations. Sub-section 3 
examines USAN’s institutional organization. 
 
 
4.2.1 Historical background 
Article 2 of USAN constitutive treaty (2008) establishes that USAN’s general 
objective is to build a cultural, social, economic and political integration among 
South American peoples while strengthening the sovereignty and independence of its 
member states. USAN member states comprise the twelve South American 
                                                          
6
 Union of South American Nations (USAN), constitutive treaty, Brasilia, 23 May 2008 (hereinafter 
referred to as USAN constitutive treaty), as reported in 15 (2009) Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 465, Articles 
1 and 2. It entered into force on 11 March 2011. 
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countries.
7
 Prior to the creation of USAN, South American nations never reached 
political consensus on proposals to foster deeper economic integration through the 
creation of market-driven models of regional integration, such as the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA).
8
  
 
Failure to reach an agreement on the FTAA
9
 arises from political and ideological 
differences among parties. The consultation stalemate rests on two dominant 
positions. On one side, countries aligned with Brazil
10
 and Venezuela
11
 contrast free 
trade agreements with the United States, which is regarded as the strongest proponent 
of trade liberalization. Brazil’s position arises from political concerns over the 
different size of national economies.
12
 It is contended that the creation of a free trade 
area with the most developed economies of the world, such as the United States, 
would negatively affect the populations of the smallest and most vulnerable 
countries.
13
 Although this is not an absolute position against free trade, it recognises 
that the smallest and most vulnerable economies of the Americas are South 
American countries. On the other side, Venezuela’s position arises from historical 
and ideological contingences. It relies upon XIX century’s political ideas, especially 
the ideas of Simon Bolìvar and Jose Martì,
14
 to foster the integration and unity of 
                                                          
7
 French Guyana is the only USAN non-member state.  
8
 The FTAA proposal was launched by the United States during the first Summit of the Americas. See 
First Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, Miami, Florida, 9-11 
December 1994, available at < http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Summits_e.asp > (last visited 10 June 2012). 
The purpose of the FTAA consists of the creation of a free trade area covering the entire American 
continent. See K. C. Kennedy, ‘The FTAA Negotiations: A Melodrama in Five Acts’ 1 (2003-2004) 
Int’l L. Rev. 121.  
9
 P. Rynerson, ‘The Free Trade Area of the Americas: Dead before it Was Ever Born’ 13 (2007) Law 
& Bus. Rev. Am. 183. M. Baquero-Herrera, ‘Latin American Update: Something is Going On in Latin 
America’ 12 (2006) Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 613. 
10
 A. de Moura Borges, ‘The Brazilian Perspective on the FTAA’ 10 (2004) Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 
695. 
11
 C. H. Blake, ‘The Dynamics of Economic Integration in Venezuela and Their Implication for the 
FTAA Process’ 15 (2009) Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 81. 
12
 See Table 4.1.  
13
 See supra note 10. 
14
 H. M. Erisman, ‘ALBA as a Neobolivarian Challenge: Prospects and Problems’ 3 (2011) IJCS 235. 
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South America as well as to redress the adverse effects of colonialism and economic 
liberalization on Latin American populations. It is an absolute position against free 
trade policies.
15
 
 
Opposition to the FTAA led to the creation of new forms of regionalism concerned 
with social development through economic cooperation.
16
 On one hand, Brazil’s 
initiative gathered consensus to create a South American Community of Nations 
(SACN)
17
 operating within the framework of the Latin America Integration 
Association (LAIA).
18
 It was eventually established in 2008 as USAN.
19
 On the other 
hand, Venezuela’s initiative culminated in the creation of the BAA.20 
                                                          
15
 Policies rejecting trade liberalization are referred to as ‘post-neoliberal.’ However, the term neo-
liberalism does not benefit from a universal definition. For an overview see, among many, S. G. 
Sreejith, ‘Public International Law and the WTO: A Reckoning of Legal Positivism and 
Neoliberalism’ 9 (2007-2008) San Diego Int’l L. J. 5, at 46-53. With emphasis to the South American 
continent, see L. Macdonald and A. Ruckert (eds.), Post-Neoliberalism in the Americas, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009; E. Sader, ‘Postneoliberalism in Latin America’ 51 (2009) Development Dialogue 
171. With specific regard to the BAA, Backer and Molina write that “[the BAA] is grounded in the 
notion that globalization cannot be left to the private sector but must be overseen by the state in order 
to maximize the welfare of its citizens.” L. C. Backer and A. Molina, ‘Cuba and the Construction of 
Alternative Global Trade Systems: ALBA and Free Trade in the Americas’ 31 (2010) Penn. J. Int’l L. 
679.  
16
 P. Kellogg, ‘Regional Integration in Latin America: Dawn of an Alternative to Neoliberalism? 29 
(2007) New Pol. Science 187. 
17
 Cusco Declaration on the South American Community of Nations, Third South American 
Presidential Summit, Cusco, December 8, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the Cusco Declaration), at < 
http://www.unasursg.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=436:declaracion-del-
cusco-sobre-la-comunidad-sudamericana-de-naciones-diciembre-de-2004&catid=96:declaraciones > 
(last accessed 10 June 2012). See also J. Bennett, ‘The Union of South American Nations: The 
New(est) Regionalism in Latin America’ 32 (2008-2009) Suffolk Transn’l L. Rev. 103, at 124. 
18
 Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), Treaty of Montevideo establishing the Latin 
American Integration Association, 12 August 1980, 12 (1981) ILM 672. It replaced the Latin 
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), Treaty establishing the Latin American Free Trade 
Association, Montevideo, Uruguay, 28 February 1960, reprinted in Inter-American Institute for 
International Legal Studies, The Inter-American System, Its Development and Strengthening, Dobbs 
Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1966, p. 485. 
19
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6.  
20
 Agreement on the Application of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas between Cuba and 
Venezuela, Havana, Cuba, 14 December 2004, available at < http://www.alba-
tcp.org/en/contenido/agreement-between-venezuela-and-cuba-alba-application > (last visited 10 June 
2015). 
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Table 4.1: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), current prices (U.S. dollars, billions) 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 Population 
2011 (millions) 
Antigua and Barbuda 1.378 1.253 1.245 1.311 0.080 
Argentina 328.133 310.351 369.992 435.179 40.900 
The Bahamas 8.239 7.806 7.700 8.074 0,241667 
Barbados 3.988 3.895 4.110 4.381 0,192361 
Belize 1.359 1.349 1.401 1.474 0,235417 
Bolivia 16.602 17.464 19.810 23.875 10.629 
Brazil 1,655.091 1,600.841 2,090.314 2,517.927 194.933 
Canada 1,502.678 1,337.577 1,577.040 1,758.680 34.384 
Chile 170.606 161.079 203.299 243.049 17.399 
Colombia  235.721 234.182 289.433 321.460 46.052 
Costa Rica  29.838 29.241 35.789 40.024 4.715 
Dominica 0,320833 0,333333 0,330556 0,340972 0.072 
Dominican Republic 45.516 46.714 51.626 54.355 10.056 
Ecuador 54.209 52.022 57.978 65.308 15.005 
El Salvador 21.431 20.661 21.215 22.616 5.904 
Grenada 0,576389 0,528472 0,547917 0,574306 0,072917 
Guatemala 39.145 37.683 41.178 46.730 14.707 
Guyana 1.916 2.024 2.258 2.480 0,538194 
Haiti 6.550 6.552 6.575 7.399 10.013 
Honduras 13.838 14.126 15.347 17.250 8.195 
Jamaica 13.911 12.313 13.356 14.711 2.736 
Mexico 1,093.984 879.158 1,034.308 1,185.215 109.713 
Nicaragua 6.372 6.214 6.551 7.078 5.889 
Panama 23.001 24.059 26.808 30.233 3.590 
Paraguay 16.905 14.216 18.427 22.340 6.530 
Peru 126.823 126.924 153.802 168.459 30.009 
St. Kitts and Nevis 0,4875 0,467361 0,469444 0,495139 0.056 
St. Lucia 1.128 1.105 1.198 1.253 0,115972 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
0,485417 0,466667 0,475 0,480556 0,074306 
Suriname 3.065 3.252 3.682 3.889 0,370833 
Trinidad and Tobago 27.179 19.623 20.375 22.091 1.323 
United States 14,291.550 13,938.925 14,526.550 15,064.816 312.891 
Uruguay 31.177 31.322 40.272 49.423 3.369 
Venezuela 310.696 325.678 293.268 309.837 29.767 
Cuba - - - - - 
 
* IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011. 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Normative background 
Section 4.2.1 showed that early regional agreements currently in operation in Latin 
America are not altered by the creation of USAN. This section examines the nature 
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of USAN as an integration of existing regional and sub-regional economic 
integrations. Such characteristic stems from two orders of considerations. 
 
On one hand, USAN constitutive treaty (2008) establishes that USAN’s bodies have 
the duty to ensure coordination with existing regional and sub-regional integrations.
21
 
South American regionalism includes three schemes of regional integration.
22
 LAIA 
promotes the creation of regional trade preferences through regional scope 
agreements and partial scope agreements among member states.
23
 The Andean 
Community of Nations (Andean Community) is a multilateral free trade area within 
the Andean sub-region. Trade liberalization includes individual agreements with 
non-member states.
24
 The Common Market of the South (also known by its Spanish 
acronym MERCOSUR)
25
 establishes a common market among its signatories. 
  
On the other hand, Paragraph 7 of the Preamble to USAN constitutive treaty (2008) 
reads: 
 
“South American integration should be achieved through an innovative process, which 
would include the progress achieved so far by the processes of MERCOSUR and [the 
Andean Community], as well as the experiences of Chile, Guyana and Suriname.”  
 
                                                          
21
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6, Articles 9(d) and 10(h). 
22
 For an overview of historical developments in South American regionalism, see G. Mace, ‘Regional 
Integration in Latin America: A Long and Winding Road’ 43 (1987-1988) Int’l J. 404; M. Baquero-
Herrera, ‘Open Regionalism in Latin America: An Appraisal’ 11 (2005) Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 139; R. 
A. Porrata-Doria, Jr., ‘MERCOSUR: The Common Market of the Twenty-First Century?’ 32 (2004) 
Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1; J. Bennett, supra note 17, at 103-25.   
23
 See supra note 18. 
24
 Andean Community of Nations, Trujillo Protocol, 1996, reported in UN General Assembly, UN 
Doc. A/51/87, 25 March 1996, Annex. It replaced the Andean Group (also known as the Cartagena 
Agreement), Agreement on Andean Sub-regional Integration, 26 May 1969, 8 (1969) ILM 939. 
25
 Spanish: Mercado Comùn de Sur (MERCOSUR), Treaty establishing a common market between 
the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern 
Republic of Uruguay (also known as the Treaty of Asuncion), 30 (1991) ILM 1044. 
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Accordingly, USAN members are also members of other regional and sub-regional 
integration processes.
26
 Although this is not unusual,
27
 it strengthens the character of 
USAN as both an autonomous legal entity and a complementary institution within 
South American regionalism.
28
  
 
 
4.2.3 Institutional organization 
Article 4 of USAN constitutive treaty (2008) establishes four principal bodies. The 
first body is the Council of Heads of State and Government. It is the highest organ of 
USAN and it possesses the final decision-making power.
29
 The second body is the 
Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In order to implement the decisions of the 
Council of Head of State and Government, it has the power to adopt resolutions. It 
also approves the annual Programme of activities and the annual budget of USAN.
30
 
The third body is the Council of Delegates. It is composed of one accredited 
representative of each member state. In order to promote South American 
integration,
31
 it has the function “[t]o ensure the compatibility and to coordinate the 
initiatives of [USAN] with other existing regional and sub-regional integration 
                                                          
26
 Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela are also members of the BAA. Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and 
Peru are also members of the Andean Community. Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and 
Venezuela are also members of MERCOSUR. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela are also members of LAIA. Chile is an associate member of 
MERCOSUR and the Andean Community. Guyana and Suriname are members of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM); see Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the Caribbean 
Community including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, 2001, available at < 
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/revised_treaty-text.pdf > (last visited 10 June 2012).  
27
 The Southern African Development Community (SADC), for example, is composed of fifteen 
member states. Eight of them (Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe) are also members of the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA) while Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo are also 
members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). 
28
 See J. Bennett, supra note 17, at 124. 
29
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6, Article 6. 
30
 Ibid., Article 8(a), (g). 
31
 As discussed in section 4.2.1.  
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processes.”32 It also “encourage[s] opportunities for dialogue in order to facilitate 
citizens participation in the South American integration process.”33 The fourth body 
is the General Secretariat. It holds administrative functions. It performs its duties 
under the leadership of the Secretary-General, who has the power of external 
representation of USAN.
34
 
 
Other secondary bodies, such as Ministerial Meetings, Ministerial Councils and 
Working Groups, may be established as required, in order to fulfil the mandates and 
recommendations of the principal bodies.
35
 Secondary bodies report on their 
activities to the Council of Delegates. The latter, in turn, reports on the findings of 
such activities carried out by secondary bodies to the Council of Heads of State and 
Government or to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as appropriate.
36
  
 
In addition, USAN holds the United Nations observer status,
37
 which confers the 
right to participate in the work of the UN General Assembly on USAN, with the 
exception of the right to vote.   
  
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6, Article 9(d). 
33
 Ibid., Article 9(g). 
34
 Ibid., Article 10. 
35
 Ibid., Article 5. USAN’s primary bodies have established eight Ministerial Councils, one Working 
Group on Dispute Settlement and three other bodies. Ministerial Councils comprise the Health 
Council, the Council of Social Development, the Council of Infrastructure and Planning, the Council 
of Education, Culture, Science, Technology and Innovation, the Council of Drug Traffic Fighting, the 
Defence Council, the Economy and Finance Council and the Energy Council. The proposal for the 
Electoral Council is under discussion. Other consultative bodies are the Technical Secretariat for 
Haiti, the Center for Strategic and Defence Studies and the South American Institute of Government 
in Health. See USAN’s General Secretariat official website http://www.unasursg.org/ (last visited 10 
June 2012).          
36
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6, Article 5. 
37
 UN General Assembly, Observer Status for the Union of South American Nations in the General 
Assembly, UN Doc. A/RES/66/109, 13 January 2012. 
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Chart 4.1: USAN’s institutional organization 
 
 
 
 
4.3 USAN and conceptions of international constitutionalism 
Section 4.2 examined USAN’s historical and normative background as well as its 
institutional organization. It showed that USAN is conceived as an international 
organization with a social and economic mandate. It concluded that USAN is a 
pattern of economic integration based on cooperation with existing regional and sub-
regional integration processes. This section examines USAN’s law from the 
perspective of international constitutionalism. It takes into account the provisions of 
USAN constitutive treaty (2008)
38
 as well as those of the three SACN declarations.
39
 
Sub-section 1 evaluates USAN’s primary law through the basic propositions of the 
formal conception of international law. Sub-section 2 analyses USAN’s primary law 
through the basic propositions of the individualistic conception of international law.  
 
                                                          
38
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6.  
39
 Cusco Declaration (2004), supra note 17; Declaration on the Convergence of Integration Processes 
in South America, First Meeting of Heads of State of the South American Community of Nations, 
Brasilia, Brazil, 30 September 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the Brasilia Declaration), available at < 
http://www.unasursg.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=439:declaracion-
presidencial-y-agenda-prioritaria-septiembre-de-2005&catid=96:declaraciones (last accessed (10 June 
2012) >; Declaration of Cochabamba – Placing the Fundamental Stone for a South American Union, 
Cochabamba, Bolivia, 9 December 2006, reprinted in 13 (2007) Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 499 (hereinafter 
referred to as the Cochabamba Declaration). The declarations above are those recalled in the Preamble 
to USAN constitutive treaty (2008). See USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6, Preamble, 
para. 2.  
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Table 4.2: Basic propositions of international law 
Conception of international law Basic propositions 
Formal conception International actors are the addressees of the norms of 
international law. 
International personality is an open concept. There are no 
further consequences attached to it. 
 
Individualistic conception States are entities made by individuals for individuals. 
International law includes basic rights and duties of the 
individual. 
 
 
     
4.3.1 Formal conception 
Chapter 1 showed that current contributions to global constitutionalism are regarded 
as manifestations of the formal conception of international law.
40
 This section 
evaluates USAN’s primary law from the perspective of the two basic propositions of 
the formal conception of international law.
41
 Its purpose is to establish whether 
USAN’s legal order represents a manifestation of the formal conception of 
international law in light of concerns of fragmentation and constitutionalisation.  
 
According to the first basic proposition,
42
 all the addressees of international norms 
are international actors. USAN constitutive treaty (2008) addresses member states as 
well as the bodies of USAN.
43
 It thus recognises USAN and its member states as 
international actors.
44
 Article 11 of USAN constitutive treaty (2008) establishes the 
legal sources regulating the internal functioning of USAN. They aim to strengthen 
the progress achieved through previous regional and sub-regional processes of 
                                                          
40
 See Chapter 1, section 1.3.2.3.  
41
 See Table 4.2. 
42
 See supra Chapter 1, section 1.3.1.3 and Table 4.2. 
43
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6. See also section 2.3.  
44
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008) establishes USAN as an entity with international legal character. 
See USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6, Article 1. 
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integration.
45
 Primary law of USAN comprises the constitutive treaty (2008)
46
 and 
other additional instruments
47
 as well as agreements concluded by member states to 
implement the constitutive treaty’s provisions.48 Secondary law of USAN comprises 
the Decisions of the Council of Heads of State and Government, the Resolutions of 
the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the acts (“Provisions”) of the Council 
of Delegates.
49
 Subsequent Article 12 of USAN constitutive treaty (2008) establishes 
that USAN’s secondary law must be adopted by consensus.50 It also underscores that 
it becomes binding on member states after incorporation in domestic law, according 
to each member’s internal procedures.51 The provisions of USAN constitutive treaty 
(2008) referred to above do not establish any enforcement mechanism of USAN law 
and the dispute settlement is limited to direct negotiations between members.
52
 
 
According to the second basic proposition of the formal conception of international 
law,
53
 international personality represents an open concept with no consequences 
attached to it. The considerations above show that USAN’s primary law recognises 
only USAN and its member states as the addressees of all USAN law. Provisions of 
USAN constitutive treaty (2008) regulating accession of new members establish that 
                                                          
45
 Ibid., Preamble, para. 7. 
46
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6.  
47
 See, for instance, the Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of USAN on Commitment to 
Democracy, Georgetown, Guyana, 26 November 2010, available at 
http://unasursg.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=292&Itemid=340 (last accessed 
10 June 2012). 
48
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6, Article 11, paras 1 and 2. Although implicit in the 
text of Article 11, international agreements concluded by USAN members are subject to the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (VCLT), 23 May 1969, 8 (1969) ILM 679. 
49
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6, Article 11, paras 3, 4 and 5. 
50
 Ibid., Article 12, para 1.  
51
 Ibid., Article 12, para. 5.  
52
 Ibid., Article 21. Possibility to establish an arbitral tribunal or to refer the controversy to an 
international tribunal is denied. In favour of international arbitration, see N. Allen, ‘The Union of 
South American Nations, the OAS, and SurAmérica’ 1 (2010) ILS J. Int’l L. 44, at 55-56. 
53
 See Table 4.2. 
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only associate states
54
 that have held such status for four years may become USAN 
members after decision of the Council of Heads of State and Government.
55
 The 
governmental character of USAN is also reflected in the composition of its primary 
bodies.
56
  
 
The considerations above show that USAN primary law states the goal of the 
organization and it regulates its internal functioning. It establishes the international 
governmental character of USAN without any reference to international law. 
However, reference to agreements concluded by member states to implement USAN 
law within domestic law suggests that USAN recognises the norms of general 
international law, such as the VCLT (1969),
57
 as well as specialised fields of 
international law.
58
 Likewise, USAN’s character of integration of integrations 59 
implicitly recognises international law as the governing rule-system of existing 
integrations. Nevertheless, lack of a centralized dispute settlement and of 
enforcement mechanisms suggests that resort to international law depends entirely on 
state will. As a consequence, USAN law may either contribute to fragmentation or 
restore unity within international law on a case-by-case basis, depending on political 
agreement among USAN members. 
 
In this context, prescriptive projects of international constitutionalism would rely 
upon the institutional organization of USAN. In the absence of either a hierarchy of 
international norms or a centralized dispute settlement and enforcement mechanism, 
they would result in a political agenda. Likewise, descriptive projects of international 
                                                          
54
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6, Article 19 (stating that membership is restricted to 
Latin American and Caribbean states). 
55
 Ibid., Article 20. 
56
 See supra section 4.2.3. 
57
 See supra note 48. 
58
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), for example, states that one of the specific objectives of USAN is 
to ensure coordination among specialized bodies of the member states in various fields of international 
security, “taking into account international norms.” USAN constitutive treaty, supra note 6, Article 3, 
rr). See also Table 4.3. 
59
 See supra section 4.2.2. 
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constitutionalism would rely upon USAN’s primary law. In the absence of a 
centralized law-making power, they would end up describing a series of non-binding 
policy commitments by member states to implement USAN’s treaty provisions. This 
suggests that, as a cooperative effort among member states carried out on a voluntary 
basis, conceptions of constitutionalism within USAN law do not represent a viable 
remedy to the phenomenon of fragmentation of international law.
60
         
    
      
4.3.2 Individualistic conception  
This section evaluates USAN’s primary law from the perspective of the basic 
propositions of the individualistic conception of international law.
61
 It aims to 
determine whether USAN’s legal order represents a manifestation of the 
individualistic conception of international law in light of concerns of fragmentation 
and constitutionalisation.  
 
The first basic proposition of the individualistic conception of international law 
establishes that states are entities made by individuals for individuals.
62
 Section 4.3.1 
showed that USAN is a state actor whose institutional organization reflects its 
governmental character. It also showed that new membership is granted only to Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. Article 2 of USAN constitutive treaty (2008) 
provides that: 
 
“[T]he objective of [USAN] is to build, in a participatory and consensual manner, an 
integration and union among its people in the cultural, social, economic and political 
fields [...] in order to achieve social inclusion and participation of civil society, to 
strengthen democracy and reduce asymmetries [while] strengthening sovereignty and 
independence of the states.”     
 
                                                          
60
 As discussed in Chapter 1, section 1.2. 
61
 See Chapter 1, section 1.3.1.3. 
62
 See Table 4.2.  
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This shows that USAN has a people-centered mandate. Furthermore, it suggests that 
USAN is an international organization made by states for the peoples of South 
America. It also suggests that if collective state action organized through USAN’s 
institutions aims to foster the well-being of South American peoples, individual state 
action aims to attain socio-economic development of its population alike. From this 
perspective, USAN’s legal order complies with the first basic proposition of the 
individual conception of international law. 
  
According to the second basic proposition of the individual conception of 
international law,
63
 international law establishes basic rights and duties of the 
individual. Section 4.3.1 showed that USAN law addresses only states. It also 
showed that international law might become relevant for USAN’s functioning if 
member states decide to rely upon it. From this standpoint, USAN’s legal order does 
not deny that international law establishes basic rights and duties of the natural 
person, especially in the field of human rights.
64
 
 
With regard to international constitutionalism, Chapter 2 showed that the teleological 
approach to constitutionalism possesses four normative components.
65
 The first one 
consists of the presumption in favour of the legal personality of the individual.
66
 As 
shown above, USAN law neither establishes such a presumption nor does it deny it.  
 
The second normative component of constitutionalism recognises that human dignity 
is an end in itself.
67
 The Preamble to the constitutive treaty (2008) envisions USAN 
as a socio-economic integration aimed at promoting the well-being of South 
American peoples.
68
 Likewise, the Cusco Declaration (2004) and the Brasilia 
Declaration (2005) describe SACN, the predecessor of USAN, as “an integration of 
                                                          
63
 Ibid. 
64
 As discussed in Chapter 1, section 1.3.1.3.  
65
 See Table 3.1.  
66
 As discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.2.2. 
67
 See Table 3.1. 
68
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6, Preamble, para. 4.  
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people.”69 The Cusco Declaration (2004) also states that SACN aims to preserve “the 
pre-eminence of human beings, their dignity and rights, the plurality of peoples and 
cultures.”70 In addition, Chapter 2 established that human dignity is violated when a 
severe denial or violation of human rights occurs or when conditions of extreme 
poverty and social exclusion deprive the individual of the capability to enjoy basic 
human rights.
71
 Although the text of USAN’s constitutive treaty (2008) does not 
mention human dignity, the Preamble thereto states that one of the goals of the 
integration is “to contribute to the solution of […] persistent poverty, social 
exclusion and inequality.”72 The same commitment to ease the burden of poverty and 
social exclusion is also set forth in the Cusco Declaration (2004) and the 
Cochabamba Declaration (2006).
73
  
 
The third normative component of international constitutionalism consists in the 
recognition of an open catalogue of human rights.
74
 Neither USAN constitutive 
treaty (2008) nor the three SACN declarations
75
 refer to a specific catalogue of 
human rights. However, they acknowledge the centrality of human dignity and 
human rights in the regional process of social and economic integration.
76
 Chapter 2 
showed that human dignity is regarded as both the precondition and the outcome of 
human rights.
77
 It also showed that human rights represent both legal rights and 
ethical claims.
78
 With regard to human rights as legal rights, the Preamble to USAN 
                                                          
69
 Cusco Declaration (2004), supra note 17, section I, para. 11; Brasilia Declaration (2005), supra note 
39, para. 1. 
70
 Cusco Declaration (2004), supra note 17, section I, para. 2.  
71
 Ibid.  
72
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6, Preamble, para. 4.  
73
 Cusco Declaration (2004), supra note 17, section I, para. 6; Cochabamba Declaration (2006), supra 
note 39, section 1, para. 2. 
74
 See Table 3.1. See also Chapter 3, section 3.2.2. 
75
 See supra note 39. 
76
 See supra notes 68 and 70. 
77
 See Chapter 2, section 2.3.2.  
78
 Ibid. 
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constitutive treaty (2008) establishes that USAN’s model of integration is based on 
respect of universal, interdependent and indivisible human rights.
79
 Likewise, Article 
3 thereof states that one of the specific objectives of USAN consists in developing a 
regional cooperation on migration issues based on unrestricted respect for human and 
labour rights.
80
  
 
Reference to universal, interdependent and indivisible human rights recalls the 
wording of international human rights instruments.
81
 This suggests that USAN law 
recognises the minimum core of universal human rights law as set forth in 
international treaties and declarations. Other regional catalogues, such as the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man of 1948
82
 and the American 
Convention on Human Rights of 1969,
83
 may also be taken into consideration by 
USAN’s bodies. However, an argument is made that universal human rights law 
should be regarded as the minimum standard of protection within USAN. 
 
The fourth normative component of international constitutionalism is the rule of 
law.
84
 Chapter 2 showed that the individualistic interpretation of international law 
entails the recognition of individuals as decision-makers.
85
 It also established that 
this conception of the rule of law implies an inductive approach to interpretations of 
                                                          
79
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6, Preamble, para. 6. 
80
 Ibid., Article 3, ll).  
81
 See, for instance, the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), UN Doc. 
27(III), General Assembly resolution, 10 December 1948; the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, 25 June 1993 
(1993 Vienna World Conference), reprinted in 14 (1993) Hum. Rts. L. J. 352; the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2, General Assembly Resolution, 8 September 2000 
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rev. 6 (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American 
System, OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82, doc. 6, rev. 1, 1992, p. 17. 
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 American Convention on Human Rights (also known as the Pact of San José), 22 November 1969, 
9 (1969) ILM 99. 
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 See Table 3.1. See also Chapter 3, section 3.2.2.  
85
 See Chapter 2, section 2.4.1.  
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international law.
86
 With regard to USAN, the Preamble to the constitutive treaty 
(2008) states that the rule of law represents one of the goals of USAN.
87
  Likewise, 
the Cusco Declaration (2004) reaffirms the commitment of member states to “the 
effective exercise of international law” in pursuit of international peace and 
security.
88
 As a specific goal of USAN, the rule of law contributes to the process of 
social and economic integration of South America. Integration, according to USAN 
law, must be realised through multilateralism with existent institutions.
89
 However, 
in the absence of a centralised legislative power, implementation of the rule of law 
within USAN rests upon member states’ decisions by consensus.90 This shows that 
USAN does not recognise individuals as decision-makers. Despite this, USAN’s law 
comports with the basic propositions of the individualistic conception of 
international law, as noted above at the beginning of this sub-section. The analysis 
established that USAN is a governmental organization with a people-centered 
mandate. It also evidenced that USAN’s law does not reject the presumption in 
favour of the legal personality of the individual. From this perspective, there is no 
difference between the individual’s interest and state interest.  
 
This section showed that there is scope for examining USAN law from the 
perspective of the teleological conception of constitutionalism. Tsagourias maintains 
that constitutionalism represents the ideological component behind the process of 
constitutionalisation.
91
 The next section evaluates the process of constitutionalisation 
of USAN in light of its conceptions of constitutionalism.
92
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 Ibid., section 2.4.2.  
87
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6, Preamble, para. 5.  
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 Cusco Declaration (2004), supra note 17, section I, para. 7. 
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4.4 Constitutionalisation processes 
Section 3 analysed USAN’s primary law in light of international constitutionalism. It 
showed that resort to constitutionalism from the perspective of the formal conception 
of international law does not represent a meaningful remedy to the phenomenon of 
fragmentation.
93
 It also showed that USAN’s law comports with both the basic 
propositions of the individualistic conception of international law and the normative 
components of the teleological conception of constitutionalism.
94
  
 
Bearing in mind terminological
95
 and theoretical
96
 problems associated with global 
constitutionalism, this section examines the process of constitutionalisation of USAN 
law. Sub-section 1 evaluates USAN’s primary law from the perspective of the 
analytical matrix. Sub-section 2 analyses USAN’s primary law from the perspective 
of the teleological matrix. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
93
 As discussed in section 4.3.1. 
94
 As discussed in section 4.3.2.  
95
 Johnston for example describes the phenomenon of world constitutionalism as a model of 
international utopianism. D. M. Johnston, ‘World Constitutionalism in the Theory of International 
Law’ in R. St J. Macdonald and D. M. Johnston (eds.), Towards World Constitutionalism. Issues in 
the Legal Ordering of the World Community, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2005, pp. 15-16, 27. 
From a different standpoint, Klabbers, Peters and Ulfstein posit the existence of an ongoing process of 
constitutionalisation of international law. J. Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’ J. Klabbers, A. Peters and 
G. Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law, Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009, pp. 1-44. Finally, Dunoff and Trachtman write that the aim of the analytical matrix is to 
evaluate “the extent to which international constitutions enable or constrain international law.” J. L. 
Dunoff and J. P. Trachtman, ‘A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization’ in J. L. 
Dunoff and J. P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and 
Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 4.   
96
 See Chapter 1, section 1.3.2. In addition, Chapter 3 showed that while the analytical matrix is not 
grounded on any general theory of international constitutionalism, the teleological matrix represents 
the procedural component of the constitutional approach to international law. See supra Chapter 3, 
section 3.2. 
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4.4.1 Analytical matrix 
Chapter 3 showed that current international legal scholarship evaluates 
constitutionalisation processes through the constitutional matrix. It established that 
scholarly efforts approach the issue of constitutionalisation from the perspective of 
the formal conception of international law. It concluded that current contributions on 
the constitutional matrix refer to the model of analytical matrix proposed by Dunoff 
and Trachtman.
97
 The analytical matrix aims to locate the presence of decision-
making powers within a given rule-system of international law. This section 
examines the primary law of USAN from the perspective of the analytical matrix. By 
analysing the extent to which USAN’s primary law hosts each of the seven 
mechanisms of the analytical matrix, it aims to determine whether USAN possesses 
any decision-making centre that is able to serve any of the three constitutional 
functions of the analytical matrix.
98
  
 
Bearing in mind terminological and theoretical concerns about the idea of 
international constitutionalisation,
99
 the first part of this section examines USAN’s 
primary law in light of the seven mechanisms of the analytical matrix. The second 
part of this section analyses USAN’s primary law from the perspective of the three 
constitutional functions of the analytical matrix. 
 
Dunoff and Trachtman argue that the purpose of the seven mechanisms is to 
implement three constitutional functions.
100
 The first mechanism of the analytical 
matrix is represented by the horizontal allocation of powers among the bodies of a 
given international organization.
101
 Section 4.2.3 showed that USAN’s institutional 
organization consists of a pyramidal structure of governmental bodies. However, 
                                                          
97
 J. L. Dunoff and J. P. Trachtman, supra note 95, pp. 3-35. 
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 As discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.2.1.  
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 See supra notes 95 and 96. 
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 See supra note 97. 
101
 See Table 3.2. The analytical matrix also applies to the international legal system as a whole. See 
Chapter 3, section 3.3.1.  
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USAN’s primary law does not regulate their accountability.102 Lack of a centralised 
judicial system as well as the possibility to establish an international arbitral tribunal 
or to refer the controversy to an international tribunal reveals that there are no formal 
enforcement mechanisms within USAN. Hence, its legislation becomes binding on 
each member state after an act of transposition within domestic law, according to 
member states’ internal procedures.103  
 
USAN constitutive treaty (2008) establishes that negotiations are the preferred 
dispute settlement mechanism within USAN. Article 21 thereof, for example, 
provides that in case of failure to reach an agreement through direct negotiations, 
member states involved will submit the dispute to the Council of Heads of State and 
Government, which will formulate recommendations within sixty days.
104
 If the 
Council of Heads of State and Government is not able to settle the dispute, Article 21 
of USAN constitutive treaty (2008) establishes that the Council of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs will consider the controversy at its next meeting.
105
 The latter 
provision suggests that political dialogue is the only enforcement mechanism 
compatible with USAN’s objective of realising the integration of South American 
peoples by “strengthening the sovereignty and independence of [USAN member] 
States.”106  
 
Finally, USAN’s character of integration of previous integrations107 suggests that by 
serving the function of coordination of existing economic policies at the regional and 
sub-regional levels,
108
 USAN is not conceived as a supra-national institution. The 
Preamble to USAN constitutive treaty (2008), for example, states that cooperation is 
                                                          
102
 See supra section 4.2.3.   
103
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6, Article 12, para. 4. 
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 Ibid., Article 21, para. 2.  
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 Ibid., Article 21, para. 3. 
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 Ibid., Article 2. 
107
 See supra section 4.2.2.  
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one of the guiding principles of USAN.
109
 The considerations above show that there 
is little scope for horizontal allocation of powers within USAN’s institutional 
organization. 
 
The second mechanism is vertical allocation of powers.
110
 Its purpose is to draw a 
distinction between the national and international areas of competence within the 
mandate of an international organization. The analysis of horizontal allocation of 
powers showed that USAN is not regarded as a supra-national institution. In 
addition, four out of the nine guiding principles listed in USAN’s constitutive treaty 
(2008) establish that USAN’s mandate is to foster deeper integration in the exclusive 
interest of its member states.
111
 Although solidarity among USAN’s members is one 
such principle, the goal of preservation and strengthening of states’ independence112 
suggests that the interest of USAN and the interest of its members turn out to be the 
same. However, as long as state sovereignty is regarded as the only means to achieve 
regional union and integration,
113
 national identities do not merge in the process of 
socio-economic integration of South America. Therefore, vertical allocation of 
powers within USAN legal order is not able to create the conditions for exercising 
one of the three constitutional functions of the analytical matrix.  
 
The third mechanism consists of the supremacy of certain international norms over 
general international law.
114
 Chapter 3 showed that current contributions on the 
analytical matrix focus on the analysis of the effects of the principle of supremacy 
within rule-systems of international law. With regard to macro-constitutionalisation 
processes, Paulus and Fassbender argue that UN law is superior to all law by virtue 
                                                          
109
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6, Preamble, para 6. See Table 4.2.   
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of Article 103 of the UN Charter.
115
 Another way to establish a hierarchy of sources 
of international law focuses on categories of norms. Dunoff and Trachtman write that 
jus cogens norms and the rules of modification of international customs and treaties, 
for example, are considered superior norms to ordinary international law.
116
 In 
addition, jus cogens norms are generally considered the only legal source superior to 
human rights treaties.
117
  
 
Table 4.3: Guiding principles and objectives of USAN 
Guiding Principles General objective of 
integration 
Specific objectives of integration 
Preamble to USAN 
constitutive treaty: 
 
- Unlimited respect for 
sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and 
inviolability of 
member states; 
- Self-determination of 
South American 
peoples; 
- Solidarity; 
- Cooperation; 
- Peace; 
- Democracy, citizen 
participation and 
pluralism; 
- Universal 
interdependent and 
indivisible human 
rights; 
- Reduction of 
asymmetries; 
- Harmony with nature 
for a sustainable 
development.  
Article 2 of USAN 
constitutive treaty: 
 
- Integration of South 
American peoples in 
the cultural, social, 
economic and 
political fields. 
 
- Prioritized areas of 
intervention include 
political dialogue, 
social policies, 
education, energy, 
infrastructure, 
financing and the 
environment. 
 
- Integration aims to 
achieve social 
inclusion and 
participation of civil 
society, to strengthen 
democracy and to 
reduce asymmetries 
among members 
while strengthening 
state sovereignty and 
independence. 
Article 3 of USAN constitutive 
treaty: 
 
1. Strengthening political dialogue 
among members; 
2. Inclusive and equitable social 
and human development; 
3. Universal education; 
4. Energy integration; 
5. Infrastructure development; 
6. Financial integration; 
7. Protection of biodiversity, 
natural resources and 
ecosystems; 
8. Equitable regional integration; 
9. South American citizenship; 
10. Universal access to social 
security and health services; 
11. Cooperation on issues of 
migration; 
12. Economic and commercial 
cooperation; 
13. Industrial and productive 
integration; 
14. Innovation and technology 
cooperation; 
15. Promotion of cultural diversity; 
16. Grassroots participation; 
17. Cooperation in fields related to 
international security; 
18. Judicial cooperation; 
19. Regional defence; 
20. Cooperation in the field of 
internal security; 
21. Information cooperation.  
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With regard to micro-constitutionalisation processes, the analysis carried out in 
Chapter 3 shows that the presence of dispute settlement mechanisms is able to 
determine the nature of an international organisation as an autonomous regime by 
establishing hierarchies of norms within the legal order of the international 
organisation.
118
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), for example, 
establishes that panels and the Appellate Body cannot add or diminish the rights and 
obligations set forth in the WTO covered agreements.
119
 In addition, WTO panels 
review the conformity of domestic measures with WTO norms, although they do not 
review the legality of acts by WTO institutions.
120
 Likewise, within the EU system, 
the law of treaties is regarded as superior to derivative law.
121
  
 
With regard to USAN, the analysis of the first two mechanisms of the analytical 
matrix shows that USAN is not conceived as a supra-national institution. 
Consequently, international law is not regarded as hierarchically superior to domestic 
law, unless an act of transposition provides for incorporation of specific clusters of 
international law within domestic law.
122
 Furthermore, USAN’s dispute settlement 
mechanism is based on direct negotiations.
123
 It follows that legal enforcement of 
USAN’s law 124  relies upon the willingness of individual member states to 
incorporate USAN law in their domestic systems. The considerations above show 
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that USAN law does not take into consideration the issue of supremacy of specific 
rules of international law over general international law. 
 
The fourth mechanism is represented by stability.
125
 It refers to the possibility to 
amend the law of a given system of international law.
126
 Article 25 of USAN 
constitutive treaty (2008) regulates the amendment procedure. It establishes that any 
member state may propose amendments to USAN constitutive treaty (2008). 
Proposed amendments are submitted to the General Secretariat for notification to 
other member states.
127
 Proposed amendments are taken into consideration by 
USAN’s bodies and are subject to approval by the Council of Heads of State and 
Government.
128
 Approved amendments will enter into force thirty days after deposit 
before the Government of the Republic of Ecuador, which will communicate the date 
of deposit as well as the date of entry into force of amendments to the other member 
states.
129
 In the absence of any specific treaty provision, approval of amendments by 
the Council of Heads of States and Government is regulated by Article 12 of the 
constitutive treaty (2008), by virtue of which all legislative measures are adopted by 
consensus.
130
 
 
The fifth mechanism is represented by human rights protection.
131
 One of the guiding 
principles of USAN is the commitment to “universal, interdependent and indivisible 
human rights.”132 This recalls the formulation of other provisions of international 
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human rights law, especially universal documents adopted within the UN mandate.
133
 
In addition, Article 3, ll) of USAN constitutive treaty (2008) refers to the 
“unrestricted respect for human and labour rights” as one of the specific objects of 
USAN. It follows that commitment by USAN’s bodies to human rights protection 
establishes limits to USAN’s legislation. For instance, integration policies should not 
violate the minimum core of universal human rights law as set forth in the 
international documents referred to above.  
 
With regard to the issue of enforceability of human rights, an argument is made that 
although USAN member states have an obligation to protect basic human rights of 
South American peoples, provisions of USAN constitutive treaty (2008) on human 
rights do not establish any enforcement mechanism. Consequently, on one hand 
implementation of treaty provisions relies upon state will to adopt USAN legislative 
measures and subsequent acts of transposition within domestic law. On the other 
hand, political discretion to implement provisions of USAN constitutive treaty 
(2008) cannot be regarded as a formal decision-making centre, as required by the 
analytical matrix.
134
 This shows that USAN law does not possess any formal 
mechanism for human rights protection. 
 
The sixth mechanism is represented by judicial review.
135
 Section 4.3.1 showed that 
lack of a binding enforcement mechanism as well as the possibility to establish an 
international arbitral tribunal or to refer the controversy to an international tribunal 
implies that USAN does not possess any judicial review mechanism of the legality of 
acts and actions of its bodies. Recourse to direct negotiations and subsequent 
involvement of the Council of Heads of State and Government and of the Council of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs
136
 serves the function of strengthening member states’ 
sovereignty and independence, as set forth in Article 2 of USAN constitutive treaty 
(2008). This suggests that the presence of a formal mechanism of judicial review 
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would undermine the realisation of the treaty stated general objective of USAN’s 
integration.  
 
The seventh mechanism consists of the democratic composition and accountability of 
the bodies and organs of a given international system.
137
 One of the guiding 
principles of USAN provides that USAN’s model of integration is based on 
democracy.
138
 Commitment to democracy is also reaffirmed in the Additional 
Protocol to USAN constitutive treaty (2008).
139
 Furthermore, USAN law establishes 
that all USAN’s treaty bodies have a governmental composition, 140  with the 
exception of the General Secretariat.
141
 As a result, democratic composition of 
USAN’s bodies consists in granting equal conditions for participation to all member 
states. It follows that accountability of USAN’s bodies turns out to be equivalent to 
the individual responsibility of member states acting on behalf of their population 
towards other USAN members. Since independence and sovereignty of member 
states represents the general objective of USAN’s pattern of integration, 142 
accountability is evaluated against the members’ loyalty to the principles of USAN’s 
integration through political dialogue within USAN’s bodies. This implies that, as 
noted above with regard to judicial review, the presence of a formal enforcement 
mechanism would jeopardize the attainment of the general objective of USAN 
integration.
143
   
 
The considerations above show that USAN’s legal order complies with the 
mechanisms of the analytical matrix with regard to stability. The remaining 
mechanisms presuppose either formal allocation of powers among USAN’s bodies or 
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centralized legislative and judicial mechanisms, therefore they do not meet the 
criteria of the analytical matrix. 
 
Dunoff and Trachtman argue that the purpose of the seven mechanisms of the 
analytical matrix is to implement three constitutional functions.
144
 The first function 
is referred to as ‘enabling constitutionalisation.’145 Its purpose is to recognise the 
presence of norms that authorize or facilitate the production of international law.
146
 
With regard to USAN, lack of a central legislative power
147
 and of a binding judicial 
system shows that it does not possess any such enabling norms. In this sense, 
USAN’s institutional architecture shares some of the features of the international 
legal system and the WTO.
148
 Analysis of their constitutionalisation processes 
showed that the international legal system does not possess any separation of powers. 
Therefore it is not endowed with a mechanism with a centralized law-making 
power.
149
 It also showed that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism cannot make 
new law.
150
  
 
Another feature of USAN’s pattern of integration is that it is an international 
organization built on the progress achieved by other regional and sub-regional 
bodies
151
 and processes of integration.
152
 This may be regarded as an indirect form of 
enabling constitutionalisation insofar as such regional and sub-regional bodies and 
integrations possess norms authorising or facilitating the production of international 
law.  
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Another indirect type of enabling constitutionalisation may consist of the function of 
the Council of Delegates to ensure coordination of USAN’s initiatives with existing 
regional and sub-regional integration processes, in order to promote the 
complementary efforts.
153
 Likewise, the Council of Heads of State and Government 
possesses decision-making power to establish policy guidelines, plans of action, 
programmes and projects of USAN as well as priorities to be implemented.
154
 The 
function of subsequent acts of transposition is to make USAN’s secondary law 
binding on member states.  
 
The considerations above show that USAN’s capacity to authorize or facilitate the 
production of ordinary international law rests upon individual state will. On one 
hand, USAN legislative measures are adopted by consensus.
155
 On the other hand, 
USAN law must be implemented in domestic law. Consequently, the compatibility of 
USAN law with the function of enabling constitutionalisation remains uncertain. 
 
The second function is ‘constraining constitutionalisation.’ 156  Its purpose is to 
recognise the presence of norms that restrict the production of international law.
157
 
Dunoff writes that constraining constitutional norms comprise jus cogens norms and 
Article 103 of the UN Charter.
158
 With regard to USAN, the absence of a centralized 
law-making system and of a binding judicial system suggests that USAN’s law does 
not serve the function of constraining constitutionalisation. 
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The third function is ‘supplemental constitutionalisation.’ 159  Its purpose is to 
complement domestic constitutions when international law is perceived to threaten 
domestic law. Trachtman, for example, writes that demand for increased democratic 
participation in the WTO can be understood as a request for enabling 
constitutionalisation.
160
 As shown above in relation to the mechanisms of the 
analytical matrix, USAN’s focus on state sovereignty and independence, coupled 
with its character of integration of integrations already regulated by international 
law, determines the absence of both horizontal and vertical allocation of powers 
within USAN’s legal order. From this perspective, national and international orders 
are not separated. This suggests that USAN does not recognise the rationale behind 
supplemental constitutionalisation.     
 
This section showed that USAN law does not serve any of the three constitutional 
functions of the analytical matrix. On one hand, lack of formal decision-making 
centres allows only an indirect form of enabling constitutionalisation. On the other 
hand, only one out of the seven mechanisms of the analytical matrix may be regarded 
as a valuable instrument through which implement the function of enabling 
constitutionalisation. It follows that, since the analysis of the constitutional process 
of USAN is not helpful to evaluate the relationship between USAN law and general 
international law, the analytical matrix cannot be regarded as a means through which 
redress the phenomenon of fragmentation.    
 
 
4.4.2 Teleological matrix 
Section 4.3.2 showed that USAN law complies with the normative components of 
international constitutionalism. This section evaluates the process of 
constitutionalisation of USAN in light of its individualistic conception of 
constitutionalism. Chapter 1 established that the process of constitutionalisation 
represents the second component of the constitutional approach to international 
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law.
161
 This section examines the process of constitutionalisation of USAN legal 
order through the teleological matrix. It aims to implement the tenets of 
constitutionalism through the meta-right to development.
162
  
 
Chapter 3 showed that the teleological matrix possesses three normative 
components.
163
 The first component consists of the prioritization of basic 
commitments.
164
 The Cochabamba Declaration (2006) recognises the right to 
development as “a substantive right under the integrating and multidisciplinary 
protection of human rights.” 165  Provisions on human rights set forth in USAN 
constitutive treaty (2008) confirm that USAN’s pattern of integration is committed to 
the protection of basic rights of the individual.
166
 The Preamble to USAN 
constitutive treaty (2008) solemnly affirms that USAN is committed to the protection 
of universal, interdependent and indivisible human rights.
167
 Regarded as an essential 
condition for integration of South American states,
168
 USAN constitutive treaty 
(2008) proclaims the commitment of USAN members to the protection of labour 
rights.
169
  
 
Another prioritized area of intervention is international security. Article 3, rr) of 
USAN constitutive treaty (2008) states that coordination among specialized bodies of 
USAN’s member states is essential to secure transnational security. Subsequent 
coordination policies adopted under USAN law must take into account the relevant 
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international norms.
170
 Finally, Article 3 of USAN constitutive treaty (2008) contains 
a list of twenty-one specific objectives of USAN’s integration policies.171 In light of 
the general objective of USAN,
172
 they turn out to be all prioritized areas of 
intervention. According to Article 2 of USAN constitutive treaty (2008), prioritized 
areas of intervention include political dialogue, social policies, education, energy, 
infrastructure, financing and the environment.  
 
Since USAN’s conception of constitutionalism establishes that USAN is an 
international organization with a people-centered mandate,
173
 prioritized areas of 
intervention should be regarded as directed to benefit the most vulnerable and 
impoverished populations of South America while protecting the basic rights of all 
South American populations. Article 2 of USAN constitutive treaty (2008) confirms 
this assumption by stating that USAN’s model of integration aims to reduce existent 
asymmetries among member states. The observations above show that USAN’s law 
complies with the first normative requirement of the teleological matrix.  
 
The second structural component of the teleological matrix is popular 
participation.
174
 It must be active, free and meaningful. Several provisions of USAN 
constitutive treaty (2008) refer to both citizens’ participation and pluralism as 
essential conditions of the regional process of integration. The Preamble to USAN 
constitutive treaty (2008), for instance, recognises that USAN integration is based on 
citizens’ participation. Subsequent Article 3 establishes that one of the prioritized 
areas of integration consists in the creation of mechanisms for dialogue and 
interaction between USAN’s institutions and various social actors. Its purpose is to 
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contribute to the formulation of South American integration policies.
175
 Finally, 
Article 18 regulates citizens’ participation in the process of South American 
integration. It aims to establish the conditions for active and direct participation of 
the people in the process of policy-making of USAN.
176
 To promote dialogue and 
interaction between USAN’s bodies and social actors, Article 18 states that: 
 
“Member States and organs of [USAN] will promote innovative mechanisms and spaces 
to encourage discussion of various issues ensuring that the proposals submitted by civil 
society receive adequate consideration and response.” 
 
This provision consolidates previous provisions of SACN declarations. A passage 
from the Cusco Declaration (2004), for example, reads:  
 
“South American integration is, and should be, an integration of people.”177  
 
Another provision of the Cochabamba Declaration (2006) recognises that to be a 
pattern of regional integration committed to the protection of human rights and 
human dignity, South American integration should be based on the contribution of 
social movements and civil society organizations.
178
 It also recognises the right of 
grassroots movements to democratic participation within USAN member states, 
which aims to contribute to the process of integration of South America through 
coordinated state intervention.
179
 
 
Article 18 of USAN constitutive treaty (2008) also recalls the European Citizens’ 
Initiative (ECI), which confers the right to submit legislative proposals to the 
European Commission on a collective of one million European citizens from at least 
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one quarter of EU member states.
180
 Both Article 18 of USAN constitutive treaty 
(2008) and the ECI establish a right to individual participation in the functioning of 
the international organization. However, while the ECI is formulated as a legal right 
supported with an enforcement mechanism, the right to citizens’ participation set 
forth in Article 18 of USAN constitutive treaty (2008) is conceived as an entitlement 
to democratic participation. The institutional organization of USAN shows that to 
implement the treaty stated goals, only states have decision-making power within 
USAN’s bodies, although they act on behalf of their population.181 Consequently, 
citizens’ participation to USAN’s model of integration turns out to be equal to the 
right to political participation within the domestic legal order of USAN’s member 
states. Viewed from this angle, Article 18 of USAN constitutive treaty (2008) has 
international legal relevance. Steiner, for example, writes that political participation 
is a human right stemming from other international human rights, such as the right of 
free speech, assembly and association.
182
  
 
The considerations above show that in order to foster social and economic 
integration, USAN law is concerned with civic engagement and grassroots 
participation. Although subsequent implementation of treaty provisions relies upon 
the will of individual member states, USAN law complies with the second normative 
component of the teleological matrix. 
 
The third structural component of the teleological matrix is described as 
accountability of all actors involved.
183
 Section 4.4.1 above showed that USAN’s 
institutional architecture does not provide for vertical allocation of power, supremacy 
clause or judicial review. Within this context, accountability for South American 
integration through USAN law has two main prongs. First, member states hold a seat 
in the treaty bodies on equal footing.
184
 They possess decision-making power to 
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adopt USAN’s secondary legislation. In the absence of any enforcement 
mechanism,
185
 they are held politically accountable before the other member states. 
Secondly, member states exercise their decision-making power within USAN’s 
bodies on behalf of their populations. As noted above in relation to the second 
structural requirement of the teleological matrix, provisions on citizens’ participation 
in the process of regional integration suggest that member states are held directly 
accountable to South American peoples through domestic procedures.  
 
From this perspective, open public reasoning
186
 on matters regulated by USAN law 
turns out to be a duty of individual South American citizens. By discussing which 
freedoms are valuable in context of USAN’s model of integration, South American 
citizens can make claims against member states, including their own country, for 
denial or violation of their right to those freedoms, whenever states are in a position 
to make the difference to fulfil citizens’ expectations.187 The considerations above 
show that USAN law possesses informal mechanisms of accountability of member 
states against other member states as well as against South American peoples for 
implementation of USAN’s treaty provisions. 
 
This section showed that USAN law complies with the three normative components 
of the teleological matrix. It established that the normative components of 
constitutionalism can be operationalized within USAN law.  
 
 
4.5 Constitutionalisation outcomes 
Section 4.4 examined the process of constitutionalisation of USAN from both the 
perspective of the analytical matrix and the teleological matrix. It showed that USAN 
law comports with the normative components of the teleological matrix while it does 
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not meet the criteria of the analytical matrix. It concluded that the functional 
approach to international law featured by the analytical matrix is not helpful to 
evaluate USAN’s legal order in light of concerns of fragmentation of international 
law. This section evaluates USAN’s constitutionalisation outcomes from the 
perspective of the teleological matrix.  
 
According to the tripartite structure of the constitutional approach to international 
law,
188
 the idea of constitution represents the outcome of the process of 
constitutionalisation.
189
 As long as the process of constitutionalisation is able to 
generate several outcomes, several constitutions may stem from the same process of 
constitutionalisation. With regard to USAN, sub-section 1 examines the rules 
governing the Bank of the South. Sub-section 2 evaluates projects implementing 
USAN’s prioritized areas in the field of universal access to healthcare services. 
 
 
4.5.1 The Bank of the South 
Section 4.4.2 showed that USAN law complies with the normative components of 
the teleological matrix. To be coherent with its normative background, acts of 
implementation of USAN’s integration policies and projects had to comport with the 
mandatory requirements of the teleological matrix. One of the outcomes of the 
process of constitutionalisation of USAN is the Bank of the South (also known by its 
Spanish acronym BANCOSUR).
190
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Conceived as a means to implement USAN’s treaty provisions,191 the Bank of the 
South is a regional development bank with international legal personality.
192
 
Although it is not a specialized body of USAN, it aims to promote social and 
economic integration between USAN member states.
193
 Like other regional 
entities,
194
 the Bank of the South is a financial institution dedicated to the promotion 
of regional development.
195
 It is committed to operate under USAN’s guiding 
principles of integration.
196
 The Bank of the South provides financial support to 
economic projects, social projects and integration projects.
197
 It also creates and 
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administers special funds for social solidarity and disaster relief.
198
 Article 3 of the 
Founding Charter establishes that the purpose of social sector projects consists in 
reducing poverty and social exclusion. Bearing in mind that USAN aims to foster the 
well-being of South American peoples through the action of its member states,
199
 this 
provision implements the first mandatory requirement of the teleological matrix on 
the prioritization of basic commitments.
200
  
 
The second mandatory requirement of the teleological matrix is popular 
participation.
201
 Neither the Founding Charter
202
 nor the Constitutive Agreement
203
 
contains any reference to forms of inclusion of civil society in the running of the 
Bank. Article 4 of the Founding Charter establishes that in order to be self-
sustaining, the Bank of the South is governed by the principle of financial efficiency. 
Subsequent Article 5 states that the management of the Bank is based on the 
egalitarian representation of the members that signed the Founding Charter.  
 
Section 4.4.2 above showed that USAN’s members act on behalf of South American 
populations. It also showed that USAN constitutive treaty (2008) acknowledges the 
contribution of grassroots participation to USAN’s process of integration. It 
concluded that implementation of such provisions relies upon the willingness of 
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member states to commit themselves individually. From this perspective, provisions 
of the Founding Charter do not uphold the right to direct participation of South 
American peoples to USAN’s policy-making. One way to establish active, free and 
meaningful popular participation in the activities of the Bank of the South would be 
to recognise the natural person as the recipient of the Bank’s funds. Reliance on 
microcredit and microfinance lending programmes, for example, would contribute to 
target situations of extreme poverty.
204
 Lack of any mechanism of civic engagement 
determines that the second mandatory requirement of the teleological matrix is not 
met. 
 
The third normative component of the teleological matrix is accountability of all 
actors involved.
205
 Section 4.4.2 showed that in the absence of any enforcement 
mechanism, accountability of USAN member states amounts to political 
accountability of each member state against other members as well as before its own 
population. With regard to the Bank of the South, internal management is governed 
according to professional criteria of financial efficiency.
206
 Governmental 
composition of the Bank’s organs,207  coupled with the exclusion of civil society 
participation from all areas of decision-making and policy-making,
208
 creates a series 
of tensions on internal and external accountability of the Bank.  
 
As regards internal accountability, political divergence between member countries 
may affect the efficiency of the Bank
209
 in areas such as governability, voting 
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Doc. A/RES/63/229, 10 March 2009; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(DESA) and United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), Building Inclusive Financial 
Sectors for Development, New York, 2006. 
205
 See Table 3.2. 
206
 Founding Charter, supra note 192, Article 4.  
207
 Ibid., Article 5. For an overview of the governance and composition of the Bank of the South, see 
Outcome of the Technical Workshop, supra note 192, at 6-11. In favour of technocratic management, 
see I. Ortiz and O. Ugarteche, supra note 197, at 98.  
208
 Outcome of the Technical Workshop, supra note 192, at 26-28. 
209
 I. Ortiz and O. Ugarteche, supra note 197, at 97-98. 
168 
 
system, investment portfolio, funding procurement and distribution of investments 
among member countries.
210
  
 
As regards external accountability, Bank’s decisions on project financing are 
governed by the principles of efficiency and self-sustainability of the Bank.
211
 
However, professional management does not necessarily take into account concerns 
of civil society.
212
 This may jeopardize the attainment of the original purpose of the 
Bank of boosting economic and social development of South American countries.
213
 
One way to secure external accountability would be to implement forms of public 
reasoning
214
 to discuss the projects to be financed by the Bank. This would require 
that subsequent financing and implementation phases by the Bank be conducted in a 
public and transparent way as well.
215
 Without any such corrective measure, current 
functioning of the Bank of the South does not implement the third normative 
component of the teleological matrix.  
 
This section showed that the provisions of the Founding Charter of the Bank of the 
South are able to implement only the first component of the teleological matrix. Lack 
of popular participation in the Bank’s activity and limited accountability affect the 
coherence of the Bank’s functioning against its normative background. On the 
contrary, since the Bank of the South is an autonomous international organization, 
the legitimacy of the activities of the Bank cannot be assessed against USAN’s 
guiding principles. In spite of this, the non-implementation of two mandatory 
requirements of the teleological matrix may affect the legitimacy of the Bank’s 
                                                          
210
 Ibid., at 99-102; S. O. Quintana, supra note 195, at 740-756.  
211
 See supra note 206.  
212
 See supra note 208. With regard to environmental issues, see the two letters to the members of the 
Bank from civil society organizations expressing their concern on the construction of a gas pipeline 
running from Venezuela to Argentina, available at < http://www.oid-
ido.org/IMG/pdf/LETTER_TO_PRESIDENTS_19junio07.pdf > (last accessed 10 June 2012) and < 
http://www.cadtm.org/Second-open-letter-to-the > (last accessed 10 June 2012).    
213
 S. O. Quintana, supra note 195, at 749. 
214
 See supra section 4.3.2.  
215
 See supra note 208. 
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actions against international law when peoples’ rights are threatened by projects 
financed by the Bank.
216
     
 
 
4.5.2 USAN Health Agenda 
USAN constitutive treaty (2008) establishes that USAN’s general objective is to 
foster integration of South American people in cultural, social, economic and 
political fields.
217
 Article 3 thereof provides for a list of twenty-one specific 
objectives of integration.
218
 As a consequence, USAN is also referred to as a multi-
dimensional integration.
219
 Although the majority of USAN integration projects are 
still at a seminal stage of development,
220
 this sub-section examines projects 
implementing prioritized commitments in the field of universal access to healthcare 
services.  
 
Article 3, kk) of USAN constitutive treaty (2008) establishes that one of the specific 
objectives of USAN’s model of integration consists in securing universal access to 
social security and health services. Projects on universal access to healthcare 
services, also known as USAN Health Agenda, are implemented under the 
supervision of the Health Council.
221
 Other specialized bodies have been created to 
carry out specific tasks in thematic areas identified in the Health Plan of Action 
                                                          
216
 With regard to environmental issues, for example, see supra note 212. 
217
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6, Article 2. 
218
 See table 4.3.  
219
 Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA), Recent Developments in the 
Institutional Architecture for Latin American and Caribbean Integration, Permanent Secretariat, Doc. 
SP/Di No. 10-10, October 2010, at 31.  
220
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008) entered into force on 11 March 2011. See supra note 6. 
221
 USAN Council of Heads of State and Government, Decision Establishing USAN Health Council, 
Salvador de Bahìa, Brazil, 16 December 2008, available at < 
http://unasursg.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=508:decision-para-el-
establecimiento-del-consejo-de-salud-suramericano-diciembre-2008&catid=86:consejo-de-salud-
suramericano > (last visited 10 June 2012).  
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(2009-2010).
222
 The Health Agenda represents one of the outcomes of the process of 
constitutionalisation of USAN. Coherence with its normative background is 
evaluated against the normative components of the teleological matrix.  
 
The first component is the prioritization of basic commitments.
223
 Since one of the 
objectives of the Health Agenda is to secure access to basic healthcare services to 
South American peoples in accordance with provisions of USAN constitutive treaty 
(2008),
224
 projects implementing the Health Agenda target the most vulnerable 
sectors of society as their primary beneficiaries. It suggests that the Health Agenda 
has the capacity to implement the first normative requirement of the teleological 
matrix.  
 
The second normative component is popular participation.
225
 One of the functions of 
the Coordinating Committee is to ensure participation of South American citizens 
and social movements to the process of integration in the health sector.
226
 The 
presence of such consultation mechanisms between civil society and USAN Health 
Council’s specialized bodies may contribute to implement the requirement of active, 
free and meaningful popular participation. 
 
The third normative component of the teleological matrix is accountability of all 
actors involved.
227
 Section 4.2.3 showed that secondary bodies of USAN report on 
their activities to the Council of Delegates. The latter, in turn, reports to either the 
Council of Heads of State and Government or the Council of Ministers of Foreign 
                                                          
222
 The specialised bodies of the Health Council are the Coordinating Committee, the Technical 
Secretariat and the Technical Groups. See Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA), 
Cooperation Experiences in the Health Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean: Critical 
Assessment and Proposals for Actions with a Regional Scope, Doc. SP/RRC-ICSALC/DT No. 2-10, 
July 2010, at 51, supra note 147, at 51-53. 
223
 See Table 3.2.  
224
 USAN constitutive treaty (2008), supra note 6, Article 3, kk). 
225
 See Table 3.2.  
226
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Affairs, as appropriate. Accordingly, the Health Council and its specialised bodies 
report to the Council of Delegates whose function is to ensure coordination between 
USAN’s activities and those of other regional and sub-regional integrations. 228 
However, they are ultimately held accountable before the Council of Heads of State 
and Government, as long as the function of the Council of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs is to implement the decisions of the Council of Heads of State and 
Government.  
 
Section 4.4.2 above showed that in the absence of any enforcement mechanism, 
accountability of USAN treaty bodies amounts to political pressure between USAN 
members as well as to internal responsibility of individual member states through 
domestic procedures. The considerations above suggest that Health Agenda projects 
may comport with the third component of the teleological matrix. However, 
evaluation should be carried out on a case-by-case basis.
229
        
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This Chapter examined the process of constitutionalisation of USAN. It showed that 
USAN law does not comply with the normative components of the analytical matrix 
while it comports with the mandatory requirements of the teleological matrix. It 
established that from the perspective of the constitutional matrix, USAN 
constitutional outcomes do not secure automatic coherence with USAN law. 
Implementation of USAN projects must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. It 
concluded that interpretations of USAN law from the perspective of the formal 
conception of international law do not allow conceptions of international 
constitutionalism that are helpful to redress the phenomenon of fragmentation of 
international law. On the contrary, interpretations of USAN law from the 
individualistic conception of international law through the teleological matrix rely 
upon a pattern of principles and rules against which to assess coherence and 
legitimacy of USAN law in light of international law.  
                                                          
228
 SELA, supra note 222, at 45 and 51. 
229
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This chapter analysed a model of constitutionalisation that is not grounded on liberal-
democratic tenets. It thus contributed to develop a global theory of international 
constitutionalism.
230
 Chapter 5 evaluates the process of constitutionalisation of the 
BAA, which is regarded as an alternative to USAN model of integration. It aims to 
further contribute to the paradigm-shifting towards a global theory of international 
constitutionalism from a different understanding of international law.   
                                                          
230
 See supra section 4.1.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Constitutional Assessment of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Chapter 4 analysed the constitutional process of an international organization whose 
legal order is not regarded as a manifestation of the Western legal tradition.
1
 It thus 
contributed to conceptualise a global theory of international constitutionalism. 
Likewise, this chapter evaluates the process of constitutionalisation of the Bolivarian 
Alliance for the Americas (BAA, also known by its Spanish acronym ALBA)
2
 with 
the aim to further develop the theory of constitutionalism in international law. 
  
Section 5.2 examines the normative and institutional features of the BAA. Sub-
section 1 analyses its economic and normative background. It situates the BAA in 
context of Latin American regionalism. Sub-section 2 evaluates its institutional 
organization. It shows that the BAA is a soft law organization.   
 
Section 5.3 evaluates BAA law in light of conceptions of constitutionalism. Sub-
section 1 examines BAA law from the perspective of the formal conception of 
international law. Sub-section 2 examines BAA law from the perspective of the 
individualistic conception of international law.  
 
Section 5.4 analyses the process of constitutionalisation of the BAA. Sub-section 1 
evaluates BAA law through the analytical matrix, which is regarded as a 
manifestation of the formal conception of international law. Sub-section 2 evaluates 
                                                     
1
 Existent contributions to the theory of international constitutionalism share the same liberal-
democratic underpinnings, as discussed in Chapter 1, section 1.3.2.2. 
2
 Spanish: Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America (ALBA). All documents of the 
BAA presidential summits are available online at < http://www.alba-tcp.org/en/contenido/statements-
and-summits-resolutions > (last accessed 10 June 2012). Unless it is otherwise specified, all BAA’s 
official documents referred to elsewhere in this chapter can be consulted online at the address above. 
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BAA law through the teleological matrix, which is regarded as a manifestation of the 
individualistic conception of international law.   
 
Section 5.5 examines selected outcomes of the process of constitutionalisation of 
BAA law from the perspective of the teleological matrix. Sub-section 1 analyses 
projects implementing BAA law in the field of healthcare services. Sub-section 2 
analyses the rules governing the BAA Bank.  
 
 
5.2 The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (BAA) 
Despite the BAA belonging to the category of institutions of political
3
 and economic 
analysis,
4
 legal scholarship on the BAA is still at a seminal stage.
5
 Sub-section 1 
examines the historical and normative background of the BAA. Sub-section 2 
situates the BAA in context of soft law international organizations. It also outlines 
the BAA institutional organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3
 VV. AA, ‘Venezuela: The Chávez Effect’ 8 (2008) ReVista – Harv. Rev. Latin Am. 3; K. Cole, 
‘ALBA as a Process of Concentizaciòn’ 1 (2008) IJCS 31; K. Cole, ‘Jazz in the Time of 
Globalization: the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America’ 31 (2010) Third World Q. 
315; D. Harris and D. Azzi, ‘Venezuela’s Answer to “Free Trade:” The Bolivarian Alternative for the 
Americas’ Focus on the Global South, Occasional Paper No. 3, October 2006, 1; P. Kellogg, 
‘Regional Integration in Latin America: Dawn of an Alternative to Neoliberalism?’ 29 (2007) New 
Pol. Science 187.   
4
 N. Girvan, ‘Is ALBA a New Model of Integration? Reflections on the CARICOM Experience’ 3 
(2011) IJCS 157.   
5
 Relevant contributions on the BAA in the legal field are L. C. Backer and A. Molina, ‘Cuba and the 
Construction of Alternative Global Trade Systems: ALBA and Free Trade in the Americas’ 31 (2010) 
Penn. J. Int’l L. 679. See also M. Baquero-Herrera, ‘Latin American Update: Something is Going On 
in Latin America’ 12 (2006) Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 613. R. Linares, ‘The ALBA Alliance and the 
Construction of a New Latin American Regionalism’ 2 (2011) IJCS 145, at 146-147. 
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5.2.1 Economic and normative background 
Chapter 4 showed that USAN and the BAA are regarded as alternative models of 
regional integration in Latin America. It established that they are alternatives to 
existing regional and sub-regional integrations as well as alternatives to each other.
6
  
 
Muhr argues that different generations of regionalism are grounded on different 
political and economic models.
7
 Drawing from Söderbaum and van Langehove’s 
analysis, Muhr writes that there are three generations of regionalism: 
 
“[F]irst generation, state-centric regionalisms are ‘introverted’ and tend to be narrowly 
defined as trade or security alliances. The second generation is understood as more 
comprehensive and multi-dimensional, to include the political, social, cultural and 
environmental, with the ambition to establish regional coherence and identity. Within 
the post-Westphalian order, second generation regionalisms are more extroverted and 
linked with processes of globalisation for multilateral trade. Finally, third generation 
regionalisms demonstrate stronger external ‘actorness’ towards global international 
regimes and organisations, other regions, and other countries in the rest of the world. A 
stronger and more evident institutional environment (e.g. jurisdiction) is developed for 
dealing with out-of-era policies.”8  
 
The category of first generation regionalism is associated with the import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) model,
9
 which created a regional market protected by a 
common tariff to prevent competitive goods from entering such market.
10
 Examples 
in Latin America include the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)
11
 and 
                                                     
6
 See supra Chapter 4, section 4.2.1.  
7
 T. Muhr, ‘Conceptualising the ALBA-TCP: Third Generation Regionalism and Political Economy’ 3 
(2011) IJCS 98. 
8
 Ibid., at 99-100. 
9
 Ibid., at 100. 
10
 Ibid., at 101. 
11
 Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), Treaty establishing the Latin American Free 
Trade Association, Montevideo, Uruguay, 28 February 1960, reprinted in Inter-American Institute for 
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the Andean Group.
12
 Second generation regionalism promotes unilateral trade 
liberalisation and deregulation of markets. Examples include the Latin American 
Integration Association (LAIA),
13
 the Andean Community,
14
 the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM)
15
 and the Common Market of the South (also known by its 
Spanish acronym MERCOSUR).
16
 Despite some regional and sub-regional 
processes, such as the Common Market of the South and the Andean Community, 
incorporate social and environmental agendas, second generation regionalisms are 
regarded as primarily commercial initiatives.
17
 Third generation regionalism fosters a 
political regional union rather than a purely economic one.
18
 It pursues extra-regional 
political and economic integration with other regional and sub-regional integrations. 
It includes USAN and the BAA. 
 
Proposed for the first time at the Association of Caribbean States Summit in 2001,
19
 
the BAA arose in opposition to the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas 
                                                                                                                                                      
International Legal Studies, The Inter-American System, Its Development and Strengthening, Dobbs 
Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1966, p. 485. 
12
 Andean Group (also known as the Cartagena Agreement), Agreement on Andean Sub-regional 
Integration, 26 May 1969, 8 (1969) ILM 910.  
13
 Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), Treaty of Montevideo establishing the Latin 
American Integration Association, 12 August 1980, 12 (1981) ILM 672.  
14
 Andean Community of Nations, Trujillo Protocol, 1996, reported in UN General Assembly, UN 
Doc. A/51/87, 25 March 1996, Annex.  
15
 Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the Caribbean Community, 2001, available at < 
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/revised_treaty-text.pdf > (last visited 10 June 2012). 
16
 Spanish: Mercado Comùn de Sur (MERCOSUR), Treaty establishing a common market between 
the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern 
Republic of Uruguay (also known as the Treaty of Asuncion), 30 (1991) ILM 1044.  
17
 T. Muhr, supra note 7, at 102. 
18
 Ibid.  
19
 III Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Association of Caribbean States, Isla 
Margarita, Venezuela, 10 December 2001, as reported in History of ALBA-TCP, available at < 
http://www.alba-tcp.org/en/contenido/history-alba-tcp > (last accessed 10 June 2012). 
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(FTAA).
20
 Economic and political factors prevented to reach an agreement on the 
FTAA proposal.
21
 
 
With regard to economic factors, the FTAA belongs to the category of second 
generation regionalism.
22
 Second generation models are also referred to as neo-
liberal integration schemes. In context of globalisation, neo-liberal integration 
schemes are closely associated with the World Trade Organization (WTO) system.
23
 
Girvan, for instance, writes that common features of neo-liberal integrations include: 
 
“reciprocal free trade, the free movement of capital, and binding government policies in 
‘trade-related’ areas including the treatment of investment and services, intellectual 
property protection and the opening of government procurement markets. Their purpose 
is to entrench the rights of investors and exporters by removing barriers to trade and 
investment and prohibiting government policies that discriminate in favour of local 
firms and local investors.”24 
 
Although the FTAA’s goal comprises an economic and social agenda,25 it aims to 
foster a regional integration grounded on trade liberalization among its members.
26
 
                                                     
20
 L. C. Backer and A. Molina, supra note 5, at 696. On the FTAA proposal, see M. S. Viegas, ‘The 
Development of the Free Trade Area of the Americas: A Guide for Legal Research’ 33 (2005) Int’l J. 
Legal Info. 11.  
21
 J. A. Rivas-Campo, ‘FTAA Negotiations: Short Overview’ 6 (2003) JIEL 661 (arguing that the 
2005 Summit of the Americas, Mar del Plata, Argentina, ended without any agreement or final 
declaration). See also Chapter 4, section 4.2.1. 
22
 See supra note 8. 
23
 N. Girvan, supra note 4, at 158. 
24
 Ibid., at 157. 
25
 P. Rynerson, ‘The Free Trade Area of the Americas: Dead Before It Was Ever Born’ 13 (2007) Law 
& Bus. Rev. Am. 183, at 184. 
26
 The third draft of the FTAA establishes the commitment to consistency of rights and obligations 
emanating from the FTAA Agreement with WTO rules. See Article 3.1(c) of the proposed third draft 
of the FTAA Agreement, available at < http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/Index_e.asp > (last 
visited 10 June 2012). The FTAA Agreement also subordinates the treaty stated commitment to foster 
development throughout the American continent to WTO-consistent regulations. Ibid., Chapter I 
(Preamble). 
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Opposition to free trade agreements by BAA’s countries arises from concerns on 
level of development and size of the economies of Latin American and Caribbean 
countries.
27
 The composition of BAA’s members and observer countries shows that 
the BAA model of integration has attracted the less developed economies of the 
region.
28
 It follows that as a matter of principle,
29
 liberalization of regional 
economies is not regarded as a solution to overcome the underdevelopment of the 
most vulnerable countries of the region.  
 
Within this context, the BAA turns out to be a radical proposal aiming at creating a 
regional market based on cooperation instead of trade competition.
30
 Linares, for 
example, writes that the BAA model does not fit any of the economic stages of neo-
classical theory of international trade.
31
 Based on the principle of productive 
complementarities from natural resources advantages, the BAA pattern of integration 
promotes mutual assistance, complementarity, solidarity and cooperation.
32
 
Consequently, its theoretical pattern of production and trade relations is described as 
a post-neoliberal integration.
33
  
 
                                                     
27
 See Table 4.1. 
28
 T. Muhr, supra note 7, at 105. 
29
 Tahsin writes that “[the BAA] represents an ideological challenge.” E. Tahsin, ‘Development 
Economics in the ALBA’ 3 (2011) IJCS 198, at 203.  
30
 H. Yaffe, ‘The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas: An Alternative Development Strategy’ 3 
(2011) IJCS 128, at 132.  
31
 The five stages comprise: 1. Preferential Trade Agreements (reduced tariffs). 2. Establishment of a 
Free Trade Area (elimination of tariffs between commercial blocs). 3. Customs Union (common 
tariffs). 4. Common Market (free movement of factors of production within the area). 5. Economic 
Union (coordination of macroeconomic policies and currency). See R. Linares, supra note 5, at 150. 
32
 R. Linares, supra note 5, at 150-152. See also BAA Fifth Extraordinary Summit, Structure and 
Functioning of the ALBA, Joint Declaration, Havana, Cuba, 16 April 2009, Preamble, para. 2 
(stressing that the BAA is conceived as a political, economic and social alliance).  
33
 See R. Linares, supra note 5. See also M. Al Attar and R. Miller, ‘Towards an Emancipatory 
International Law: The Bolivarian Reconstruction’ 31 (2010) Third World Q. 347 (stressing the 
participatory nature of the BAA integration). 
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Economic factors are closely linked to political factors. Tahsin, Backer and Molina, 
for instance, argue that the role of the state is different in relation to second and third 
generation models of regionalism. With regard to second generation models of 
regionalism, Tahsin writes that: 
 
“The policies associated with [neo-liberalism] presume that the state is inefficient and 
market is efficient. Therefore the market, rather than the state, should address the 
economic problems of development. In other words, neoliberalism implies that the main 
reason why poor countries remain poor is not because they lack technology, 
infrastructure or money but rather because of misconceived state intervention, 
corruption, inefficiency and misguided economic incentives.”34 
 
With regard to the BAA, Backer and Molina write that the role of the state marks the 
ideological difference between neo-liberal and post-neoliberal policies.
35
 They argue 
that the BAA integration “requires harmonization of an ideological base for 
action.”36 The roots of the BAA ideological base acknowledge the unity of Latin 
American and Caribbean countries in the form of both autonomy from colonial 
powers and independence from external powers.
37
 The extended name of the BAA
38
 
refers to “Our America,” an idea that was historically promoted by Bolìvar and 
Martì.
39
 From this perspective, the BAA is conceived as the means to create “Our 
                                                     
34
 E. Tahsin, supra note 29, at 199. 
35
 On the concept of post-neoliberalism, see Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 and accompanying note 15. 
36
 L. C. Backer and A. Molina, supra note 5, at 120. 
37
 E. Tahsin, supra note 29, at 202. It is noteworthy that most of the language used in the BAA 
documents is absolute in its formulation. Explanatory documents of the BAA integration resort to the 
same kind of language. See, for instance, F. R. Bossi, ‘10 Points to Understand ALBA: Constructing 
the ALBA From Within the Peoples’ available at <  
http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=1980 > (last 
visited 10 June 2012). 
38
 See supra note 2.  
39
 S. Bolìvar, ‘Letter to Jamaica’ (1815), reprinted in L. Bertrand, Selected Writings of Bolivar, New 
York: Colonial Press Inc.,1951, pp. 118-119; J. Martì, ‘Our America’ (1891), in J. Martì, Our 
America: Writings in Latin America and the Struggle for Cuban Independence, translated by E. 
Randall, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977, p. 84. 
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America.” Consequently, BAA members recognise that sovereign states have the 
duty to control and manage their economic relations. Furthermore, they establish the 
presumption that as long as states act on behalf of their populations, national and 
regional socio-economic policies must be backed by popular participation. Backer 
and Molina write that the BAA is “an ideological joint venture among its 
participants.”40 Likewise, Cole describes this feature of the BAA integration as “a 
process of collective consciousness.”41  
 
Economic and political factors determine that the BAA model of integration is based 
on the idea of ‘endogenous development.’ The latter is described as a model of 
production that is functional to achieve the self-sufficiency of the regional market 
while preserving the interest of Latin American and Caribbean peoples.
42
 To that 
extent, trade in kind through mutually beneficial bilateral
43
 or multilateral
44
 
agreements is preferred to foreign investments.
45
 The latter, however, are allowed 
with the proviso that disputes arising from foreign investments will be regulated by 
the law of the host state.
46
  
 
The idea of the state as the central economic actor also implies state intervention for 
the supply of public goods,
47
 such as healthcare services for the poor. Social missions 
                                                     
40
 L. C. Backer and A. Molina, supra note 5, at 680. 
41
 K. Cole, supra note 3. See also K. Cole, ‘The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America 
Part I: Knowledge is What Counts’ 2 (2010) IJCS 249; K. Cole, ‘The Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Peoples of Our America Part II: The Imperative of Endogenous Development’ 3 (2011) IJCS 51.  
42
 E. Tahsin, supra note 29, at 209. 
43
 BAA First Summit, Agreement for the Application of the BAA between Cuba and Venezuela, 
Havana, Cuba, 14 December 2004, Article 3. 
44
 BAA Third Summit, Agreement for the Application of the BAA between Bolivia, Cuba and 
Venezuela, Havana, Cuba, 28 April 2006, Article 2. 
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 E. Tahsin, supra note 29, at 209. see also P. Kellogg, supra note 3, at 201 and 206. 
46
 BAA Seventh Summit, Governing Principles of the Peoples’ Trade Agreement (PTA), 
Cochabamba, Bolivia, 17 October 2009, No. 16.  
47
 E. Tahsin, supra note 29, at 207. 
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are one of the strategies adopted to deliver such goods. They aim to foster self-
sufficiency and fair use of national resources and human capital through state 
intervention in conjunction with popular participation.
48
 ‘Operation Miracle,’ for 
example, provides free ophthalmology care to Venezuelan people living in severe 
conditions of poverty by Cuban doctors. In exchange Venezuela provides Cuba with 
subsidized petroleum.
49
  
 
The ideology behind the BAA model of integration reveals two major differences 
with second generation patterns of integration. First, it is opposed to the 
liberalization of markets to the extent that private companies operate outside specific 
state control.
50
 Secondly, the BAA institutional organization
51
 emphasises inter-
governmentalism while rejecting any supra-national structure.
52
  
 
 
5.2.2 Institutional organization 
Chapter 4 showed that USAN and the BAA represent patterns of socio-economic 
integration alternative to each other.
53
 Sub-section 5.2.1 examined the ideological 
roots of the BAA model of integration. This sub-section evaluates the difference 
between USAN and the BAA from the perspective of the law of international 
organizations. It shows that they are both international actors. 
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 Ibid., at 210-212.  
49
 See J. M. Kirk, ‘Cuban Medical Cooperation within ALBA: The Case of Venezuela’ 3 (2011) IJCS 
221. 
50
 L. C. Backer and A. Molina, supra note 5, at 104. 
51
 See infra section 5.2.2. See also Chart 5.1.  
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 L. C. Backer and A. Molina, supra note 5, at 107. 
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 See supra Chapter 4, section 4.2. 
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There are two types of international organizations.
54
 First, formal international 
organizations are established by binding treaty provisions and possess international 
legal personality. Article 1 of USAN constitutive treaty (2008), for example, 
establishes USAN as an organization with international legal personality.
55
 Secondly, 
soft law organizations are established by non-legally binding agreements and include 
various types of entities.
56
 Examples of soft law organizations are the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
57
 the Arctic Council
58
 and the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).
59
 Other legal entities possess an 
ambiguous status.
60
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Tasmania L. Rev. 52.  
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Jackson describes it as “a de facto organization.” J. H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing 
Fundamentals of International Law, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2006, pp. 96-97. 
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Soft law organizations share the common feature of establishing non-legally binding 
international structures. Consequently, they are not empowered to enter into treaties 
or to adopt legally binding decisions.
61
 However, Klabbers writes that with regard to 
efficacy, there is no meaningful difference between soft law organizations and 
formal international organizations.
62
 OSCE’s political commitments, for example, 
are drafted as legal instruments and interpreted through the relevant rules of general 
international law,
63
 such as Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969.
64
 From this standpoint, Klabbers argues that: 
 
“[I]f an entity looks like an international organization, functions like one, and is treated 
by outsiders like one, then it is pretty unlikely that in reality it is, all appearances 
notwithstanding, something other than an international organization.”65   
 
The BAA belongs to the category of soft law organizations. Its non-legal nature has 
two main prongs. First, the BAA was established by the Joint Declaration between 
the Governments of Cuba and Venezuela on the Creation of the Bolivarian 
Alternative for the Americas.
66
 It establishes the general principles of the BAA 
regional model of integration.
67
 In addition, specific principles governing trade 
relations concluded by BAA members with other member or non-member countries 
are included in the Peoples’ Trade Agreement (PTA).68 Conceived as “a ‘fair trade’ 
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63
 Ibid.  
64
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alternative to the US-promoted bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs),”69 the PTA 
possesses the same status of the Joint Declaration (2004).
70
 Likewise, accessions are 
made by means of declarations. A passage from the Declaration of Adhesion of 
Antigua and Barbuda, for instance, states that the formal adhesion to the BAA is “a 
sovereign decision,” not a treaty.71 Secondly, the BAA is not empowered to adopt 
legally binding decisions or to enter into international agreements.
72
 
 
The BAA institutional organization reflects its nature of third generation regionalism. 
Its organigram
73
 is structured to allow the functioning of the BAA integration in the 
political, economic and social fields.
74
 The Council of Presidents is composed of the 
Heads of State and Government of the BAA member states. It is the body endowed 
with final decision-making and policy-making power. The BAA institutional 
organization also comprises three Ministerial Councils and the Council of Social 
Movements. They stay on an equal footing and carry out different functions, 
according to their respective competence.
75
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Chart 5.1: BAA Institutional organization 
 
* Source: http://www.alba-tcp.org/en/contenido/structure-and-functioning-alba-tcp (last accessed 10 June 2012) 
 
 
Table 5.1: Founding principles of the BAA 
Joint Declaration (2004): 
1. Trade and investment must not be an end in itself. 
2. Special and differential treatment. 
3. Economic complementarity and cooperation among member countries. 
4. Special plans for the least developed countries of the region. 
5. Creation of the Social Emergency Fund. 
6. Development of transportation and communication systems between Latin American 
and Caribbean countries. 
7. Sustainable development and environmental protection. 
8. Energy integration. 
9. Promotion of Latin American investments within Latin America and the Caribbean. 
10. Defence of the Latin American and Caribbean culture.  
11. Intellectual property protection. 
12. Coordination of positions of Latin American countries in international relations. 
 
 
The Political Council consists of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the BAA 
member states. It is the advisory body of the Presidential Council on strategic and 
political topics. It has the capacity to present proposals on policy matters to the 
Presidential Council 
Social Council 
Women and Equal 
Opportunities 
Committee 
Political Council 
Committee 
for the 
Defence of 
Nature 
Defence 
Council 
Political 
Commission 
Working Group on International 
Law, Self-Determination, Respect 
for Sovereignty and Human Rights 
Permanent 
Coordination 
(Executive 
Secretary) 
Economic Council Council of Social 
Movements 
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Presidential Council as well as the function of coordination of the functioning of the 
BAA. The Social Council is composed of the Ministers of Social Affairs of the BAA 
countries. It serves the function of implementing the BAA social programs. It 
established Working Groups in various fields, including education, employment, 
housing, health, culture and sport. The Women and Equal Opportunities Committee 
also reports to it. The Economic Council is composed of the Ministers of Industry, 
Economy, Finance, Trade, Planning and Development of the BAA countries. It has 
the power of coordination of BAA policies and projects in the economic area. It 
relies on ten Working Groups covering the fields of energy integration, food 
sovereignty, trade complementarity, technology, the industrial sector, regional 
financial architecture, tourism, infrastructure and transport, intellectual property and 
dispute settlement.  
 
The Council of Social Movements is composed of civil society organizations of both 
BAA member and non-member countries. It allows direct popular participation in all 
areas of policy-making activities of the BAA.
76
  
 
Subordinated to the Political Council, the Political Commission is composed of 
senior officials practicing in the field of foreign affairs. It coordinates the activities of 
various Committees
77
 and of the Working Group on International Law, Self-
Determination, Respect for Sovereignty and Human Rights.
78
 Its support body is the 
Permanent Coordination, which is composed of National Coordinators designated by 
each BAA country. Finally, the Executive Secretariat is the support body 
subordinated to the Permanent Coordination. Its role consists in implementing and 
supervising the follow-up of the decisions of the Permanent Coordination.
79
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Table 5.2: Governing principles of the Peoples’ Trade Agreements 
1. Trade with complementariness, solidarity and cooperation.  
2. State-controlled trade without external conditionality or interference in internal 
affairs.   
3. Complementary and solidarity among peoples, states and national companies. 
4. Protection of national production interest. 
5. Solidarity treatment for the weakest economies. 
6. Recognition of the role of sovereign states in socio-economic development and the 
regulation of the economy. 
7. Sustainable development and environmental protection. 
8. Trade and investments as a means to protecting Latin American and Caribbean 
culture and historical heritage. 
9. Promotion of local, small and medium companies. 
10. Food sovereignty. 
11. Special tariff treatment for developing countries. 
12. Basic services as human rights. 
13. Cooperation in services. 
14. Promotion of national production through public purchases. 
15. Establishment of Grand National Companies. 
16. Foreign investment regulated by national law.  
17. Protection of biodiversity.  
18. Intellectual property rights subjected to health and development rights. 
19. Regional monetary and financial autonomy. 
20. Protection of labour rights and indigenous rights. 
21. Publication of trade negotiations to facilitate the participative role of peoples in 
trade. 
22. Quality of production based on satisfaction of peoples’ needs. 
23. Free movement of people as a human right. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
Further information on the function of each Team is available at < http://www.alba-
tcp.org/en/contenido/permanent-coordination-alba-tcp > (last visited 10 June 2012).  
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In addition to full member countries, Haiti is a permanent BAA observer while Saint 
Lucia and Suriname are BAA observers.
80
   
 
 
5.3 BAA and conceptions of constitutionalism 
Section 5.2 examined the economic and normative background of the BAA. It 
outlined its legal status as well as its institutional organization. It showed that the 
BAA is a soft law organization with a people-centered mandate. It concluded that its 
state-centered institutional organization is functional to achieve the objectives of 
regional integration set forth in the Joint Declaration (2004).
81
 This section evaluates 
BAA law in light of conceptions of international constitutionalism. It takes into 
consideration the provisions of the Joint Declaration (2004). Sub-section 1 analyses 
BAA law through the basic propositions of the formal conception of international 
law.
82
 Sub-section 2 examines BAA law through the basic propositions of the 
individualistic conception of international law.
83
  
 
 
5.3.1 Formal conception 
The formal conception of international law has two basic propositions.
84
 The first 
one establishes that international actors are the addressees of the norms of 
international law. The second one describes international personality as an open 
concept with no consequences attached to it. This section evaluates the BAA primary 
                                                     
80
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law from the perspective of the basic propositions of the formal conception of 
international law. It aims to establish whether the BAA law is a manifestation of the 
formal conception of international law and the extent to which its conception of 
constitutionalism is helpful to redress the phenomenon of fragmentation of 
international law.  
 
With regard to the first basic proposition, section 5.2.2 showed that the BAA is a soft 
law organization. Although the twelve principles of the Joint Declaration (2004)
85
 do 
not refer to international law, scholars maintain that soft law organizations serve the 
same functions of formal international organizations.
86
 Implementation of the 
provisions of the Joint Declaration (2004), for example, takes the form of bilateral
87
 
and multilateral
88
 agreements between BAA participating countries. This shows that 
lack of formal reference to international law in the provisions of the Joint Declaration 
(2004) does not affect the legal status of the BAA as an international organization. 
Furthermore, the text of the Joint Declaration (2004) may be regarded as a legally 
binding treaty in itself. Article 11 of the VCLT (1969) provides that “the consent of a 
State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by [...] acceptance, approval... or by 
any other means if so agreed.”  
 
Chapter 1 showed that provisions of the VCLT (1969) are regarded as general 
international law.
89
 From this perspective, the line of reasoning of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in Continental Shelf according to which rules of general or 
customary international law are binding on states “automatically and independently 
of any specific assent, direct or indirect given by [the parties]” also applies to the 
                                                     
85
 See Table 5.1. 
86
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case of the creation of the BAA.
90
 The considerations above show that the BAA is 
the addressee of the norms of international law. Hence, it possesses international 
legal personality.  
 
With regard to the second basic proposition, section 5.2.1 showed that the BAA is 
conceived as an organization that emphasises inter-governmentalism instead of 
supra-nationalism. Accordingly, BAA’s institutional organization includes bodies 
with a governmental composition.
91
 They ultimately refer to the Presidential Council, 
which is the organ endowed with final decision-making and policy-making power.
92
 
Other non-governmental bodies, such as the Council of Social Movements, stay on 
an equal footing with governmental bodies
93
 while others, such as the Executive 
Secretariat, are subordinated to them.
94
 Although civil society is directly represented 
in the Council of Social Movements, only sovereign states can apply for accession to 
the BAA.
95
 However, no further consequence is attached to the international legal 
personality of the BAA. 
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The analysis above shows that the recognition of the international legal personality 
of the BAA entails no further consequences. As a soft law organization, BAA’s 
conceptions of international constitutionalism cannot be conceived as prescriptive as 
long as institutionalism is not a characteristic of soft law organizations. Descriptive 
ones, in turn, would not represent a remedy to the phenomenon of fragmentation of 
international law.
96
      
 
 
5.3.2 Individualistic conception 
The previous sub-section examined BAA law from the perspective of the formal 
conception of international law. It showed that although BAA law complies with the 
basic propositions of the formal conception of international law, its conception of 
constitutionalism cannot be regarded as a remedy to the phenomenon of 
fragmentation of international law. This sub-section evaluates BAA law from the 
perspective of the basic propositions of the individualistic conception of international 
law.
97
   
 
The first basic proposition establishes that states are made by individuals for 
individuals.
98
 The institutional organization of the BAA shows that its primary 
bodies have a governmental composition.
99
 Provisions of the Joint Declaration 
(2004) also establish that the BAA is conceived as an integration of the Latin 
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American and Caribbean peoples.
100
 Within this context, socio-economic integration 
is promoted by states on behalf of their populations. As states are regarded as the 
driving force of social and economic development of the region,
101
 they “play the 
role of regulator and coordinator of all economic activities.”102 Likewise, one of the 
governing principles of the PTA provides that the standards of quality production 
within both BAA countries and non-BAA commercial partners should reflect the 
level of satisfaction of peoples’ needs.103 The considerations above suggest that BAA 
law complies with the first basic proposition of the individualistic conception of 
international law. 
 
The second basic proposition establishes that international law includes basic rights 
and duties of the individual.
104
 Section 5.2.2 showed that the BAA possesses 
international legal personality. It also showed that BAA’s principles are implemented 
by means of international agreements between both the BAA countries and BAA and 
non-BAA countries. Provisions of BAA law address the issue of basic rights and 
duties of the individual from two different perspectives.  
 
First, BAA law rejects all laws that contradict international law in general and human 
rights in particular.
105
 BAA countries maintain that such legal acts would breach the 
                                                     
100
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101
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sovereignty of the state
106
 as well as basic human rights, such as the right to 
development,
107
 the right to education, the right to health and the right to water.
108
  
 
Secondly, the institutional organization of the BAA comprises the Council of Social 
Movements.
109
 It allows popular participation in the process of regional integration 
on an equal footing with the BAA governmental bodies. This confers the right to 
direct participation on individuals and civil society organizations. It also implies that 
civil society has the duty to assist BAA countries to attain the integration’s goals set 
forth in the Joint Declaration (2004)
110
 and the Guiding Principles of the PTA 
(2009).
111
 This includes the duty to monitor the implementation of international 
norms through BAA policies as well as to claim the violation of international norms, 
for example in the fields of food sovereignty
112
 or the protection of the 
environment,
113
 by either BAA members, non-BAA members or other international 
actors. In addition, the twelfth principle of the Joint Declaration (2004) aims at 
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strengthening the common position of BAA countries in international relations. It 
stresses the importance of the common position of BAA countries in negotiating the 
democratic reform of international institutions such as the United Nations.
114
  
 
This shows that BAA countries acknowledge the rules governing international 
institutions as legally binding, to the extent that they comply with the BAA 
principles.
115
 This further suggests that BAA countries recognise that international 
law directly affects their own population. The considerations above suggest that 
BAA law complies with the second basic proposition of the individualistic 
conception of international law. 
 
The analysis above established that BAA law complies with both of the basic 
propositions of the individual conception of international law. From this perspective, 
its conception of constitutionalism stems from interpretations of BAA law against the 
four normative components of constitutionalism.
116
  
 
The first normative component establishes a presumption in favour of the legal 
personality of the individual.
117
 Although BAA law addresses only states, the 
creation of the Council of Social Movements
118
 along with the BAA conception of 
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the role of the state
119
 suggests that individuals have the right and the duty to 
participate in the process of regional integration on an equal footing with states and 
BAA institutions. Since Latin American and Caribbean people are regarded as the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the BAA policies,
120
 they turn out to be the addressees of 
rights and duties of the individual established by international law. Therefore, the 
international legal status of the individual is implicitly recognised.  
 
The second normative component of constitutionalism establishes that human dignity 
is an end in itself.
121
 Neither the Joint Declaration (2004)
122
 nor the Guiding 
Principles of the PTA
123
 refer to the dignity of the person. A passage from the 
Declaration of Adhesion of Nicaragua to the BAA states that: 
 
“The unity of actions of our peoples and nations must be grounded on higher principles 
such as the defence of human dignity, the eradication of poverty, peaceful resolution of 
disputes, reconciliation and a culture of peace.”124 
 
Another passage from the same document describes the procedure of adhesion to the 
BAA. It consists of two steps. First, new candidate members submit a solemn 
declaration of adhesion to the principles set forth in the Joint Declaration (2004) and 
the Governing Principles of the PTA. Second, BAA members ratify by consensus the 
act of adhesion of the new country.
125
 After ratification, such documents of adhesion 
become law of the BAA. It follows that the principle of human dignity declared in 
the act of adhesion of Nicaragua represents one of the principles recognised by BAA 
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countries. This is also confirmed by the commitment of BAA countries to eradicate 
poverty.
126
  
 
Chapter 2 showed that the minimum core of the principle of human dignity is 
violated when a severe denial or violation of human rights occurs or when conditions 
of extreme poverty and social exclusion deprive the individual of the capability to 
enjoy basic human rights.
127
 From this standpoint, the commitment of the BAA 
countries to preserve the well-being of Latin American and Caribbean peoples 
through anti-poverty programmes suggests that human dignity represents an end in 
itself. BAA primary law confirms that the ultimate purpose of the BAA model of 
regional integration is the promotion of well-being of peoples through the 
preservation of human dignity.
128
 
 
The third normative component of constitutionalism recognises an open catalogue of 
human rights.
129
 Although BAA law does not refer to any specific catalogue of 
human rights, it stresses the special commitment of BAA countries to both the right 
to development
130
 and environmental rights.
131
 In relation to the right to 
development, the BAA recognises it as “an inalienable human right.”132 Chapter 3 
analysed the right to development as set forth in the UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development (1986).
133
 It showed that it is a right to a process of development or a 
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meta-right which includes all human rights.
134
 On the contrary, the considerations 
above show that the BAA’s ideological roots restrict the catalogue of human rights to 
those which are compatible with the guiding principles of its model of integration.
135
 
This further suggests that BAA law does not recognise an open catalogue of human 
rights. 
 
The fourth normative component of constitutionalism is the rule of law.
136
 The Joint 
Declaration (2004) establishes the twelve “cardinal principles and bases” of the BAA 
pattern of integration.
137
 Likewise, the PTAs are governed by twenty-three guiding 
principles.
138
 The characteristic of BAA founding principles is that they are 
conceived as protectionist measures in favour of BAA states against other states and 
international actors, such as multinational companies, operating within the territory 
of BAA countries.
139
 Such principles establish that, for instance, the rule of law 
consists of the unconditional respect of the written and customary law of each 
member states
140
 whose purpose is to preserve the democratic order of BAA states.
141
  
 
Other principles refer to international recognised human rights, such as the protection 
of the environment, including the rational use of natural resources,
142
 the protection 
of labour and indigenous rights,
143
 respect of state’s sovereignty144 and the right to 
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development.
145
 The Joint Declaration (2004) also establishes the commitment of 
BAA countries to multilateralism in international institutions such as the United 
Nations and its specialised agencies.
146
  
 
The considerations above show that BAA law entails a conception of the rule of law 
that is functional to the protection of national interest. The idea of the centrality of 
the state is regarded as the means to protect BAA peoples’ fundamental rights.147 The 
recognition of universal human rights also suggests that BAA countries are entitled 
to make claims against other international actors on the ground of an international 
principle of legality stemming from concerns of protection of the above-mentioned 
universal human rights.  
 
This section analysed the BAA conception of constitutionalism in light of the basic 
propositions of the individual conception of international law. It showed that BAA 
law complies with the first, second and fourth normative components of 
constitutionalism. It concluded that its conception of human rights is affected by 
ideological assumptions that prevent to recognise an open catalogue of human rights. 
The following section examines the process of constitutionalisation of BAA law. It 
aims to establish whether the process of operationalization of the principles of 
BAA’s constitutionalism discussed above is coherent with the BAA people-centered 
mandate. 
 
 
5.4 Constitutionalisation processes 
Section 5.3 analysed the law of the BAA from the perspective of international 
constitutionalism. It showed that although BAA law complies with the basic 
                                                                                                                                                      
144
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propositions of the formal conception of international law, its related conception of 
constitutionalism cannot be regarded as a remedy to the phenomenon of 
fragmentation of international law.
148
 It also showed that while BAA law comports 
with the basic propositions of the individualistic conception of international law, it 
comports with three normative components of the teleological conception of 
international constitutionalism.
149
 
 
This section examines the process of constitutionalisation of BAA law from the 
perspective of the matrices of international constitutionalism.
150
 It aims to evaluate 
the degree of coherence of the process of operationalization of the BAA founding 
principles through both the functional and the teleological approach to international 
law backed by the constitutional matrices referred to above. Sub-section 1 analyses 
BAA law through the normative components of the analytical matrix. Sub-section 2 
examines BAA law through the normative components of the teleological matrix.   
 
 
5.4.1 Analytical matrix 
Chapter 3 showed that the purpose of the analytical matrix is to locate law-making 
centres within international institutions and organizations.
151
 Dunoff and Trachtman 
write that the normative components of the analytical matrix consist of seven 
mechanisms implementing three constitutional functions.
152
 Bearing in mind 
terminological
153
 and theoretical
154
 concerns, this section examines BAA law in light 
of the normative components of the analytical matrix. 
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The first mechanism consists of the horizontal allocation of powers among the bodies 
of the international institution under scrutiny.
155
 The institutional organization of the 
BAA shows that the Presidential Council is the body endowed with final decision-
making and policy-making power.
156
 Other governmental and secondary bodies have 
the function of implementing BAA policies and coordinating BAA’s activities.157 
However, since the BAA is a soft law organization, decisions of the Presidential 
Council are not legally binding upon member states.
158
 Consequently, the BAA 
institutional organization does not include a binding dispute settlement 
mechanism.
159
  
 
The second mechanism is represented by vertical allocation of powers.
160
 Its purpose 
is to single out the boundaries of both domestic and international jurisdiction within 
the mandate of the international organization. The conception of soft law 
organization stemming from the ideological roots of the BAA
161
 establishes the 
presumption that only states can make decisions on behalf of their population. 
Consequently, BAA countries reject internationalism in favour of intergovernmental 
relations. This shows that there is no scope for vertical allocation of powers within 
BAA law.  
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The third mechanism is described as supremacy.
162
 Its purpose is to establish the 
supremacy of certain norms of rule-systems of international law over general 
international law. Section 5.3.2 showed that BAA law recognises international law to 
the extent that it comports with the guiding principles of the BAA. This suggests that 
BAA countries acknowledge BAA law as superior to general international law.  
 
The fourth mechanism is stability.
163
 Its purpose is to assess the possibility to amend 
the law governing an international institution or organization. Lack of horizontal and 
vertical power within BAA law suggests that supremacy is an issue that is not taken 
into consideration. However, the considerations above on supremacy show that the 
guiding principles of BAA set forth in the Joint Declaration (2004) and the 
Governing principles of PTA cannot be amended.  
 
The fifth mechanism is represented by human rights protection.
164
 Section 5.3.2 
showed that BAA countries are committed to protect the rights established in the 
Joint Declaration (2004) and the Governing Principles of the PTA. It also showed 
that BAA law does not recognise an open catalogue of human rights. In addition, 
lack of a central dispute settlement mechanism entails that the effective protection of 
the minimum core of international human rights law recognised by BAA law
165
 rests 
upon the willingness of individual BAA member states. From this perspective, 
implementation of such provisions should be carried out according to domestic 
procedures.  
 
The sixth mechanism is judicial review.
166
 As noted above,
167
 the institutional 
organization of the BAA does not include any binding enforcement mechanism. This 
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suggests that, as discussed in relation to USAN law,
168
 disputes arising from BAA 
law are likely to be settled through negotiations between BAA members and the 
Presidential Council as the preferred means. 
 
The seventh mechanism is described as the democratic composition and 
accountability of the organs of an international institution.
169
 As noted for USAN,
170
 
the BAA conception of democratic representation consists in granting equal 
participation to member states within the BAA bodies.
171
 In addition, the BAA 
institutional organisation comprises the Council of Social Movements, which allows 
direct participation to grassroots movements to all aspects of policy-making.
172
 In the 
absence of any binding enforcement mechanism, accountability is measured in terms 
of loyalty by individual BAA members to the BAA founding principles and it is 
equivalent to political pressure among BAA members. Individual members are also 
accountable before their population.
173
  
 
The analysis above shows that BAA law hosts three of the seven mechanisms of the 
analytical matrix.
174
 However, they are affected by the ideological roots of the BAA 
integration. It follows that, since BAA law is not binding, the presence of supremacy, 
human rights protection and democracy and accountability mechanisms is justified 
on the ground of ideological concerns instead of objective legal commitments set 
forth in international law.  
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The purpose of the mechanisms of the analytical matrix is to implement three 
constitutional functions.
175
 The first function is described as ‘enabling 
constitutionalisation.’176 Its purpose is to identify those rules that authorise or 
facilitate the production of international law.
177
 Like USAN, the BAA does not 
possess any central legislative power or a binding dispute settlement mechanism. 
Unlike USAN, however, the BAA is not conceived as an integration of regional and 
sub-regional integrations.
178
 Although the BAA is regarded as complementary to 
previous integrations
179
 such as CARICOM,
180
 commitment of BAA member states 
to promote the democratic reform of international institutions such as the United 
Nations and its specialised agencies
181
 might be regarded as an indirect form of 
enabling constitutionalisation.  
 
The second function is described as ‘constraining constitutionalisation.’182 Its 
purpose is to identify the presence of norms that restrict the production of 
international law.
183
 Although the BAA institutional organization does not possess 
any compulsory judicial system, the analysis of the third mechanism of the analytical 
matrix shows that the primary law of BAA is conceived as superior to international 
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law. This suggests that the provisions of the Joint Declaration (2004) and the 
Governing Principles of the PTA
184
 serve the function of constraining 
constitutionalisation.  
 
The third function is described as ‘supplemental constitutionalisation.’185 Its purpose 
is to identify international legal norms that arise in response to domestic 
constitutional deficiencies.
186
 Since BAA law is conceived as a form of inter-state 
model of integration instead of a supra-national one,
187
 national and international 
orders are not separated. From this perspective, the BAA, like USAN, does not 
recognise the rationale behind supplemental constitutionalisation. However, the 
provision of the Joint Declaration (2004) on multilateralism and democracy in 
international institutions
188
 suggests that new international regulations are needed to 
change the actual functioning of institutions, such as the United Nations and its 
specialised agencies, in order to protect the constitutional order of BAA member 
states.
189
 From this perspective, commitment of member states to multilateralism is 
regarded as a form of supplemental constitutionalisation.  
 
The considerations above show that BAA law serves the three constitutional 
functions of the analytical matrix. Although enabling and supplemental 
constitutionalisation are exercised indirectly, the analysis of the constitutional 
functions of BAA law suggests that the BAA is an autonomous regime of 
international law. In this context, the analysis of the normative components of the 
analytical matrix proves to be helpful to evaluate the relationship between BAA law 
and general international law. However, since the BAA is a soft law organization,
190
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it cannot be regarded as a valuable means to redress the phenomenon of 
fragmentation of international law.   
 
 
5.4.2 Teleological Matrix 
Section 5.3.2 showed that BAA law comports with the basic propositions of the 
individualistic conception of international law. It also showed that it complies with 
three normative components of the teleological conception of constitutionalism. It 
concluded that BAA law does not recognise an open catalogue of human rights. This 
section examines BAA law from the perspective of the teleological matrix. By 
applying the tripartite conception of constitutionalism outlined by Tsagourias,
191
 it 
aims to evaluate the process of operationalization of the tenets of constitutionalism 
within BAA law. 
 
Chapter 3 analysed the three normative components of the teleological matrix.
192
 It 
established that for the purposes of this dissertation, the right to development turns 
out to be a procedural pattern which is consistent with the tenets of the teleological 
conception of constitutionalism.
193
 Therefore the normative components of the 
teleological matrix are conceived as a manifestation of the right to development, as 
set forth in the UN Declaration on the Right to Development (1986).
194
  
 
The first normative component of the teleological matrix consists of the prioritization 
of basic commitments.
195
 BAA law establishes that BAA policies will be adopted in 
pursuit of the fulfilment of basic needs of the poorer segment of the populations of its 
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member countries.
196
 To that extent, the final declaration of the Fourth Extraordinary 
Summit of the BAA Presidential Council, for example, establishes the BAA 
prioritized areas of intervention. Although this is not an exclusive list, it includes the 
implementation of policies in the fields of literacy, education, health, food, energy, 
the environment, culture and telecommunication services.
197
 Other provisions of 
BAA law recognise that the adoption of prioritized areas of intervention aims to fulfil 
the right to development of Latin American and Caribbean peoples.
198
 Section 5.3.1 
showed that the conception of the right to development endorsed by BAA law does 
not entail the recognition of an open catalogue of human rights. Consequently, the 
BAA justification of the adoption of prioritized areas of intervention rests upon this 
limited conception of the right to development.  
 
The UN Independent Expert on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights writes that 
“poverty removal [is] a human right objective itself.”199 Likewise, Marks writes that 
the phenomenon of global poverty is a human rights issue.
200
 Although committed to 
poverty eradication, BAA law does not provide for the definition of poverty. One 
way to assess the relationship between poverty and human rights from the 
international human rights law perspective is to assess BAA law against the notion of 
poverty endorsed by the United Nations. On one hand, the UN General Assembly 
recognises that poverty is a violation of human dignity
201
 that prevents the enjoyment 
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of basic human rights.
202
 It also recognises that concrete proposals for the eradication 
of poverty
203
 should be based on political commitment as well as on unconditional 
respect for all human rights.
204
 On the other hand, four reports of the UN 
Independent expert on Human Rights and Extreme Poverty
205
 examined the 
definition of extreme poverty and its legal implications. They established that 
extreme poverty should be regarded as a multidimensional phenomenon comprising 
“a combination of income poverty, human development poverty and social 
exclusion, in a serious and prolonged form.”206  
 
The second element of the definition, human development, is also referred to as 
capability deprivation. The term “capability,” in turn, is used in the sense of having 
the “freedoms that all individuals identify with their well-being.”207 The UN 
Independent Expert on Human Rights and Extreme Poverty argues that lack of 
human rights represents the root cause of extreme poverty:  
 
“[I]f human rights were the constituent elements of well-being when there is no poverty, 
the corresponding obligations would cover all policies that are necessary to eradicate 
poverty.”208 
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From this standpoint, extreme poverty turns out to be a violation or denial of human 
rights.
209
 Likewise, the UN Independent Expert on Human Rights and Extreme 
Poverty points out that if “a violation of human rights is sufficient to cause extreme 
poverty, extreme poverty also entails a violation of human rights.”210 
 
BAA law conceives the Peoples’ Trade Agreements (PTAs)211 as the vector of 
human rights of its model of integration. Originally incorporated in the law of BAA 
as part of Bolivia’s Declaration of Adhesion to the BAA,212 the concept of the 
Peoples’ Trade Agreement is primary law of the BAA.213 Provisions of BAA law 
establish that the Governing Principles of the PTA regulate the unique model of 
commercial relationship recognised by BAA members to implement the principles of 
the Joint Declaration (2004).
214
 In addition, section 5.2.1 showed that the BAA 
represents a third generation model of regionalism. Within this context, the purpose 
of the PTAs is to establish a ‘fair trade’ area in order to fulfil the needs of the smaller 
and least developed economies of Latin America and the Caribbean.
215
 This suggests 
that recourse to PTAs is regarded as the primary means through which foster the 
well-being of the peoples of the BAA countries.
216
 Viewed from this angle, PTAs 
may be regarded as anti-poverty mechanisms in the sense outlined by the UN 
Independent Expert on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights.
217
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The considerations above show that BAA law establishes that the BAA model of 
integration is based on prioritized areas of intervention aimed at fulfilling the needs 
of the least developed economies of the region. It also establishes that trade 
relationships between BAA countries are regulated by the concept of PTA. 
Consequently, BAA law complies with the first normative component of the 
teleological matrix.  
 
The second normative component of the teleological matrix is represented by popular 
participation.
218
 Section 5.2.2 above showed that the BAA institutional organization 
possesses two mechanisms of participation. It established that like USAN and the 
European Union, the BAA allows representative participation in the form of 
governmental composition its primary bodies.
219
 As noted for USAN,
220
 states are 
conceived as entities acting on behalf of their populations. In addition, the BAA 
ideology conceives the state as the entity whose role consists in managing all aspects 
of economic relations in order to preserve the autonomy and well-being of its 
population.
221
 From this perspective, the governmental composition of the primary 
bodies of the BAA is regarded as a form of representative democracy. The second 
mechanism of participation consists of forms of direct participation. The institutional 
organization of the BAA includes the Council of Social Movements.
222
 As a primary 
body, it stays on an equal footing with the BAA governmental bodies. Unlike other 
mechanisms,
223
 it allows popular participation in all activities of BAA institutions.  
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The teleological matrix establishes that popular participation should be active, free 
and meaningful. The creation of the Council of Social Movements allows individuals 
and civil society organizations to participate voluntarily in BAA policy-making 
process, thus complying with the requirements of the teleological matrix. In addition, 
the Governing Principles of the PTA establish that every PTA must be subject to 
public scrutiny through the publication of trade negotiations authorised by the 
state.
224
 This further facilitates the participative role of peoples in trade. 
 
The third normative component of the teleological matrix is described as 
accountability.
225
 The institutional organization of the BAA
226
 shows that the actors 
involved in the process of regional integration are states and civil society. In 
addition, as a soft law organization, the BAA does not possess any binding dispute 
settlement mechanism.
227
  
 
However, section 5.2.1 showed that the ideological roots of the BAA conceive the 
state as the actor governing all aspects of economic relations between BAA countries 
as well as between BAA countries and non-BAA countries.
228
 It follows that, as long 
as states act on behalf of their populations,
229
 they are held accountable both before 
other BAA countries, in terms of implementation of BAA policies, and domestically. 
Likewise, accountability of members of civil society is established by means of 
evaluation of the degree of participation in pursuit of the adoption of BAA anti-
poverty policies as well as the degree of implementation of those policies at the 
grassroots level. 
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As noted above in relation to the first normative component of the teleological 
matrix, BAA law recognises prioritized areas of intervention. They aim to realise the 
right to development of Latin American and Caribbean peoples. The UN 
Independent Expert on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights argues that lack of 
human rights represents the root cause of poverty.
230
 It follows that the goal of 
attaining standards of well-being for Latin American and Caribbean peoples should 
be conceived as a vector of human rights. From this perspective, accountability of all 
actors involved in the BAA model of integration is assessed against those obligations 
arising from the protection of the human rights whose deprivation causes poverty.
231
  
 
With regard to the role of the state, the UN Independent Expert on Extreme Poverty 
and Human Rights writes that: 
 
“The State plays its role as a part to human rights-based social arrangements, on equal 
term with civil society and grass-root level organizations.”232        
 
With regard to the role of civil society, the Independent Expert on Extreme Poverty 
and Human Rights underscores that: 
 
“If the objectives […] are recognized by society through a due process of norm creation, 
then all members of society would be obliged to carry out their specific duties.”233  
 
From this perspective, priority areas of intervention should be discussed and agreed 
upon by civil society through participation in the policy-making process. Anti-
poverty policies should also be backed by political will.
234
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The considerations above show that the BAA model of integration recognises that 
states and individuals partake in the process of socio-economic development as duty-
bearers. The analysis above also established that from this perspective, extreme 
poverty may be regarded as a violation of the right to development for the poor.
235
 
However, depending on the notion of human rights attached to the definition of 
poverty outlined by the UN Independent Expert on Human Rights and Extreme 
Poverty,
236
 it is possible to single out the conceptual framework of duties and 
obligations for human rights.  
 
Chapter 2 showed that human rights are both legal rights and ethical claims. From 
this perspective, accountability includes both perfect and imperfect obligations.
237
 
The principles of solidarity and cooperation between Latin American and Caribbean 
countries established by the Joint Declaration (2004)
238
 and the Governing Principles 
of the PTA
239
 suggest that BAA law complies with the mandatory requirement of 
accountability, although it does not recognise an open catalogue of human rights.
240
  
 
This section showed that BAA law comports with the normative components of the 
teleological matrix. The next section examines selected outcomes of the BAA 
process of constitutionalisation in light of the normative components of the 
teleological matrix. 
 
 
5.5 Constitutionalisation outcomes 
Section 5.4 examined the process of constitutionalisation of the BAA. It showed that 
BAA law serves the three constitutional functions of the analytical matrix. It also 
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showed that BAA law complies with the normative components of the teleological 
matrix. It established that the BAA is an autonomous regime of international law. It 
concluded that the analytical matrix cannot be regarded as a remedy to the 
phenomenon of fragmentation of international law while the teleological matrix does 
not address fragmentation concerns.  
 
Chapter 4 showed that the process of constitutionalisation may generate several 
outcomes. It analysed selected outcomes of the constitutionalisation of USAN.
241
 
This section examines selected outcomes of the process of constitutionalisation of 
BAA law. It aims to evaluate the extent to which the selected outcomes implement 
the normative components of the constitutional matrix. Previous economic studies on 
the BAA showed that BAA agreements cover nineteen areas of intervention.
242
 They 
implement the principles set forth in the Joint Declaration (2004) and the Governing 
Principles of the PTA.
243
  
 
In order to establish a comparison between patterns of integration which are regarded 
as alternative to each other,
244
 the selected BAA outcomes cover the same areas of 
intervention of the outcomes of USAN’s process of constitutionalisation examined in 
Chapter 4. As long as the analytical matrix is not concerned with the assessment of 
constitutional outcomes,
245
 this section relies upon the normative components of the 
teleological matrix. Sub-section 1 evaluates the BAA-Medicines regional project. 
Sub-section 2 evaluates the rules governing the BAA Bank.  
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5.5.1 Grand-National Project BAA-Health  
The PTA’s theoretical background is based on the idea of third generation 
regionalism and endogenous development.
246
 Guiding Principle of the PTA No. 15 
establishes that intra-regional trade among BAA countries should be carried out 
through the establishment of Grand-National Enterprises (GNEs). GNEs are 
conceived as enterprises owned by two or more BAA countries.
247
 They are 
established to foster trade among BAA countries according to the principles 
governing the BAA model of integration.
248
 GNEs may also establish partnerships 
with private companies, provided that they act under strict state control.
249
  Backer 
and Molina write that they work in the same manner like a multinational company 
does without following the rules of competition governing a free trade area.
250
 
 
GNEs belong to the category of Grand-National Projects (GNPs).
251
 BAA law 
establishes GNPs as programmes directed to attain the goals of the BAA model of 
integration.
252
 GNPs have two main features. First, programmes implementing the 
principles set forth in the Joint Declaration (2004) and the Governing Principles of 
the PTA must be approved by two or more BAA countries.
253
 Secondly, such 
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programmes must benefit the majority of the population of participating BAA 
countries.
254
  
 
GNPs and GNEs have been established in several areas of BAA agreements, 
including culture, telecommunications, tourism, industry, finance, health and 
transportation.
255
 BAA-Health (also known by its Spanish acronym ALBA-Salud),
256
 
is one such GNP in the field of healthcare services. This section evaluates the rules 
governing BAA-Health against the normative components of the teleological 
matrix
257
 in order to establish the degree of coherence of selected BAA policies in 
the field of healthcare services with the principles of BAA law. 
 
The purpose of BAA-Health is to guarantee universal access to affordable and high 
quality medicines to the citizens of its participating countries.
258
 By establishing a 
Single Sanitary Registry for drugs regulation, it aims to implement guiding principles 
of the BAA model of integration. On one hand, it implements Governing Principles 
of the PTA No. 12 and 18. They establish that universal access to healthcare services 
is a fundamental right of Latin American and Caribbean peoples.
259
 On the other 
hand, it implements the general principles of the Joint Declaration (2004) concerning 
solidarity, cooperation and special treatment for the least developed countries of the 
region.
260
  
 
                                                     
254
 Ibid.  
255
 M. Aponte-García, supra note 246, at 182. For a complete list of the areas of BAA agreements 
with GNPs and GNEs, see ibid., at 191. 
256
 Spanish: ALBA-Salud. Official website (Spanish): < http://alianzabolivariana.org/salud/ > (last 
accessed 10 June 2012).  
257
 As discussed in section 5.4.2.  
258
 Participating countries to the GNP BAA-Medicines are Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, 
as reported in Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA), Cooperation Experiences in 
the Health Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean: Critical Assessment and Proposals for Actions 
with a regional scope, Doc. SP/RRC-ICSALC/DT No. 2-10, July 2010, at 39-42. 
259
 See Table 5.2.  
260
 Joint Declaration (2004), supra note 66, para. 7, No. 1-4.  
216 
 
Section 5.4.2 showed that BAA law complies with the first normative component of 
the teleological matrix. It establishes that acts of implementation of the tenets of 
constitutionalism are based on the prioritization of basic commitments.
261
 Governing 
Principles of the PTA No. 12 and 18 establish that the regulation of services in the 
health sector represents one of the BAA prioritized areas of intervention. The BAA-
Health project aims to improve the efficiency of the system of licence for 
pharmaceutical products within BAA member states.
262
  
 
The Centre for Drugs Regulation is the institution in charge of issuing a sanitary 
registration certificate which is valid in all BAA member countries.
263
 It has also 
duties related to laboratory analysis and post-registration surveillance.
264
 This shows 
that the BAA-Health project complies with the first normative component of the 
teleological matrix. It also shows that it comports with the recommendation of the 
Independent Expert on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights establishing that specific 
anti-poverty measures should address prioritized areas of intervention.
265
 
  
The second component of the teleological matrix is represented by popular 
participation.
266
 Section 5.4.2 showed that BAA law complies with this normative 
requirement. Implementation of this aspect of the teleological matrix through the 
BAA-Health project requires free, active and meaningful participation by civil 
society in the planning and implementation of the drugs regulations.  
 
Although the operations of the Centre of Drug Regulation of the BAA do not 
envision popular participation in the decision-making process,
267
 provisions of BAA 
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primary law establish indirect forms of popular participation. On one hand, Latin 
American and Caribbean peoples are entitled to discuss policies in the field of 
healthcare services within the Council of Social Movements.
268
 On the other hand, 
Governing Principle of the PTA No. 21 establishes that trade negotiations are subject 
to public scrutiny.
269
 It follows that the transparency of agreements between BAA 
countries and pharmaceutical companies is subject to public scrutiny through 
publication of trade negotiations. The considerations above suggest that the BAA-
Health project complies with the second requirement of the teleological matrix.  
 
The third normative component of the teleological matrix is accountability of all 
actors involved.
270
 Section 5.4.2 showed that BAA law establishes two forms of 
accountability. First, BAA countries are held politically accountable to each other as 
well as internally. Secondly, individuals are held accountable to each other for 
participation and implementation of BAA policies on ground of ideological 
premises.
271
 Section 5.4.2 also showed that the BAA model of integration aims to 
eradicate poverty from Latin America and the Caribbean. It established that BAA 
law complies with the recommendations of the UN Independent Expert on Extreme 
Poverty and Human Rights. From this perspective, BAA policies are conceived to 
benefit the poorer segments of society. As noted above, the BAA-Health project aims 
to improve universal access to healthcare services, especially to the most poor and 
vulnerable people.  
 
The UN Independent Expert on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights writes that 
extreme poverty may be regarded as a violation or denial of the right to development 
of the extreme poor.
272
 It follows that: 
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“Accountability focuses on how to transform right-holders from passive recipients of 
aid into empowered claimants.”273 
 
Current proposals on the functioning of the Centre for Drugs Regulation of the 
BAA
274
 do not foresee any mechanism of accountability for implementation of the 
BAA-Health policies. BAA law establishes that intra-regional trade is subject to state 
control.
275
 As a consequence, institutions created for the purpose of implementing the 
BAA-Health project turn out to be ultimately accountable before the BAA 
Presidential Council. However, there is no scope left for popular participation in the 
policy-making process. Therefore, individuals cannot be held accountable for 
implementation of the BAA-Health project. This shows that the BAA-Health project 
does not implement the third requirement of the teleological matrix.  
 
This section showed that the BAA-Health project is not coherent with the standards 
set forth in the teleological matrix.
276
 By implication, it is not coherent with the 
underlying BAA’s conception of constitutionalism.277 As in the case of USAN, 
implementation of a health agenda within the BAA model of integration is not 
supported by any accountability mechanism. Therefore, this section established that 
political commitment to the governing principles of the BAA may not be sufficient to 
deliver quality healthcare services to Latin American people in light of concerns of 
human rights and international constitutionalism.  
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5.5.2 The BAA Bank 
The BAA Bank
278
 is a regional bank whose purpose is to provide financial support to 
BAA countries for the realisation of GNPs and GNEs.
279
 Established as an 
international organization,
280
 it is conceived as a contribution to the creation of an 
alternative financial architecture for Latin America and the Caribbean.
281
 It aims to 
implement provisions of BAA law on monetary and financial autonomy of the BAA 
economic area
282
 and economic complementation among BAA countries.
283
  
 
The Foundational Act of the BAA Bank establishes three governing principles of the 
bank. According to the first principle, the BAA Bank is based on the principles of 
solidarity, complementariness and cooperation, as set forth in the 2004 Joint 
Declaration.
284
 The second principle provides that BAA Bank’s operations are 
subject to the control of the peoples of BAA participating countries and are directed 
to provide financial assistance to projects and programmes prioritising peoples’ basic 
needs.
285
 The third principle sets out the BAA Bank’s commitment to contribute to 
the BAA objective of eradication of poverty from Latin America.
286
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The first normative component of the teleological matrix consists of the prioritization 
of areas of intervention.
287
 The Foundational Act of the BAA Bank establishes that 
priority should be given to “programmes and projects aimed at eradicating extreme 
poverty and all forms of exclusion.”288 Development programmes supported by the 
BAA Bank include projects in the field of culture, education, health and food.
289
 This 
shows that the law of the BAA Bank complies with the first structural requirement of 
prioritization of areas of intervention.  
 
The second normative component of the teleological matrix is popular 
participation.
290
 Chapter IV of the Constitutive Agreement of the BAA Bank 
establishes that the governance and management of the BAA Bank consist of the 
Ministerial Council, the Executive Board and the General Manager.
291
 The 
Ministerial Council is the highest organ of the BAA Bank. Its composition comprises 
the Minister of the Economy or Treasure or Finance of the president of the Central 
Bank of each country. The Executive Board comprises a member from each country. 
The General Manager carries out administrative duties. The governance structure of 
the BAA Bank suggests that there is no scope for active, free and meaningful popular 
participation in the management of the bank. Therefore, the second requirement of 
the teleological matrix is not met. 
  
The third normative component of the teleological matrix is represented by the 
accountability of all actors involved.
292
 Since the BAA Bank is an international 
organization,
293
 its institutions are held internally accountable before the competent 
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organs of the bank, as established in the BAA Bank’s governance structure.294 As 
noted above, the Ministerial Council is the highest organ of the BAA Bank. 
However, in the absence of any formal dispute settlement mechanism, controversies 
regarding project financing are likely to be settled by the Ministerial Council. The 
latter’s governmental composition shifts the responsibility for the management of the 
Bank’s operations to BAA countries that have signed the Constitutive Agreement of 
the BAA Bank. From this perspective, the management of the BAA Bank turns out 
to be one of the BAA policies. This is confirmed by provisions of BAA law 
establishing that the state is the principal economic actor.
295
  
 
It follows that activities of the BAA Bank are governed by BAA countries’ political 
will. By implication, the operations of the BAA Bank turn out to be subject to the 
two ordinary forms of accountability stemming from BAA law.
296
 First, BAA 
countries are politically accountable to each other for implementation of BAA 
policies. Consequently, BAA countries that are members of the BAA Bank are 
ultimately subject to political pressure by other BAA countries. Secondly, the 
Council of Social Movements ensures popular participation in all aspects of BAA 
policy-making. Projects to be financed by the BAA Bank should thus be subject to 
popular approval. Likewise, financed projects should be subject to public scrutiny 
within the Council of Social Movements. Publication of all trade negotiations serves 
the same function.
297
  
 
Viewed from this angle, the law of the BAA Bank complies with the third structural 
requirement of the teleological matrix, provided that both the BAA Bank’s organs 
and BAA states act in a transparent way in order to allow free, active and meaningful 
popular participation. 
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This section showed that the rules governing the BAA Bank implement two 
requirements of the teleological matrix. It established that although the structure of 
the BAA Bank’s governance does not entail forms of direct popular participation, 
operations of the bank are subject to public scrutiny under BAA law. This suggests 
that although the BAA Bank and the Bank of the South share the common objective 
of promoting social and economic integration between Latin American and 
Caribbean countries
298
 through the financing of anti-poverty programmes in 
prioritized areas,
299
 the Bank of the South does not implement two mandatory 
requirements of the teleological matrix.  
 
Extra-legal considerations, such as the economic role of the state, and legal 
considerations, such as the creation of an institutional body facilitating grassroots 
participation, determine that the BAA Bank possesses an institutionalized system of 
accountability under BAA law. On the contrary, the Bank of the South’s 
commitment to the principle of efficiency is not accompanied by a formal 
mechanism of accountability that is inclusive of civil society. It follows that while 
the BAA Bank is coherent with its theoretical and normative background, the Bank 
of the South fails to implement the tenets of its teleological conception of 
constitutionalism.
300
 
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the process of constitutionalisation of the BAA. It outlined 
the rule-system governing the internal functioning of the BAA. It showed that 
interpretations of BAA law from the perspective of the formal conception of 
international law establish conceptions of international constitutionalism that cannot 
be regarded as a remedy to the phenomenon of fragmentation of international law. 
Likewise, the analysis of the constitutionalisation of BAA law through the analytical 
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matrix showed that BAA law serves the three constitutional functions featured by the 
analytical matrix. However, it concluded that the findings of the analysis cannot be 
regarded as a means through which redress the phenomenon of fragmentation. 
 
This chapter also showed that the interpretation of BAA law from the perspective of 
the individualistic conception of international law turns out to be compatible with the 
normative requirements of the teleological conception of constitutionalism. Although 
BAA law does not recognise an open catalogue of human rights, the analysis of the 
constitutionalisation of BAA law through the teleological matrix shows that BAA 
law possesses mechanisms that are able to implement the tenets of its conception of 
constitutionalism. However, subsequent analysis of selected constitutional outcomes 
established that implementation of BAA policies does not automatically comply with 
the normative components of the teleological matrix. Therefore, BAA policies such 
as the GNP BAA-Health do not implement the tenets of constitutionalism while 
other policies, such as the creation of the BAA Bank, may comport with them.  
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 analysed the constitutionalisation processes of the international 
legal system as well as of selected international organizations from the perspective of 
the formal conception of international law. They showed that recourse to the 
analytical matrix, which is regarded as a manifestation of the formal conception of 
international law, does not provide helpful solutions to the fragmentation of 
international law. Previous analysis also showed that recourse to the teleological 
matrix, which is regarded as a manifestation of the individualistic conception of 
international law, is helpful to establish the degree of coherence of the outcomes of 
constitutionalisation of the selected organizations with their normative background. 
The next chapter carries out a theoretical inquiry on the relationship between the 
theory of global constitutionalism and the phenomenon of fragmentation of 
international law. It aims to show whether the idea of international 
constitutionalisation can be regarded as a remedy to fragmentation.  
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CHAPTER 6 
International Constitutionalism and Fragmentation 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter evaluates how conceptions of international constitutionalism affect the 
idea of fragmentation. Its purpose is two-fold. First, it establishes whether scrutinised 
conceptions of international constitutionalism represent a remedy to the phenomenon 
of fragmentation. Secondly, it establishes whether fragmentation represents a 
universally recognised characteristic of modern international law. 
    
Section 6.2 examines theoretical and practical implications of conceiving 
international constitutionalism as a remedy to the phenomenon of fragmentation. It 
establishes whether conceptions of international constitutionalism provide alternative 
solutions to the findings of the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006). Sub-section 1 
evaluates the theoretical relationship between conceptions of international 
constitutionalism and the phenomenon of fragmentation. It establishes that the 
former comprise constitutive conceptions and interpretive conceptions. Sub-section 2 
analyses procedural and non-procedural conceptions of international 
constitutionalism. It establishes whether scrutinised conceptions of constitutionalism 
possess conceptual autonomy or duplicate the findings of the ILC Report on 
Fragmentation (2006). 
  
Section 6.3 analyses contested concepts of international constitutionalism. It 
evaluates whether fragmentation is a contested concept of international 
constitutionalism. It also examines the extent to which the idea of fragmentation is 
relevant for the theory of global constitutionalism. 
 
Section 6.4 examines the relationship between the idea of fragmentation and the 
teleology of conceptions of international constitutionalism. It establishes that 
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fragmentation is not a universally recognised characteristic of modern international 
law.  
 
 
6.2 Problematizing alternative conceptions of international constitutionalism 
Chapter 1 analysed the idea of fragmentation from the perspective of international 
legal scholarship. It showed that it represents a characteristic of modern international 
law. It established that in an attempt to overcome the phenomenon of fragmentation, 
scholars have developed two main approaches. The first approach consists of the 
methodology set forth in the Report on Fragmentation of the International Law 
Commission (ILC) of 2006.
1
 The second approach comprises contributions on the 
constitutionalisation of international law.
2
 Chapter 1 concluded that both such 
approaches turn out to be manifestations of the formal conception of international 
law. By implication, since existent contributions on the constitutionalisation of 
international law and the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) share the same 
theoretical underpinnings, they do not represent alternative remedies to 
fragmentation. To contribute to a global theory of international constitutionalism, 
Chapter 2 examined the concept of constitutionalism from the perspective of the 
individualistic conception of international law. It analysed the normative components 
of the individualistic conception of constitutionalism. 
 
Chapter 3 evaluated existent contributions on the constitutionalisation of 
international law from both the perspective of the formal and the individual 
conception of constitutionalism. It showed that recourse to different conceptions of 
constitutionalism determines different outcomes. It concluded that the formal and the 
individual conception of international law embedded in the above mentioned 
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alternative conceptions of constitutionalism affect the phenomenon of fragmentation 
of international law in different ways.  
 
In relation to the concept of positional perspectives, Sen writes that: 
 
“What we can see is not independent of where we stand in relation to what we are trying 
to see.”3 
 
Consequently, Sen argues that the specification of positional perspectives allows 
objective interpretations of the same subject matter.
4
 Within this context, positional 
objectivity entails that anyone looking at the same object from the same position can 
confirm the same observations.
5
 Applied to the international legal order, Sen’s theory 
shows that interpretations of positive international law presuppose positional 
perspectives. For the purpose of this dissertation, the basic propositions of 
conceptions of international legal personality represent the positional perspective for 
interpretations of international law.
6
 Chapter 1 showed that current contributions on 
international constitutionalism are manifestations of the formal conception of 
international law.
7
 However, as long as they do not presuppose a general theory of 
international constitutionalism,
8
 they do not possess any specific positional 
perspective.  
 
Chapter 1 also showed that the tripartite structure of the constitutional approach to 
international law is a conception of constitutionalism that is able to incorporate the 
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basic propositions of the individualistic conception of international law.
9
 By 
implication, the normative components of the individualistic conception of 
constitutionalism represent the positional perspective through which assess the legal 
order of selected systems of international law.
10
  
 
The considerations above suggest that in the absence of specific positional 
perspectives, positive international law does not justify its existence. Likewise, in the 
absence of specific positional perspectives, international constitutionalism does not 
justify its function of interpretive device. It follows that the tripartite structure of the 
constitutional approach to international law proves to be an instrument that is able to 
provide objective assessments of the international legal system.   
 
This section examines theoretical and practical implications of conceiving 
international constitutionalism as a remedy to the phenomenon of fragmentation. It 
evaluates how conceptions of international constitutionalism address concerns of 
fragmentation and the extent to which they propose solutions that are alternative to 
the findings of the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006). Sub-section 1 evaluates the 
theoretical relationship between conceptions of international constitutionalism and 
fragmentation. It establishes that the former comprise constitutive conceptions and 
interpretive conceptions. Sub-section 2 analyses how procedural and non-procedural 
conceptions of international constitutionalism affect the phenomenon of 
fragmentation. It evaluates whether conceptions of constitutionalism possess 
conceptual autonomy or duplicate the findings of the ILC Report on Fragmentation 
(2006). 
 
 
6.2.1 Constitutive versus interpretive conceptions 
Chapter 3 showed that existent contributions on the constitutionalisation of 
international law establish a hierarchical conception of international law. They are 
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constitutive theories. Although they share the same theoretical background,
11
 they 
establish different hierarchies in relation to the constitutionalisation process of 
different regimes of international law. Paulus, for example, writes that the basic 
principles governing the international legal system consist of provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations (UN).
12
 Likewise, Fassbender argues that the 
provisions of the UN Charter are the highest rules governing international law.
13
 
Chapter 3 also analysed the idea of the analytical matrix. It established that its 
purpose is to locate the presence of decision-making centres that are able to create or 
restrain the production of international law. Conceived as an interpretive device on 
its own, the analytical matrix turns out to be a valuable instrument to determine 
higher and lower international rules in relation to the legal order of both selected 
international organizations and the international legal system. Dunoff and 
Trachtman, for example, write that the World Trade Organization (WTO) is an 
autonomous regime of international law endowed with constitutional functions 
enabling or restraining the production of international law.
14
  
 
The considerations above show that constitutive conceptions of constitutionalism are 
manifestations of the formal conception of international law. The basic propositions 
of the formal conception establish that all the addressees of international norms are 
international persons.
15
 They also establish that there are no consequences attached 
to the international legal personality. This suggests that constitutive conceptions of 
international law acknowledge the primacy of positive international law over 
international legal personality. From this perspective, constitutive conceptions of 
international constitutionalism address the phenomenon of fragmentation by creating 
several hierarchies within international law. It follows that to restore unity and 
coherence of the international legal order, constitutive conceptions of international 
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constitutionalism address the phenomenon of fragmentation by means of functional 
interpretations of primary international law. Paulus and Fassbender, for example, 
write that provisions of the UN Charter represent superior norms within the hierarchy 
international norms stemming from the UN process of constitutionalisation.
16
 From 
another perspective, Dunoff and Trachtman write that although WTO law is a part of 
international law, its nature of autonomous regime entails a functional approach to 
international law. Consequently, normative conflicts should be resolved through 
treaty interpretation in light of the supremacy of WTO treaty provisions.
17
 
 
Recourse to functional interpretations of international law is a form of legal 
reasoning that shares the same methodological approach of the ILC Report on 
Fragmentation (2006). Chapter 1 analysed the structural components of the process 
of legal reasoning proposed by the ILC to overcome the phenomenon of 
fragmentation.
18
 It showed that it comprises three elements.
19
 The first one consists 
of the specification of the purpose that conflicting norms seek to attain. The second 
one consists in selecting the relevant cluster of international provisions in light of the 
specified regulatory purpose. The third one requires interpreting the selected 
provisions in light of general international law. The analysis carried out in Chapter 1 
and Chapter 3 shows that both the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) and 
constitutive conceptions of constitutionalism establish a positional perspective that 
determines hierarchical structures of international law. Therefore, they do not feature 
alternative methodologies to address the phenomenon of fragmentation. 
 
In addition to the analysis of constitutive conceptions, Chapter 1 showed that 
teleological conceptions of international constitutionalism turn out to be interpretive 
conceptions. They establish interpretations of international law in light of the basic 
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 See Chapter 1, section 1.3.1.2. 
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propositions of the individualistic conception of international law.
20
 The analysis 
established that the tripartite structure of the constitutional approach to international 
law represents the only contribution to the theory of international constitutionalism 
that incorporates the basic propositions of the individualistic conception of 
international law.
21
 The first basic proposition recognises that states are legal entities 
composed of individuals.
22
 The second basic proposition acknowledges the 
individual as the beneficiary of all law. It also acknowledges the international legal 
personality of the individual.
23
 This suggests that interpretive conceptions of 
international constitutionalism establish the presumption in favour of the primacy of 
the international legal personality of the individual over positive international law.
24
  
 
Interpretive conceptions of constitutionalism require the international legal order to 
accommodate the interests of various international actors without jeopardizing the 
achievement of the ultimate purpose of the international legal system. The analysis of 
the constitutionalisation of the European Union (EU), for example, showed that the 
right of a collective of one million European citizens to present legislative proposals 
to the European Commission is conferred on each European person qua person by 
treaty provision.
25
 The EU citizens’ initiative protects the interests of individual 
citizens while strengthening the role of the EU as an international actor. In addition, 
provisions of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights apply to both EU member 
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states implementing EU law and the EU institutions.
26
 It follows that as the EU 
citizens’ right of legislative initiative involves EU citizens, EU institutions and EU 
member states, provisions of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
complement relevant treaty provisions.
27
 Hence, the teleology of international law is 
preserved. 
 
From this perspective, the phenomenon of fragmentation does not represent a 
characteristic of modern international law. Consequently, the constitutional approach 
to international law turns out to be an alternative instrument to the ILC Report on 
Fragmentation (2006). It assesses concerns of legitimacy and coherence of 
international law.  
 
This section examined theoretical implications of adopting conceptions of 
international constitutionalism as a remedy to the idea of fragmentation of 
international law. It established that conceptions of international constitutionalism 
can be divided into two categories. It concluded that on one hand, constitutive 
conceptions do not represent alternative remedies to the methodological approach set 
forth in the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006). On the other hand, interpretive 
conceptions represent alternative instruments through which restore unity in 
international law.  
 
 
6.2.2 Procedural and non-procedural conceptions 
Chapter 1 showed that existent contributions on constitutionalisation are not 
grounded on a general theory of international constitutionalism. It established that 
the seminal idea of the tripartite structure of constitutionalism proposed by 
Tsagourias presupposes the idea of international constitutionalism.
28
 Chapter 2 
analysed the theoretical conception of constitutionalism from the perspective of the 
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individualistic conception of international law while Chapter 3 examined the 
structured process underlying existent conceptions of constitutionalisation through 
the idea of the constitutional matrix of international law. The analysis showed that on 
one hand, existent contributions on constitutionalisation do not comport with the 
normative requirement of the analytical matrix proposed by Dunoff and Trachtman.
29
 
On the other hand, it established that the model of constitutionalisation stemming 
from the teleological matrix acknowledges the process of constitutionalisation as the 
second component of the tripartite structure of the constitutional approach to 
international law.
30
 Section 6.2.1 above showed that constitutive and interpretive 
conceptions of constitutionalism affect the phenomenon of fragmentation in different 
ways. This section analyses a further implication arising from recourse to 
constitutionalisation practices as a means to overcome the phenomenon of 
fragmentation of international law. Its purpose is to evaluate how procedural and 
non-procedural conceptions of constitutionalisation affect fragmentation.  
 
Sen writes that techniques of interpretations of social phenomena can be grouped in 
two categories. First, techniques that take into account both the process leading to a 
choice and its expected outcome determine ‘comprehensive outcomes.’31 Second, 
techniques focusing on the simple outcome of a given choice “in a way that is 
detached from processes, agencies and relations” determine ‘culmination 
outcomes.’32 The comprehensive outcome and the culmination outcome construct are 
helpful to the original purpose of this dissertation. Sen writes that the adoption of the 
comprehensive outcome construct implies a consequential evaluation of the process 
at stake.
33
 Applied to conceptions of international constitutionalism, Sen’s argument 
shows that constitutive, non-procedural conceptions of constitutionalism produce 
culmination outcomes whereas interpretive, procedural conceptions of 
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constitutionalism produce comprehensive outcomes. The consequential analysis of 
models of constitutionalisation of international law is helpful to single out the 
specific contribution of the theory of international constitutionalism to the task of 
overcoming the phenomenon of fragmentation. 
 
Section 6.2.1 showed that constitutive conceptions of international constitutionalism 
do not feature any alternative methodology to the findings of the ILC Report on 
Fragmentation (2006) whereas interpretive conceptions create an alternative 
approach to the phenomenon of fragmentation. The considerations above also show 
that the former are non-procedural conceptions of international constitutionalism 
while the latter are procedural ones. This suggests that the presence or absence of the 
procedural element of constitutionalisation confer the consequentialist or non-
consequentialist quality on conceptions of constitutionalism. It follows that the 
functional approach to international law embedded in the analytical matrix produces 
outcome-indifferent analyses of constitutionalisation practices.  
 
From this perspective, constitutional outcomes turn out to be ‘culmination 
outcomes.’ For example, the analysis of the process of constitutionalisation of 
selected regimes of international law shows that by establishing a hierarchy of 
international rules, the constitutionalisation of WTO law and UN law address 
concerns of internal coherence of their respective legal orders. Likewise, existent 
contributions on the constitutionalisation of EU law suggest that the EU legal order is 
regarded as an autonomous regime of international law.  
 
Conversely, the holistic approach to international law embedded in the teleological 
matrix produces goal-oriented outcomes. The latter also represent comprehensive 
outcomes. For example, the analysis of the constitutionalisation of EU law shows 
that the EU is an international organization committed to securing the stability of EU 
internal market while protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms of EU 
citizens.
34
 The findings of the analysis establish that the EU legal order is a 
specialized regime of international law whose features comport with the tenets of the 
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teleological matrix. Consequently, EU law produces comprehensive outcomes while 
preserving the teleology of international law. 
 
With regard to the constitutionalisation processes of the Union of South American 
Nations (USAN) and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (BAA), Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 showed that the functional approach does not represent a means through 
which redress the phenomenon of fragmentation of international law. On the 
contrary, the holistic approach endorsed by teleological conception of 
constitutionalism is able to address concerns of external and internal coherence of 
both USAN law and BAA law. This suggests that the idea of constitutionalisation 
serves different functions stemming from different positional perspectives.  
 
As noted above, conceptions of constitutionalism grounded on the formal conception 
of international law turn out to be constitutive conceptions producing ‘culmination 
outcomes.’ This shows that the model of legal reasoning underlying the functional 
approach to international law does not presuppose any teleology of international law. 
The recognition of several hierarchies of international law confirms this assumption. 
It also demonstrates that constitutive conceptions of constitutionalism cannot be 
regarded as alternative instruments to the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) as 
long as they share the same non-teleological conception of international law. From 
this perspective, conceptions of international constitutionalism do not possess any 
distinctive feature on its own.  
 
With regard to conceptions of international constitutionalism that are grounded on 
the individualistic conception of international law, the analysis above shows that they 
are interpretive conceptions that produce ‘comprehensive outcomes.’ They are 
conceived as procedural instruments through which preserve the teleology of 
international law. By implication, they provide an original approach through which 
restore coherence in international law. From this perspective, conceptions of 
constitutionalism possess a distinctive character that addresses, but is not limited to, 
concerns of fragmentation.  
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This section examined practical implications of adopting conceptions of international 
constitutionalism as a remedy to the idea of fragmentation of international law. It 
established that conceptions of constitutionalism can be divided into procedural and 
non-procedural ones. It concluded that only procedural conceptions have conceptual 
autonomy. They possess a structured methodology endowed with original 
characteristics that distinguish it from existent models of legal reasoning. 
 
  
6.3 Contested concepts of international constitutionalism characterised 
Chapter 1 showed that international law is a contested concept. It established that, as 
an interpretive device of international law, international constitutionalism is a 
contested concept of international law.
35
 Section 6.2 showed that the choice of 
positional perspectives affects the outcome of the process of interpretation of positive 
international law. Previous chapters flagged the presence of concepts of international 
constitutionalism whose legal significance is contested. To assess those concepts in 
light of concerns of fragmentation and constitutionalism, they established specific 
positional perspectives through which evaluate theoretical and practical implications 
of each such contested concept. This section examines the concept of ‘contested 
concepts.’ Its purpose is to establish whether fragmentation is a contested concept of 
international constitutionalism and how it affects the theory of global 
constitutionalism. 
 
Gallie writes that “there are concepts which are essentially contested, concepts the 
proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper use on 
the part of their users.”36 Although formulated as a philosophical argument, Gallie’s 
definition of essentially contested concepts has been extended to other fields, such as 
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political science
37
 and law.
38
 With regard to law, Besson draws a distinction between 
essentially contested concepts and essentially contestable concepts. The former 
category corresponds to Gallie’s definition of essentially contested concepts. It 
implies disagreement “as to the kind of the use that is approapriate to the concept in 
question.”39 The latter category implies disagreement over both the use and the 
content of the concept in question.
40
 Besson writes that: 
 
“In short, an essentially contestable concept is a concept that not only clearly embodies 
and names a normative standard or value, the detailed content of which determines the 
correct application of the concept, but that it is also disputable by different users. It is 
therefore a concept whose ‘correct use is for its correct use to be contestable.’”41 
 
Likewise, Freeden writes that the essential contestability of concepts consists of two 
propositions. First, there is no correct evaluation of the concepts that anyone can 
agree upon. Second, each concept “contains more potential components than can be 
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included in any actual definition or deployment of that concept.”42 Consequently, one 
concept contains manifold conceptions.
43
 
 
Previous chapters flagged the presence of concepts whose legal significance is 
debated. Chapter 1 showed that the ontology of international law is a contested 
concept.
44
 It established that for the purpose of this dissertation, the standpoint from 
which to interpret positive international law consists of conceptions of international 
legal personality.
45
 Chapter 2 showed that the concept of human dignity and the 
concept of human rights are not universally accepted. It established that human 
dignity is both the precondition and the outcome of human rights while human rights 
are both legal rights and moral rights. Subsequent chapters analysed the idea of 
constitutionalisation of international law in light of conceptions of constitutionalism, 
constitutionalisation and constitution. It established that conceptions of international 
constitutionalism presuppose underlying conceptions of international law. For the 
purpose of this dissertation, the contested concepts of international constitutionalism 
referred to above are assessed against the backdrop of the categories of essentially 
contestable concepts proposed by Besson.
46
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Besson writes that essentially contestable concepts share three common features. The 
first feature establishes that in order to claim essential contestability, the concept in 
question must be a normative concept.
47
 The analysis carried out in previous chapters 
shows that the six contested concepts of international constitutionalism referred to 
above are all normative concepts. Chapter 1 established that conceptions of 
international law acknowledge that the international legal system is regarded as both 
a social system and a legal system. Chapter 2 showed that conceptions of human 
dignity recognise a normative core of human dignity while conceptions of human 
rights recognise human rights as legal rights. With regard to conceptions of 
constitutionalism, constitutionalisation and constitution, they are regarded as legal 
techniques of interpretation of international law. With regard to the idea of 
fragmentation, Chapter 1 showed that it is not a normative concept. Regarded as a 
phenomenon stemming from the phenomenon of globalisation of international 
society,
48
 it does not fulfil the first criteria of essential contestability. 
 
The second feature establishes that the debates over the criteria of correct application 
of a concept are inconclusive.
49
 Section 6.2 showed that the choice of different 
positional perspectives affects subsequent outcomes of interpretation of positive 
international law. With regard to international law, Chapter 1 established that 
conceptions of international legal personality confer different qualities on the 
ontology of modern international law. However, as a matter of principle no 
conception of international law represents the correct one.
50
  
 
With regard to human dignity and human rights, Chapter 2 showed that international 
legal scholarship relies upon them either as the same concept or as different ones. 
However, no conception of human dignity and human rights is the correct one in 
absolute terms.  
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With regard to conceptions of constitutionalism, constitutionalisation and 
constitution, Chapter 1 showed that scholars of international constitutionalism 
conceive them either as synonyms or as different, although related, concepts. The 
analysis of constitutionalisation processes and practices carried out in Chapters 3, 4 
and 5 established that none of the existent conceptions of international 
constitutionalism can be regarded as the correct one.  
 
With regard to the idea of fragmentation, Chapter 1 established that it seems to 
convey a unique message characterising the status of modern international law. 
Therefore, it is not suitable for a plurality of interpretations. As it is not a normative 
concept, it represents one of the possible outcomes of interpretations of positive 
international law from a given positional perspective. This suggests that 
fragmentation is a term describing the practical difficulties of reaching coherent 
interpretations of the whole spectrum of rules of international law. This shows that 
fragmentation does not fulfil the second criteria of essential contestability.  
 
The third feature establishes that there are always good reasons for someone to 
dispute the propriety of any use of an essentially contestable concept.
51
 In relation to 
international law, section 6.2.1 showed that conceptions of international legal 
personality presuppose different positional perspectives. This suggests that it is 
possible to feature as many conceptions of international law as the number of 
positional perspectives one may choose. The analysis of the basic propositions of the 
conceptions of modern international law confirms this assumption.
52
  
 
With regard to the concept of human dignity and human rights, Chapter 2 showed 
that the choice of positional perspectives addressing concerns about the nature of 
human dignity and human rights determines that each conception of human dignity 
and human rights confers a series of rights and duties on international actors. For 
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instance, the extent to which universal human rights instruments
53
 are recognised as 
legally binding instruments determines different levels of responsibility. 
Responsibility entails the recognition of basic rights and corresponding duties of 
several international actors,
54
 including the natural person.
55
  
 
With regard to constitutionalism, constitutionalisation and the international 
constitution, section 6.2.1 above showed that the functional approach to international 
law fostered by constitutive conceptions of constitutionalism establishes a 
presumption in favour of the supremacy of the norms of positive international law 
over the status of international legal personality. It also showed that the holistic 
approach to international law fostered by interpretive conceptions of international 
constitutionalism establishes a presumption in favour of the supremacy of the status 
of international legal personality over positive international law.  
 
With regard to fragmentation, the considerations above on the second feature of 
essentially contestable concepts show that there is no debate or speculation on the 
meaning of fragmentation or the proprieties of its uses. This suggests that since 
fragmentation is not a normative concept, to dispute the property of any of its uses is 
not relevant in context of analysis of the use of essentially contestable concepts. 
Hence, the idea of fragmentation does not fulfil the third criteria of essential 
contestability. 
 
The considerations above show that the idea of fragmentation does not comply with 
the common features of essentially contested concepts. Section 6.2.2 also showed 
that constitutive conceptions of international constitutionalism do not possess 
conceptual autonomy while interpretive ones provide an original approach that 
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addresses, but is not limited to, concerns of fragmentation. This suggests that 
fragmentation does not represent a constitutive element of conceptions of 
international constitutionalism. 
 
This section examined the idea of essentially contested concepts. It showed that the 
phenomenon of fragmentation of international law does not belong to the category of 
essentially contestable concepts. It established that fragmentation does not comply 
with the normative components of the category of essentially contested concepts. It 
concluded that fragmentation is not a constitutive element of the theory of 
international constitutionalism. 
 
   
6.4 Fragmentation as an objective illusion 
Section 6.3 examined essentially contested concepts of international 
constitutionalism. It showed that fragmentation is no one such concept. This section 
evaluates the relationship between the idea of fragmentation and the teleology of 
conceptions of international constitutionalism. It aims to establish whether 
fragmentation is a universally recognised characteristic of modern international law.  
 
Chapter 1 showed that interpretations of positive international law from the 
perspective of the formal conception of international law acknowledge the 
phenomenon of fragmentation.
56
 It also showed that interpretations of international 
law from the perspective of the personal conception and the actor conception do not 
focus on the phenomenon of fragmentation of positive international law.
57
 Since 
conceptions of international constitutionalism embody the tenets of conceptions of 
international law,
58
 they address the issue of fragmentation from the perspective of 
the basic propositions of conceptions of international law. It follows that constitutive, 
non-procedural conceptions of constitutionalism recognise the phenomenon of 
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fragmentation as a characteristic of modern international law. On the contrary, 
interpretive, procedural conceptions of constitutionalism address the phenomenon of 
fragmentation indirectly. The considerations above suggest that the relevance of the 
phenomenon of fragmentation arises from a rule-based, positivistic interpretation of 
the international legal system.  
 
Sen writes that interpretations of the same issue from the same positional perspective 
by different subjects determine an objective interpretation.
59
 By implication, 
interpretations of the same issue from different positional perspectives should not 
produce the same outcome. Sen argues that: 
 
“An objective illusion… is a positional objective belief that is, in fact, mistaken in terms 
of transpositional scrutiny.”60 
 
To evaluate whether fragmentation of international law is a universal characteristic 
of modern international law or an objective illusion, the idea of fragmentation is 
analysed in light of the transpositional scrutiny of the teleology of conceptions of 
international constitutionalism. In addition, section 6.2.1 established that the 
functional approach to international law fostered by constitutive conceptions of 
constitutionalism recognises that positive international law prevails over 
international legal personality whereas the holistic approach fostered by interpretive 
conceptions of constitutionalism establishes a presumption in favour of the concept 
of international legal personality of the individual over norms of positive 
international law. This suggests that to assess whether fragmentation is a universal 
characteristic of modern international law, implications of fragmentation on the 
theory of international constitutionalism should be scrutinised from the perspective 
of international legal personality as well.  
 
Conceptions of international constitutionalism presuppose the ontology and teleology 
of conceptions of international law. Chapter 1 showed that the formal and the 
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individualistic conception of international law presuppose a different ontology of the 
international legal system.
61
 The basic propositions of the formal conception of 
international law recognise that international law is a system of rules created by 
states. Grounded on Kelsen’s general theory of law,62 the formal conception 
establishes that the ultimate source of international law is customary international 
law. From this perspective, international law does not possess any specific teleology.  
 
However, the above-mentioned features of the structural arrangements of the 
international legal system suggest that the nature of international law is to foster 
national interests through a sovranational system of positive law. This shows that the 
formal conception acknowledge a state-centered and rule-based international legal 
system. It does not entail any specific teleological commitment. Chapter 1 also 
showed that the basic propositions of the individualistic conception of international 
law recognise that the natural person is the beneficiary of all law, including 
international law.
63
 From this perspective, states are conceived as entities created by 
individuals for individuals. This shows that the teleology of international law 
consists in preserving the status of the individual as the beneficiary of all law. 
 
Conceptions of international constitutionalism foster the same teleological 
perspective of underlying conceptions of international law. Section 6.2 established 
that on one hand, constitutive conceptions of international constitutionalism foster a 
functional approach to international law.
64
 It showed that they are non-procedural 
instruments that entail non-consequential interpretations of positive international 
law.
65
 It concluded that they determine outcome-indifferent interpretations of 
international law.
66
 On the other hand, interpretive conceptions of international 
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constitutionalism foster a holistic approach to international law.
67
 They entail a 
procedural and consequential evaluation of positive international law that determines 
goal-oriented outcomes.
68
 In addition, section 6.3 concluded that, from the 
perspective of positive international law, fragmentation is not a normative concept 
and it does not represent a constitutive element of either constitutive or interpretive 
conceptions of international constitutionalism.  
 
The considerations above examined the relationship between the teleology of 
conceptions of international constitutionalism and fragmentation from the 
perspective of positive international law. To complete the analysis of the idea of 
fragmentation in light of the transpositional scrutiny of the teleology of conceptions 
of international constitutionalism, the relationship between fragmentation and the 
teleology of conceptions of international constitutionalism should be analysed in 
light of concerns of international legal personality.  
 
Section 6.2.1 showed that constitutive conceptions of international constitutionalism 
recognise the supremacy of hierarchies of positive international law over the status of 
international legal personality. It also showed that interpretive conceptions recognise 
the supremacy of the international legal personality of the individual over positive 
international law. It follows that the teleology of interpretive conceptions entails a 
teleological approach to constitutionalism that creates a prioritisation of 
commitments in favour of the individual that amounts to a hierarchy of international 
actors instead of international rules. Viewed from this angle, the phenomenon of 
fragmentation of international law is not relevant to achieve the ultimate purpose of 
international law. On the contrary, constitutive conceptions recognise fragmentation 
as a characteristic of modern international law. However, lack of any teleological 
perspective determines that constitutive conceptions address concerns of internal 
coherence of the legal system of autonomous regimes of international law.  
 
                                                     
67
 See supra section 6.2.1.  
68
 See supra section 6.2.2. 
245 
 
The considerations above show that since constitutive conceptions recognise a state-
centered international legal system, the idea of fragmentation arises from clashes 
between protected national interests. From this standpoint, the phenomenon of 
fragmentation does not represent a constitutive element of conceptions of 
international law. Consequently, it does not represent a constitutive element of 
conceptions of international constitutionalism. This demonstrates that the 
transpositional scrutiny of the relationship between fragmentation and teleology of 
international constitutionalism from different positional perspectives determines the 
same outcome. This further demonstrates that the idea of fragmentation of 
international law is a positional objective belief that is mistaken in terms of 
transpositional scrutiny.
69
 As an objective illusion, it cannot be regarded as a 
universally recognised characteristic of modern international law.  
 
This section examined the relationship between the idea of fragmentation and the 
teleology of conceptions of international constitutionalism. It showed that 
fragmentation does not represent a constitutive element of conceptions of 
international constitutionalism. It establishes that evaluation of the idea of 
fragmentation from the functional and the holistic approach to international law 
fostered by conceptions of international constitutionalism leads to the same outcome. 
It concluded that fragmentation is not a universally recognised characteristic of 
modern international law.        
 
 
6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter examined the relationship between the idea of fragmentation of 
international law and the theory of international constitutionalism. It showed that 
conceptions of international constitutionalism that entail a functional approach to 
international law do not offer an alternative remedy to the findings of the ILC Report 
on Fragmentation (2006). It also showed that conceptions of international 
constitutionalism that entail a holistic approach to international law only indirectly 
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address the phenomenon of fragmentation. It established that procedural conceptions 
of international constitutionalism possess a structured methodology endowed with 
original characteristics that distinguish it from existent models of legal reasoning 
while non-procedural conceptions do not have conceptual autonomy. It concluded 
that since fragmentation does not represent a constitutive element of conceptions of 
international constitutionalism, it does not represent a universally recognised 
characteristic of modern international law.     
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Submissions 
 
 
This dissertation demonstrated that the idea of fragmentation of positive international 
law is not a universally recognised characteristic of modern international law. It also 
demonstrated that constitutionalisation does not represent a remedy to the 
phenomenon of fragmentation. 
 
 
Challenges 
The analysis of the relationship between fragmentation and constitutionalisation of 
international law required examination of contestable concepts. Selected 
interpretations represent the positional perspective for assessing conceptions of 
international constitutionalism and related process of constitutionalisation. 
 
Chapter 1 examined methodological approaches to fragmentation. It showed that 
both the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006) and current contributions on 
constitutionalisation of international law presuppose a formalistic, state-centered 
conception of international law. In order to evaluate whether they are alternative 
remedies to the phenomenon of fragmentation, this chapter analysed the ontology of 
international law and conceptions of international constitutionalism. On one hand, it 
established that international law is a contested concept. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, it selected conceptions of international legal personality as the positional 
perspective whereby evaluate the ontology of international law. It showed that there 
are three main conceptions of modern international law. The formal and the 
individualistic conception are regarded as the majoritarian ones while the actor 
conception is regarded as minoritarian. On the other hand, this chapter established 
that existent conceptions of international constitutionalism do not provide any 
definition of constitutionalism, constitutionalisation or international constitution. For 
the purpose of this dissertation, it selected the tripartite structure of constitutionalism 
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proposed by Tsagourias
1
 as the positional perspective for assessing 
constitutionalisation processes and practices. 
 
Chapter 2 evaluated the normative components of the teleological conception of 
constitutionalism. It analysed the concept of human dignity and human rights. It 
showed that although a contested concept, human dignity possesses a normative core. 
It also showed that human rights are both legal rights and moral claims. It established 
that human dignity is both the precondition and the outcome of human rights. 
Chapter 2 also analysed the process of legalisation of legal rights through the 
principle of rule of law. It showed that the latter possesses own characteristics in 
relation to international law. It concluded that from the perspective of the teleological 
conception of constitutionalism, the process of operationalization of the rule of law 
recognises individuals as decision-makers and it possesses an inductive character. 
 
Chapter 3 applied the tenets of conceptions of international constitutionalism to the 
process of constitutionalisation of international law. It evaluated the concept of the 
constitutional matrix of international law. It showed that the analytical matrix 
grounded on formal conceptions of international constitutionalism entails a 
functional approach to international law while the teleological matrix grounded on 
the teleological conception of international constitutionalism entails a holistic 
approach to international law. The analysis showed that existent constitutionalisation 
practices resort to functional interpretations of international law. It also showed that 
evaluations of the same constitutionalisation processes through the teleological 
matrix leads to different outcomes. On one hand, the international legal system as a 
whole and UN law are not suitable for constitutional scrutiny. On the other hand, the 
process of constitutionalisation of WTO law and EU law produces different 
constitutional outcomes. 
 
                                                     
1
 N. Tsagourias, ‘Introduction – Constitutionalism: A Theoretical Roadmap’ in N. Tsagourias (ed.), 
Transnational Constitutionalism. International and European Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, p. 1. 
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Chapter 4 examined the process of constitutionalisation of the Union of South 
American Nations (USAN, also known by its Spanish acronym UNASUR).
2
 It 
assessed the extent to which recourse to constitutionalisation is helpful to restore 
unity within international law in context of an international organization with no 
centralised law-making and judicial mechanisms. It showed that USAN law does not 
serve any of the constitutional functions of the analytical matrix. Therefore, 
functional interpretations of USAN law turn out to be not helpful to redress the 
phenomenon of fragmentation. It also showed that USAN law complies with the 
normative components of the teleological matrix. It established that given the non-
binding nature of USAN law on member states, constitutional outcomes do not 
automatically comport with the teleological conception of USAN law. Consequently, 
fragmentation concerns should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  
 
Chapter 5 examined the process of constitutionalisation of the Bolivarian Alliance 
for the Americas (BAA, also known by its Spanish acronym ALBA).
3
 It assessed the 
extent to which recourse to constitutionalisation is helpful to restore unity within 
international law in context of a soft law organization. The analysis showed that 
although BAA law serves the constitutional functions of the analytical matrix and it 
comports with the mandatory requirements of the teleological matrix, the process of 
constitutionalisation of BAA law cannot be regarded as a means for redressing the 
phenomenon of fragmentation of positive international law. 
 
Chapter 6 conceptualised the relationship between fragmentation and 
constitutionalisation of international law. It analysed theoretical and practical 
implications of conceiving international constitutionalism as a remedy to the 
phenomenon of fragmentation. It showed that conceptions of constitutionalism 
grounded on the formal conception of international law are constitutive conceptions. 
They entail a functional approach to international law that determines hierarchies of 
international rules. Although they imply that fragmentation is a characteristic of 
                                                     
2
 Spanish: Uniòn de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR). 
3
 Spanish: Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America (ALBA). 
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modern international law, they lead to outcome-indifferent outcomes. From this 
standpoint, constitutionalism does not possess any conceptual autonomy and 
constitutionalisation practices do not represent an alternative remedy to the ILC 
Report on Fragmentation (2006).  
 
This chapter also showed that conceptions of constitutionalism grounded on the 
individualistic conception of international law are interpretive conceptions. They 
entail a holistic approach to international law that presupposes the supremacy of the 
concept of international legal personality over positive international law. They do not 
recognise fragmentation is a characteristic of modern international law. As 
procedural conceptions of constitutionalism, they lead to goal-oriented outcomes. 
From this standpoint, constitutionalism possesses a distinctive character that is able 
to address, although it is not limited to, concerns of fragmentation. By virtue of its 
conceptual autonomy, it turns out to be an interpretive device that is alternative to the 
methodology set forth in the ILC Report on Fragmentation (2006). For the reasons 
above, Chapter 6 concluded that fragmentation is neither a contested concept nor a 
universally recognised characteristic of modern international law. 
 
  
Recommendations 
This dissertation examined the relationship between fragmentation and 
constitutionalisation of international law. It showed that international scholarship on 
constitutionalisation relies upon constitutive, non-procedural conceptions of 
international constitutionalism. It demonstrated that they do not represent a remedy 
to the perceived phenomenon of fragmentation of positive international law. If 
proponents of constitutionalism aimed to balance the scope of the law of specialised 
regimes with general international law, three criteria had to be met.  
 
First, to overcome current interpretations of the formal conception of international 
law as a state-centered conception of international law, the opposition between 
subjects and objects of international law should be replaced with the concept of 
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participants in international law.
4
 This would determine a broader understanding of 
international law where both state and non-state actors, including the natural person, 
partake in the same legal system on an equal footing.
5
 According to dominant 
interpretations “only state objectives count.”6 However, since the formal conception 
of international law attaches no consequences to the status of international legal 
person, there is no inherent reason why non-state entities, such as international 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations and the 
individual, should not be able invoke nor should they be beneficiaries of international 
law.
7
 Higgins writes that the problem underlying the dominant understanding of 
international legal personality is that: 
 
“We have erected an intellectual prison of our own choosing and then declared it to be 
an unalterable constraint.”8 
 
Evidence shows that the inclusive approach to international law is supported by 
international theory and practice.
9
 Acceptance of its tenets entails that states play a 
primary, albeit not exclusive, role in modern international law. It also recognises that 
other state and non-state actors have their own objectives constituting legitimate 
concerns of international law.
10
 Therefore, they participate in the international legal 
system independently of state consent.
11
 For the reasons above, fragmentation 
                                                     
4
 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994, p. 49; R. McCorquodale, ‘The Individual and the International Legal System’ 
in M. D. Evans, International Law, second edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 
308-309.   
5
 R. McCorquodale, ‘An Inclusive International Legal System’ 17 (2004) LJIL 477, at 481-85. 
6
 M. Koskenniemi, ‘What is International Law For?’ in M. D. Evans, supra note 4, p. 61. 
7
 R. Higgins, supra note 4, pp. 50-55. 
8
 Ibid., p. 49. 
9
 R. McCorquodale, supra note 5. 
10
 Ibid., at 485. See also T. M. Franck, The Empowered Self: Law and Society in the Age of 
Individualism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 (discussing the autonomy of the individual in 
international law). 
11
 R. McCorquodale, supra note 5, at 485. 
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charges of international law should address concerns of both state and non-state 
actors. 
 
Second, conceptualisation of the sources of international law should not be restricted 
to state actions.
12
 A restrictive interpretation of Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) contradicts the foundations of the inclusive 
approach to international law detailed above. Some argue that Article 38 does not 
mention the term “sources” of international law.13 Its purpose is to list the sources of 
international law that are available to the ICJ to settle disputes brought before it by 
states. This shows that the misconception of the limited sources of international law 
is traceable to the combination of state-centered understandings of international law 
and restrictive interpretations of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. McCorquodale argues 
that: 
 
“In an international legal system where non-state actors are participants, the practice of 
these actors, their role in the creation, development and enforcement of law, and their 
actions within their national communities (which can become part of ‘state practice’), 
can, and should, form a part of customary international law and general principles of 
law.”14 
 
This shows that international law-making is not restricted to state action. In addition, 
international practice shows that non-state actors, including the natural person, have 
independent international rights and responsibilities.
15
 Therefore, they contribute to 
the creation, development and enforcement of modern international law. For the 
reasons above, the idea of fragmentation should be inclusive of a broader conception 
of the sources of international law that is not limited to primary international law.  
 
                                                     
12
 R. Higgins, supra note 4, p. 18. 
13
 R. McCorquodale, supra note 5, at 498. 
14
 Ibid.  
15
 Ibid., at 492-504. See also, among many, P. Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights, 
Oxford: Oxford Universty Press, 2005.  
253 
 
Third, proponents of international constitutionalism should specify the autonomy of 
the concept. Analogical conceptions of international constitutionalism foster the 
state-centered conception of international law, thus failing to recognise the 
participatory nature of international law.
16
 Likewise, current conceptions of 
international constitutionalism that entail a functional approach to international law 
foster the dominant, state-centered conception of international law. To be consistent 
with the inclusive approach to international law, conceptions of international 
constitutionalism should take into consideration the full implications of the concept 
of international legal personality as well as the broader spectrum of sources of 
international law. For the reasons above, conceptions of constitutionalism aiming at 
redressing the phenomenon of fragmentation of positive international law should be 
conceived as instruments with own characteristics. 
                                                     
16
 Werner, for example, writes that “[international constitutionalism] aims to bring about what it 
describes: the existence of a hierarchically structured international legal order that unifies the 
international community and regulates the exercise of political power.” W. Werner, ‘The Never-
Ending Closure: Constitutionalism and International Law’ in N. Tsagourias (ed.), supra note 1, p. 366. 
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